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Summary 
Neurocognitive and functional outcome deficits have long been acknowledged in 
schizophrenia and are considered a core feature of the disorder. Neurocognition has 
been found to account for functional disability to a greater extent than psychopathology 
however much of the variance in functional outcome still remains unexplained. How 
functional outcome is measured also requires clarification. By investigating the 
relationship between neurocognition and functional outcome in First-Episode Psychosis 
(FEP), much can be learnt about the trajectory of disability and the course of illness in 
schizophrenia. 
Metacognition, or thinking about thinking, has been proposed as a mediating variable 
between neurocognition and functional outcome. Despite different theoretical 
backgrounds, authors generally converge on there being higher-order, explicit, 
conscious metacognitive knowledge and lower-order, implicit metacognitive processes. 
How these relate to each other requires clarification. The prefrontal cortex (PFC) has 
been implicated in higher-order thought and metacognitive processing, and deficits 
have been observed in PFC Grey Matter (GM) volume in schizophrenia. These 
metacognitive deficits may contribute to the relationship between cognitive ability and 
community functioning. 
A preliminary meta-analysis demonstrated that a moderate effect size is found between 
neurocognition and metacognition and a moderate effect size exists between 
metacognition and functional outcome. The present thesis investigated whether 
metacognition mediates the relationship between neurocognition and functional 
outcome in FEP (N=80). Path models were created to investigate the different 
relationships between neurocognition, metacognition and both capacity to perform 
everyday tasks and objective functioning in the community. A secondary Voxel-based 
Morphometry (VBM) analysis was also conducted investigating perceptual 
metacognitive accuracy and its relationship to GM volume in both FEP (N=41) and a 
matched healthy control sample (N=21).  
Current findings support the model that metacognition and negative symptoms mediate 
the relationship between neurocognition and functional capacity in FEP. Path models 
also demonstrated a significant mediation effect of metacognition between 
neorocognition and objective function, and functional capacity and objective function. 
Significant group differences were found between FEP and controls in perceptual 
metacognitive accuracy however no significant relationship was found between 
metacognition and GM volume in the PFC.  
The present thesis suggests that metacognitive deficits are present at first episode and 
may account for the relationship between cognitive ability and functioning in the 
community. Findings also suggest that cognitive remediation programmes may wish to 
focus on metacognition to maximise the transfer of cognitive skills to community 
functioning. The findings also suggest the presence of two metacognitive processing 
routes; explicit, declarable, higher-order knowledge and implicit, intuition-based, lower-
order experience which can be accounted for by Nelson and Narens (1990) 
metacognitive model. 
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Chapter 1: General introduction 
1.1 Schizophrenia and psychosis 
Schizophrenia is thought to affect between 0.5% and 1% of the population and is viewed 
as a severe and chronic mental illness (Nuechterlein et al., 2012) estimated to cost the 
National Health Service £11.8 billion a year (Schizophrenia Commission, 2012). The 
most recent DSM V diagnostic criteria for schizophrenia requires two (or more) 
symptoms of delusions, hallucinations, disorganised speech, grossly disorganised or 
catatonic behaviour, or negative symptoms (affective flattening, alogia or avolition). At 
least one symptom must be present from the first three symptoms (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2013). The diagnostic criteria also emphasises that the symptoms must 
persist for at least 6 months unless otherwise treated, and have a significant impact on 
social or occupational functioning (Tandon et al., 2013). Research into functioning and 
recovery is therefore of utmost importance for treatment. 
The aforementioned symptoms relate to an episode of psychosis which is central to a 
schizophrenia spectrum disorder diagnosis. This can occur in the absence of a formal 
diagnosis of schizophrenia and is comprised of a profile of percept-like experiences, 
which are not in the control of the individual, and have the same force or impact as the 
corresponding actual experience (Slade & Bentall, 1988). 
The exact aetiology of schizophrenia is unclear; neurodevelopmental models suggest 
that genetics and early environment predisposes an individual toward psychosis (Aas et 
al., 2014) with social factors relegated to mere triggers in the process. Critics of this 
model suggest that genetic models fail to demonstrate the presence of a unitary disease 
process (Ruggeri & Tansella, 2009). Other authors adopt a psychosocial model of 
psychosis and posit that factors such as childhood trauma and hypothalamus-pituitary-
adrenal axis (HPA) function can give rise to psychotic experiences (Read, Bentall, & 
Fosse, 2009). This matter is further complicated by the seeming heterogeneity in 
presentation between those given a diagnosis making causal models difficult to defend 
(Cochrane, Petch, & Pickering, 2010). Biological accounts for psychosis also fail to 
consider social factors, the timing of typical symptoms development, and subclinical 
psychotic experiences (Broome et al., 2005). Garety, in an influential model, suggests 
that biological vulnerability, cognitive, social and emotional factors are pertinent to the 
development of psychosis and the relationship between cognition and biology is a 
bidirectional one (Garety, Bebbington, Fowler, Freeman, & Kuipers, 2007). Regardless 
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of trajectory and cause of psychosis symptoms, modern research acknowledges the 
cause and cost of cognitive deficits in psychosis. 
1.2 Schizophrenia and neurocognitive function 
Kraeplin (1919) in his early dementia praecox work, observed the presence of cognitive 
deficits in serious mental illness and to this day they are considered a core feature of 
schizophrenia (Reichenberg & Harvey, 2007). Neurocognition is a constellation of 
cognitive processes such as speed of processing, attention, verbal and working memory, 
and executive function (Schmidt, Mueller, & Roder, 2011). Early influential studies 
estimated that 90% of patients demonstrate a clinically meaningful deficit in one cognitive 
domain and 75% in two or more (Palmer, Heaton, Paulsen, Kuck, Braff et al., 1997). 
More recent studies consider these estimates to be conservative (Green, Kern, & Heaton, 
2004). 
Early work on cognitive disturbances focused upon the attentional disturbances 
characterised in schizophrenia measured in reaction time experiments. Keeping with the 
zeitgeist of 1970s experimental psychology, those with a diagnosis of schizophrenia 
were found to be unable to integrate a series of tasks over time (Zahn, Rosenthal & 
Shakow, 1963) demonstrating two marked deficits; problems with control of attention and 
goal maintenance (Carter, Barch, Buchanan, Bullmore, Krystal et al., 2008). Bellissimo 
and Steffy (1972) also provide corollary evidence with their redundancy-association 
deficit work demonstrating deterioration in attention when cognitive demand increased. 
Finally, another discovery of the era which would shape later schizophrenia illness 
trajectory considerations, was that these pervasive impairments to attentional focus were 
stable across chronic and acute phases (Nuechterlein & Dawson, 1984). 
Research has demonstrated that those with a diagnosis of schizophrenia show 
impairment on selective attention tasks; Kerns (2007) showed a schizophrenia sample 
to perform poorly on a Stroop Attention Interference Test with deteriorated performance 
compared to healthy controls in both accuracy and reaction times. In a meta-analysis, 
Kerns and Berenbaum (2002) also reveal a strong correlation between impaired 
executive functioning and thought disorder linking cognition to psychopathology. This 
executive function impairment has been interpreted as those with a schizophrenia 
diagnosis having cognitive disruptions that prevent the inhibition of competing responses 
and difficulties integrating contextual information into cognitive processes (Elvevaag, 
Duncan & McKenna, 2000). However, inferences on executive functioning must be made 
with caution as not all replications have found specific deficits in schizophrenia samples 
beyond a general ‘slowing’ effect (Gold, Rondolph & Coppola, 1992). In a Continuous 
3 
 
Performance Task, a cognitive test of vigilance, Servan-Schreiber, Cohen and Steingard 
(1998) found that, when the delay between cue and stimulus was increased, the 
schizophrenia sample responses were disproportionately inaccurate. The authors 
suggest this is indicative of disruption to alternative cognitive pathways to the 
aforementioned Stroop response neural structures. Poor performance on a CPT task 
has also been identified as a vulnerability marker for schizophrenia (Nuechterlein, 
Bauchsbaum & Dawson, 1994). However Elvevaag et al., (2000) were unable to replicate 
these findings instead reporting that response discrepancies occurred at shorter delay 
intervals. Goldberg and Green (2002) interpret these findings to be symptomatic of 
erroneous rapid encoding and acting upon stimuli processing or bias perceptual 
conceptualisation of target stimuli in the executive system. The aforementioned studies 
demonstrate a deficit in attention and information processing in those with a diagnosis of 
schizophrenia. 
Executive function deficits in schizophrenia have also been investigated and notable 
impairments have been well described in literature. Experimental paradigms involving a 
Wisconsin Card Sorting Test which indexes demands on set shifting, cognitive 
abstraction and integrating feedback, find those with a diagnosis of schizophrenia to 
perform more poorly than controls (Heinrichs & Zakzanis, 1998; Lee & Park, 2005) and 
display performance levels comparable to frontal lobe lesion patients (Pantelis, Barber, 
Barnes, Nelson, Owen et al., 1999). Furthermore, Weickert, Goldberg, Gold, Bigelow, 
Egan et al., (2000) found these impairments to be present in chronic schizophrenia 
regardless of compromised premorbid intellectual function, preserved intellectual 
function and normal premorbid function that declined after onset. This indicates that 
executive function deficits comprise a core deficit in schizophrenia and are not accounted 
for by general IQ. Leeson, Sharma, Harrison, Ron, Barnes et al., (2009) also found 
executive function deficits in verbal learning and spatial working memory regardless of 
IQ however measures of IQ prove problematic in schizophrenia. Language deficits are a 
primary symptom of schizophrenia (Kuperberg, 2011) thus poor performance on IQ tests 
could reflect linguistic rather than cognitive abilities. 
 
However some research indicates that these cognitive deficits are not necessarily certain 
or symptomatic of global cognitive impairment; Other researchers have found that a 
patient population ‘neuropsychologically within normal range’ exists (Palmer et al., 1997; 
Kremen et al., 2000). Whether this deficit is present prior or as a result of illness is also 
problematic to assert; Leeson et al., (2011) suggest that general IQ function post first-
episode is most predictive of longer-term cognitive function rather than premorbid 
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assessment, indicating that the profile of neurocognition is not straightforward. Other 
authors have investigated neuropsychological profiles of people with schizophrenia to 
look for distinct subtypes; Hill, Ragland, Gur and Gur, (2002) report there to be 4 distinct 
clusters of cognitive profile; one of severe global cognitive impairment, a second of more 
milder general impairment with a deficit in verbal memory. Profiles three and four, 
although demonstrating moderate-to-severe impairments, showed an interaction 
between memory and executive skills with cluster 3 demonstrating greater impairment in 
executive skills but retained memory and cluster 4 demonstrating the opposite. The 
authors suggest this could have a large impact on cognitive interventions with tailored, 
profile specific remediation plans catering for specific rather than global deficits having a 
greater impact on recovery to the individual. Despite cognitive impairment being 
relatively stable post first episode, larger deficits have been observed in verbal learning 
and memory (Mesholam-Gately, Giuliano, Goff, Faraone, & Seidman, 2009) and verbal 
learning also demonstrated a significant decline at 2 year follow-up (Torgalsbøen, Mohn, 
Czajkowski, & Rund, 2015) compared to other cognitive domains which remained stable. 
Unravelling the key cognitive determinants of both function and further cognitive 
deterioration is of upmost importance and authors remain equivocal on whether there is 
a global or domain specific cognitive deficit in schizophrenia. 
1.3 Neurocognition in FEP 
Neurocognitive impairment has also been investigated in FEP specifically. Mesholam-
Gately, Giuliano, Goff, Faraone and Seidman, (2009) in a meta-analysis, demonstrate 
that similar deficits to chronic schizophrenia are found in FEP and support Leeson et al’s 
(2011) subsequent suggestion that longer-term cognitive prognosis is stable to post-
illness levels rather than premorbid function. Medium to large effect sizes are present 
across 10 neurocognitive domains with particularly noticeable deficits in verbal memory 
and processing speed however once again, there was considerable heterogeneity in 
effect sizes across studies. Fioravanti, Bianchi, & Cinti, (2012) interpret the heterogeneity 
in findings and attribute the unstable effect sizes across studies to be symptomatic of 
inconsistency in measurement and patient sample selection. Ayesa-Arriola et al., (2012) 
in a three-year longitudinal study found that 59% of FEP patients demonstrated cognitive 
impairment and sociodemographic and clinical characteristics at baseline were not 
predictive of impairment at 3 years. The authors also unexpectedly did not find that 
baseline cognition predicted 3 year functional disability however this could be due to the 
method chosen to measure function; the authors employed self-report measures with the 
suggestion that future recreations may wish to include functional capacity outcome 
measures instead as a more reliable indicator (Ayesa-Arriola et al., 2013) (see section 
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1.7 for review of outcome measurement). In a review, Bozikas and Andreou, (2011) also 
report both cognitive deficits in FEP, and that these deficits remain stable over time with 
the exception of verbal memory which may deteriorate further. The studies included in 
the review however were inconsistent and the authors suggest that those demonstrating 
a further decline could be due to different follow-up schedules. The authors suggest a 
subgroup of neurocognitively unimpaired people with a diagnosis of schizophrenia may 
exist and the relationship between this feature and psychosocial outcome is important to 
understand. This study however only included non-affective psychosis undermining 
external validity so generalisability to other types of psychosis is restricted. Haatveit et 
al., (2015) found similar stability in FEP for executive function across multiple measures 
between baseline and 1 year follow up with no significant change across time points. 
Furthermore, Greenwood, Morris, Sigmundsson, Landau, and Wykes, (2008) found little 
difference between FEP and chronic cohorts on executive function and memory tasks 
and differences between groups were determined from disorganisation symptoms rather 
than chronicity. 
However previous research has to be evaluated against intrinsic limitations of cognitive 
assessments and the use of psychometric battery tests; Kuperberg (2010) saliently 
argues that, whilst these standardised batteries have the advantage of being well 
validated, they often probe multiple cognitive processes thus which specific domain each 
tasks assesses may vary between authors. There has been a concerted effort within 
experimental psychology and neuroscience to identify the component constructs that 
comprise neurocognitive processing and, whilst new measures have been devised that 
assess the ‘cognitively pure’ processes (Barch, Braver, Carter, Poldrack & Robins, 2009), 
research employing them is still to percolate through academic publishing. In short, if 
studies measured cognition with comparable or standardised tests which have strong 
validation and reliability information, comparing and contrasting across multiple 
populations would prove more defensible. 
Summary 
In summary, global deficits are observed in those with a diagnosis of schizophrenia 
however the exact cognitive profiles differ between individuals across domains. Working 
verbal memory, executive function and processing speed appear to have the most 
evidence of deficit pre and post first-episode however this could be due to selective 
measures being used in research. How cognition relates to function will be addressed in 
the next section. 
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1.4 Recovery and function in schizophrenia 
Early Kraeplinian definitions of psychosis adopted the disease model and assumed the 
trajectory of illness as a progressive and degenerative process (Kraeplin, 1919). 
Traditionally the dominant theme of recovery in psychiatry was symptom reduction, 
hospital discharge and relapse prevention (Harvey & Bellack, 2009). Any improvements 
in presentation were largely interpreted as temporary symptom remission (Kraepelin, 
1953) however the advent of antipsychotic medication in the 1950s and the discharge of 
patients to the community has led to a change in attitude. The dichotomy between 
medical and consumer defined definitions of recovery has merged with contemporary 
considerations of recovery largely regarded as a process rather than a definitive outcome 
(Harvey & Bellack, 2009). The recovery definition is changing in psychiatric care to a 
service-user defined one involving developing a positive sense of self-identity (Abdresen 
et al., 2003) and choosing and pursuing meaningful goals and aspirations (Davidson, 
2005). In a recent review, Lin, Wood and Yung, (2013) argue that understanding 
psychosocial function in FEP is imperative to comprehending the cause of schizophrenia 
and highlight the importance of considering the patient’s subjective experience of 
recovery in research design. With this shift in recovery attitude, new measures are 
required to capture the concept of recovery and return to function. 
1.5 Models of recovery 
A consensus held by the Centre for the Mental Health Services of the Substance Abuse 
and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA 2008) outlined the following 
fundamental components of recovery; it must have self-direction, be individualised and 
person centred, develop empowerment, be holistic, nonlinear, strengths based, contain 
peer support, respect, responsibility and hope. Pitt et al., (2007) devised a service-user 
led study examining the subjective experience of recovery from psychosis. The authors 
conclude that recovery is a complex process to evaluate and suggest that the concept 
should incorporate rebuilding one’s life, rebuilding the self and fostering hope for a better 
future. Leamy, Bird, Le Boutiller, Williams and Slade (2011) in a systematic review also 
acknowledge the importance of culturally specific definitions of recovery; recovery for 
individuals of black and minority ethnic origins also demonstrated a greater emphasis on 
spirituality and reducing stigma in subjective sense of recovery. 
The involvement of service-users in defining recovery is pragmatic and encouraging 
however a working definition employable in research is still to be developed. Definitions 
that are too stringent make them impossible to realise and of little value however if the 
working definition is non-defined and too broad, it makes the achievement unimportant 
(Bellack, 2006). Shrivastava et al., (2010) conclude that outcome measures must be 
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multidimensional incorporating both social and clinical features but future attempts to 
measure these still find discrepancies between symptoms remission and functional 
outcome despite more sophisticated measurement techniques (Oorschot et al., 2012). 
Oorschot et al., (2012) attribute disparities between sufficient symptom remission and 
poor real-life functioning to i) cognitive dysfunction ii) low mood or, due to non-completion 
of social milestones, iii) return to poor premorbid function. 
1.6 Functional outcome 
The medical perspective on recovery is derived from the definition of schizophrenia as a 
disease and reflects an elimination or significant reduction of symptoms and a return to 
premorbid levels of function (Torgalsbøen, 2005). This measure is problematic for a 
number of reasons however; there is no account for situations wherein there is symptom 
remission but the illness persists, it fails to consider the potential for profound alterations 
to premorbid status but a return of function and thirdly, the measurement is empirically 
vague. How long must symptoms dissipate for, what extent of remission is required and 
how is premorbid functioning or potential measured retrospectively? (Bellack, 2006). 
Even if symptom remission is achieved, these alterations do not necessarily translate to 
improvements in social factors or functional outcome (Shrivastave et al., 2010). 
Furthermore, the relevant aspects of recovery and the choice of person to complete the 
rating (service-user, family member or clinician) has been shown to affect measure 
outcome (McCabe et al., 2007). 
1.7 Self-report measures 
Self-report instruments are simple and inexpensive however they are problematic as they 
are influenced by poor insight and cognitive function (Atkinson et al., 1997). Further 
Bowie et al., (2007) found that accurate self-raters had the highest social skill function 
and over-estimators had the most deteriorated cognitive functioning which questions the 
conclusion that positive self-report ratings are direct reflections of better function or 
capacity. This suggests that an individual with poor cognitive function may inaccurately 
rate themselves as performing better than they are. Subjective illness belief, or the 
subjective belief in disability or recovery, is also confounded by insight and depressive 
symptoms; improved clinical insight has been associated with depressive symptoms 
which lead to less accurate, more negative subjective ratings of recovery (Cavelti, Beck, 
Kvrgic, Kossowsky, & Vauth, 2012). Thus those that are doing objectively better may 
report worse functioning or less enjoyment of life. 
8 
 
1.8 Global measures 
Another common measurement of function is the clinician-rated Global Assessment of 
Functioning (GAF) measure wherein clinicians assign a score across 10 domains to 
signify a single value for overall level of functioning (0-100 total). This is the 
recommended tool by the DSM-IV to capture social, occupational and psychological 
functioning and relies upon the clinician’s opinion of patient functioning. The GAF has 
been assessed for reliability and validity (Jones et al., 1995) and is one of the most widely 
used measures of current functioning in research (Robertson et al., 2013). Reviews 
question the consistency in interrater reliability (Mausbach, Moore, Bowie, Cardenas, & 
Patterson, 2009) and other studies fail to demonstrate an ability to associate with real-
world social function (Roy-Byrne et al., 1996), This raises questions pertaining to the 
scales internal and external reliability. In a study of FEP, Vesterager et al., (2012) found 
that the GAF was ‘impressionistic’ and lacking in nuance neglecting the grey areas 
present in independency. Robertson et al., (2013) also report that, whilst the GAF is 
sensitive to changes in clinical presentation, it misses some aspects of social function 
and the authors advise the inclusion of supplementary outcome measures when 
capturing psychosocial outcomes. 
1.9 Objective measures 
Early objective measures of function were generally based on dichotomous variables 
such as whether employed or living independently. However, these are victim to a host 
of social factors (such as background socio-demographic circumstances and socio-
political climate) rather than just recovery processes (Patterson & Mausbach, 2010). 
Other research has adopted a more sophisticated objective measure of social functioning. 
The Time Use Survey (TUS), developed by the Office for National Statistics (ONS) looks 
to directly measure the amount of time an individual spends in structured activities over 
the preceding month. Existing measures of objective function have been criticised for 
lack of sensitivity and meaning (Shepherd et al., 2008) and for overemphasis on 
employment alone (Killackey et al., 2008). The TUS taps a multitude of occupational, 
educational, social, exercise and household domains and calculates the average number 
of hours spent per week in each type of activity in the real-world (Fowler et al., 2009). In 
addition, due to the National Survey 2000 employing the same measure, meaningful 
comparisons can be made between people with a diagnosis of schizophrenia or FEP 
and similar cohorts in the general population (Hodgekins et al., 2015). 
Many functional recovery approaches also compare functioning to those in the general 
population or rate recovery on indices appropriate for normative samples. Wunderink, 
Sytema, Nienhuis, & Wiersma, (2009) consider this a difficult concept and question how 
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expected levels of functioning are to be determined for an individual that’s been through 
psychosis. Around two-thirds of a FEP sample remained functionally impaired despite 
being classified as in symptom remission and the authors also question the time frame 
in which follow-up functional measures are to be performed in order to be meaningful. 
Follow-up measure timeframes may vary from 1 month to 10 years and selecting a 
meaningful window in which to measure functional outcome isn’t standardised. Symptom 
and functional trajectories demonstrate different pathways in FEP too; Ventura et al., 
(2008) found that at 12 month follow-up 22% of a FEP cohort demonstrated symptom 
remission however only 7% were in functional remission. Also, premorbid social 
functioning significantly predicted 2 year follow-up functional status, with other studies 
suggesting that social dysfunction is present in prodromal (Niendam et al., 2009) and 
premorbid phases (Bratlien et al., 2013). Thus whether social disabilities are caused by 
or a contributing factor to psychosis is difficult to tease apart. By conducting research 
into functional outcome in FEP, some of these questions can begin to be addressed by 
understanding factors present at onset. 
McKibbin et al., (2004) assessed direct observations of people with a diagnosis of 
schizophrenia in their natural setting completing daily tasks and found these 
assessments to be reliable and comprehensive. These assessments however are costly 
to administer in addition to being time consuming and lacking in standardisation which 
has led to the development of performance-based task measurements. Real-life 
activities and scenarios are set up wherein the participant has to negotiate daily tasks 
under observation, thus measuring individual capacity in a controlled environment.  
1.10 Functional capacity 
Measures of functional capacity assess the extent to which an individual can complete 
necessary tasks or activities in their daily life (Patterson & Mausbach, 2010). These 
assessments such as the UCSD Performance-Based Assessment (UPSA: Patterson et 
al., 2001) are victim to criticisms regarding ecological validity (McKibben et al., 2004), 
but the UPSA has demonstrated good interrater reliability (Harvey et al., 2004) and test-
retest reliability (Green et al., 2008). Furthermore, the UPSA has demonstrated sound 
criterion validity (Twamley et al., 2002) and Mausbach et al., (2009) in a review suggests 
that, whilst there is no ‘gold standard’ in functional measurement, the UPSA 
demonstrates a closer relationship to real-world outcome. The authors suggest that 
performance-based measures of functional capacity may provide the most sensitive and 
valid measure of functional recovery in psychosis. Finally, Faber et al., (2011) raise the 
issue of a need for a standardised criteria for assessing functional outcome as the 
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multitude of measures employed currently make cross-study comparisons difficult to 
interpret. 
Performance-based measures are employed as a proxy measure of real-world behaviour 
and the discrepancy between what an individual is capable of and what they actually do 
has become an area of intrigue in recovery research. The relationship between 
neurocognition and functional capacity has been found consistently (e.g. Keefe, Poe, 
Walker, & Harvey, 2006) however which factors bridge the relationship between capacity 
and actual outcome is less clear cut. A host of variables have been suggested to mediate 
the relationship between functional capacity and functional outcome such as negative 
symptoms, motivation (Bowie et al., 2008) and social cognition (Pinkham et al., 2006). 
Accounts vary however depending on which measure of functional outcome is employed 
and the effects are sometimes lost once demographic and symptoms are included in 
analysis (Mausbach et al., 2010). Social competency (Mancuso, Horan, Kern, & Green, 
2011), self-efficacy (Cardenas et al., 2012a) but not recent experience (Gupta, Bassett, 
Iftene, & Bowie, 2012) have all been suggested as potential variables to bridge the gap 
between capacity and actual performance but no clear picture has been identified. It 
appears that real-world function does depend on capacity as studies demonstrate the 
two to converge however, when there are disparities between performance in the two 
domains, what is inhibiting the former when the latter skills are present is less simplistic 
to assert. 
Summary 
In summary, there are a variety of measures available for capturing function with differing 
qualities. As models of recovery have shifted, so too has the way recovery is viewed and, 
as a primary treatment target, understanding more about the concept is critical. The 
performance-based measures of capacity appear to be the most validated however their 
ecological validity is questionable. This suggests that research designs may want to 
include additional real-life objective measures of function as well. An approach adopting 
multiple measures of function is important to further understand the relationship between 
illness and outcome. By combining a validated calculation of personal capacity to 
complete typical daily tasks and a meaningful objective measure of the actual time spent 
in structured activities in the community, both aspects of functional outcome can be 
measured and investigated. Whilst the experience of the individual and personal extent 
to which they feel part of the community and recovered is of tantamount importance for 
treatment, it proves problematic for research into functional outcome due to a multitude 
of confounding variables such as insight and mood. Likewise, clinician or family-member 
rated measures of global function are subjective, do not consider the individual’s 
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experience and underestimate the subtlety of different types of recovery. Individuals can 
recover in some domains and not others making an overall global function measure 
difficult to interpret. 
1.11 Neurocognition and functional outcome 
Whilst neurocognitive impairments in schizophrenia have been well documented 
throughout the 20th century, it was the assertion that specific neurocognitive processes 
may be linked to functional outcome and therefore the target for therapeutic interventions 
that caused a consolidation of academic focus in the 1990s (Green 1996; Green et al., 
2004). Despite nascent studies being atheoretical and underpowered due to small 
sample groups (Goldberg & Gold, 2002), they identified the critical role of neurocognition 
in functional outcome and provided research with the impetus to scrutinise cognitive 
impairments in schizophrenia with a new focus. Neurocognitive deficits are present in 
chronic, acute and symptom remission stages of illness (Hoff, Svetina, Maurizio, Crow & 
Spokes, 2005) and they are a more robust predictor of functional outcome than clinical 
symptoms alone (Palmer, Dawes & Heaton, 2009). In a seminal study, Green (1996) 
highlighted the role of neurocognition in accounting for outcome in 3 domains; 
independence in community function, skill acquisition and social problem solving. Both 
cross sectional and longitudinal studies have determined that neurocognition predicts 
work performance, social skills and community functioning (Green et al., 2000) and is 
thus a valid target for psychosocial interventions (Lincoln, Hehl, Kesting & Rief, 2011). 
Further, a more profound interaction has been found between cognition with negative 
symptoms than positive symptoms (Greenwood et al. 2005; Schmidt, Mueller and Roder, 
2011) in predicting function.  
Improved working memory has been associated with increased occupational functioning 
(Hofer et al., 2005), clinical and functional outcomes (Gagan Fervaha, Agid, Foussias, & 
Remington, 2014) and processing speed with improved social and functional skills 
(Bowie et al., 2008. Fett et al., (2011) in a meta-analysis found the strongest relationship 
between neurocognition and function to lay between verbal fluency and community 
function, and reasoning and problem solving with social problem solving. The authors 
note that, whilst various domains of neurocognition demonstrate small to large 
correlations with functional domains, the overall variance explained was relatively low 
(23.3%). This means that over 75% of the variance in functional outcome remains 
unaccounted for by neurocognition and the authors also remark on the different 
definitions of functioning within the research community. This finding is comparable but 
even smaller than Green’s early paper suggesting that 40-60% of the relationship is 
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understood (Green et al., 2004) however, with the greater number of studies available to 
Fett et al., there is no reason to doubt this more up-to-date estimation. 
Couture, Penn and Roberts (2006) provide support for Fett et al., and report that studies 
exceeding 40% of variance were the exception rather than the norm leaving 60-80% of 
the relationship unexplained. Some studies, whilst demonstrating a significant 
relationship find even lower variance in their model with neurocognition, social cognition 
and negative symptoms only accounting for 7.3% of the variance in self-reported 
functioning (Couture, Granholm, & Fish, 2011). The method of measurement however 
(self-report rather than interview or capacity measurement) may explain this particularly 
low figure. To complicate an already complex picture, neurocognition has been found to 
account for objective but not subjective experience of outcome (Tas et al., 2013) 
highlighting that definitions and measurement of outcome is critical to results. This 
spearheaded the search for possible mediating or moderating variables to more 
parsimoniously explain the resulting functional outcomes deficits in schizophrenia. 
1.12 Neurocognition and functional outcome in FEP 
Functional outcome has also been investigated in FEP with working and visual memory 
found to be significant predictors of functional capacity (Vesterager et al., 2012). Stouten, 
Veling, Laan, van der Helm and van der Gaag (2014) report that, whilst psychopathology 
was most predictive of psychosocial function at baseline, neurocognitive domains 
significantly predicted 12 month follow-up general function. However, the relationship is 
not as linear as expected; general cognition (Addington & Gleeson, 2005) and verbal 
learning (Milev, Ho, Arndt, & Andreasen, 2005) have been found to strongly predict 
function but these predictors were not replicated in the Stouten et al., (2014) study which 
found an emphatic effect of visual learning on outcome. Where a relationship has been 
found in FEP between improved cognitive function and better functional outcome, the 
variance accounted for is often lower than in chronic samples (e.g. Ayesa-Arriola et al., 
2012). Tandberg, Ueland, Andreassen, Sundet, and Melle, (2012) found no significant 
difference between occupational outcome based on neurocognitive ability and Bratlien 
et al., (2013) found a significant relationship between improved psychomotor speed, but 
not verbal memory, working memory or executive function, on social function. Finally, 
O’Connor et al., (2013)  found that only negative symptoms significantly predicted 
functional outcome at 12 months with, contrary to their hypothesis, cognitive ability not 
contributing to their overall predictive model. 
Summary 
The aforementioned studies reflect the trend of cognitive dysfunction and reduced 
functional outcome in FEP however the results differ in effect size magnitude and across 
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cognitive domains. Some of the difference in findings are due to the different methods of 
capturing functional outcome; some authors suggest their findings do not align with 
existing work due to overall global functioning scales failing to capture heterogeneity in 
outcome. There is a clear relationship between functional capacity and functional 
outcome but they appear to be related but separate concepts; having the ability to 
complete a task and integrating this into complicated daily life requires different levels of 
recovery and function. The latter being influenced by a range of other external factors as 
well. It is clear that measuring functional outcome requires multiple measurements in 
experimental design. In addition, self-report and global measures of overall function are 
difficult to assert specific causal relationships between domains of function and the 
mechanisms driving them. Finally, whilst a relationship exists between improved 
neurocognitive ability and better community outcomes, many of the review papers 
demonstrate that neurocognition only accounts for a small-to-medium amount of the 
variance in functional outcome. This suggests that other factors may account for 
functional outcome and provide a more parsimonious account for the relationship with 
cognition. The relationship at first onset is less clear cut; with studies such as O’Connor 
et al., (2013) finding no clear relationship whereas Milev et al., (2005) reporting a strong 
relationship between cognition and functional outcome. Whether negative symptoms or 
neurocognition drives functional outcome most at this stage needs clarification. By 
conducting research at this crucial stage, the factors which impact on return to function 
are less impacted by medication, access to treatment and chronic social disability. If 
more is understood about this early phase of illness, meaningful initiatives can be 
introduced to get those experiencing psychosis ‘back on track’ before continued social 
atrophy. 
1.13 Neurocognition and functional outcome: The search for further 
explanation 
Early authors identified the need to find additional variables to fully account for the 
relationship between neurocognition and functional recovery (e.g. Green, Kern, Braff, & 
Mintz, 2000) and later reviews have suggested that mediating variables offer a greater 
account for the mechanism between cognition and function (Bell, Corbera, Johannesen, 
Fiszdon, & Wexler, 2011). Social cognition has been proposed as both a mediator of 
neurocognition and function, and as a predictor of functional outcome (Brekke & 
Nakagami, 2010) as it has been demonstrated to show consistent relationships with both 
constructs. Social cognition refers to the cognitive operations which underpin social 
interactions such as the perception, interpretation, and response generation to the 
disposition and intentions of others (Couture, Penn, & Roberts, 2006). The role of social 
cognition in functional outcome has been galvanised from a variety of sources with 
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Adolphs (2009) demonstrating in a neuroimaging study that social and non-social 
information processing rely on semi-independent neural pathways. Social cognition 
encompasses a multitude of cognitive tasks however research has tended to focus upon 
emotional and social perception, social schema and knowledge, social attributions and 
Theory of Mind (ToM) (Schmidt et al., 2011). Studies have shown social cognition to 
account for an additional amount of variance in outcome after controlling for 
neurocognition (Addington, Saeedi & Addington, 2006). Fanning, Bell, and Fiszdon, 
(2012) sought to extend this research rationale and test whether both concepts were 
mutually exclusive and found that normal range neurocognition is a prerequisite but not 
a guarantee of good social cognition. Social cognition appears to certainly relate to social 
competence and relationships however the extent to which it predicts general functional 
recovery is less certain. Fett et al., (2011) in a meta-analysis of this relationship, report 
that social cognition accounts for a greater amount of the variance in functional outcome 
than neurocognition alone (16% versus 6%), however a large portion of functional 
outcome remains unaccounted for. 
Other candidate variables have also been suggested as mediators of the relationship 
between neurocognition and functional outcome. Defeatist beliefs have been proposed 
to precede functional outcome after social cognition on a pathway model (Green et al., 
2012) and Grant and Beck, (2008) report defeatist beliefs to mediate the relationship 
between neurocognitive function and outcome. The authors do however stipulate that 
the pathway between neurocognition and defeatist beliefs could be bidirectional 
(defeatist beliefs could dictate worse neurocognitive performance) so causal pathways 
are difficult to determine. Defeatist beliefs have also been associated with motivation; 
Nakagami, Xie, Hoe and Brekke, (2008) found that intrinsic motivation mediated the 
relationship between neurocognition and psychosocial function. Nakagami, Hoe and 
Brekke, (2010) investigated this relationship further with a longitudinal study and found 
that intrinsic motivation correlated with neurocognition at baseline however it did not 
predict functional outcome at later time points. Rather, baseline motivation did predict 
future neurocognitive ability with the authors concluding that motivation may underpin 
cognitive recovery. In a more recent study, Fervaha, Foussias, Agid and Remington, 
(2014) investigated this relationship further and report that, whilst both neurocognition 
and motivation significantly predicted function, the contribution was independent from 
each other. 
The relationship between symptoms and functioning has demonstrated mixed findings. 
Positive symptoms have shown a lack of relationship with functional capacity (Bowie, 
Reichenberg, Patterson, Heaton, & Harvey, 2006) and functional outcome (Vesterager 
15 
 
et al., 2012) and a similar lack of relationship is found between disorganised symptoms 
and social outcomes (Tandberg et al., 2012). Although a number of other studies do 
show relationships between disorganisation and occupational function (e.g. Liddle and 
Morris 1991). Negative symptoms have been found to have a significant relationship with 
neurocognition (Couture et al., 2011), social functioning (Bratlien et al., 2013) and quality 
of life (Fervaha, Foussias, Agid, & Remington, 2014) and the impact of cognition and 
negative symptoms on outcome may be synergistic (Greenwood, Landau, & Wykes, 
2005). However other authors suggest the explanatory power of cognition and negative 
symptoms may overlap with each other rather than functioning as unique determinants 
of outcome. In a follow-up study interestingly Stouten et al., (2014) found that negative 
symptoms have more of an impact on functioning at baseline but cognitive abilities are 
better predictors of functional recovery in FEP. 
Studies have directly tested the ability of negative symptoms to mediate the relationship 
between neurocognition and psychosocial function with significant mediation effects (Lin 
et al., 2013) and partial mediation effects  found (Ventura, Hellemann, Thames, Koellner, 
& Nuechterlein, 2009). 
Summary 
The relationship between neurcognition and functional outcome is an established one 
however the scope of neurocognition to account for total variance in function is limited. 
Candidate mediating variables have been suggested however none so far offer a 
parsimonious account for this relationship and only offer slightly more explanation than 
neurocognition alone. Estimates vary but 40-60% of the relationship is yet to be 
accounted for with traditional models and how functional outcome is measured needs to 
be better defined in study design. 
Another suggested candidate variable to account for the relationship between 
neurocognition and functional outcome is metacognition. The gap between possessing 
the raw cognitive abilities and implementing them into the social world may be due to a 
deficit in monitoring and regulating the cognitive component and reflecting back on 
mental states to improve social outcomes. Metacognition will be defined and discussed 
in the following section. 
1.14 Models of Metacognition 
Despite a ‘fuzzy’ and inconsistent definition in 30 years of research, (Akturk & Sahin, 
2011) contemporary epistemological accounts of metacognition incorporate a finer 
grained definition than the generic ‘thinking about thinking’ description and acknowledge 
the multifaceted nature of a complex neural system. Many modern conceptualisations 
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report a duality in form or a dual processing model of metacognitive function however 
theorists differ in distinctions to be made across a variety of indices. 
Schraw and Moshman, (1995) propose there to be 3 types of metacognitive theory; 
Formal theories are highly developed and systemised accounts of cognitive 
phenomenon demonstrating an expertise that allows the individual explicit access to the 
constructive nature of internal theories and so that they can be the architect of self-
regulation (Kuhn et al., 1992). Informal theories are fractured and not fully integrated into 
an ubiquitous metacognitive system; the individual will have domain specific beliefs or 
assumptions about a cognitive matter thus they are partially explicit and therefore 
adaptable and testable for development and refinement (Schraw & Moshman, 1995). 
Tacit theories in comparison are developed without an explicit awareness that they are 
possessed, and are thus not cognitively scrutinised or tested against relevant data (Kuhn, 
1989). 
Flavell (1981) marks a distinction between metacognitive knowledge and experience; 
knowledge refers to the known, explicit understanding of internal mechanisms relating to 
goals and actions in both the self and others whereas experiences are conscious, 
affective states relating to a particular cognitive process (Flavell, 1981). In later work, 
Flavell (2000) also advocates that experiences relate to the planning, monitoring and 
regulation of thoughts in an executive coordination manner with the addition of 
integrating emotional states that accompany intellectual activity. Koriat (2000) further 
dissembles metacognitive experience into two levels of operation relating to 
consciousness; a higher level, theory-driven, explicit mode of operation incorporating a 
high level of both consciousness and control, and a lower-order experience-based form 
of metacognitive judgement that is often subconscious and intuitive (Koriat & Levy-Sadot, 
1999; Koriat, 2000). More pertinently, research indicates that these intuition based, 
implicit judgments are commonly relied upon without scrutiny (Koriat, 2007) and resistant 
to change (Nussinson & Koriat, 2008). 
Saxe and Offen (2012) also differentiate between different hierarchal levels of 
metacognitive function in neuropsychiatric literature. Attributive metacognition can be 
considered akin to metacognitive knowledge and concerns the capacity to relate beliefs 
and desires to one’s self to inform self-knowledge. This can be compared to strategic 
metacognition describing the control and monitoring of online mental processes. Thus, 
attributive metacognition concerns beliefs and desires in relation to the self whereas 
strategic metacognition relates to mental activities and processes. The resulting actions 
inform self-explanation in the attributive stage, and monitoring in the service of control in 
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strategic metacognition (Saxe & Offen, 2012). Furthermore, Nichols and Stich (2001) 
offer similar hypotheses with a distinction between thinking about and monitoring inner 
states; they propose that different mechanisms are involved in thinking about internal 
processes and monitoring them which can be considered in light of Tulving’s (2005) 
distinction between conscious autoneotic and unconscious noetic processes. 
Metacognition: a fractionated system? 
Muñoz (2010) attempts to consolidate these different processing avenues by 
categorising theories into two camps; metarepresentational and control theories. 
Metarepresentational theories adopt the abstract, explicit ‘thinking about thinking’ 
approach and relate to the self-ascription of mental states based on an earlier mental 
state attribution in order to rationalise and interpret behaviour (Proust, 2007). Thus 
metacognition is conceptually likened to ‘turning our mindreading capacity upon 
ourselves’ (Carruthers, 2009). This approach adopts similar conceptual architecture to 
ToM processing in that behavioural cues are interpreted (either self or other’s) and 
mental inferences or second order representations are based on this framework (Muñoz, 
2010). Control theories view metacognition purely as a monitoring and evaluation 
process in the form of an offline simulation of currently engaged cognitive processes to 
assist with prediction and adjustment to the task at hand (Proust, 2007). Muñoz (2010) 
attempts to consolidate these two approaches into a homunculus-like integrated system 
of cognitive appraisal and control. The lower order control theories based on feeling-
induced control heuristics to adjust and monitor tasks without requiring the resources 
that a higher metarepresentional level of processing require.  
Both components interact with each other in this dual-process model either through 
bottom-up instigation of higher order processes (a feeling of uncertainty in monitoring 
may trigger the instigation of higher order processing) or top down processes wherein 
metarepresentations align with lower order affective states to become more salient. A 
further interaction may be the inhibition of lower-order processing from the second-order 
belief that a mistake is going to be made; this feeling of uncertainty may lead to the 
initiation of more cognitive scrutiny of lower-order processing to avoid potential errors. 
Schwarz and Vaughan (2002) demonstrated this effect by exposing participants to a 
theory relating to the unreliability of feelings in relation to task performance. The 
information questioning the reliability of feelings of familiarity facilitated participants 
reporting more apprehension to rely on a feeling of familiarity and engage additional, 
higher order strategies when processing information. 
18 
 
Previous explanations for metacognitive processing appear to be approaching a 
consensus on there being a stratified or layered system at play. Despite contrasting 
definitions and terminology, some clarity is found between lower-order processes 
relating to unconscious, monitoring functions of subservient cognitive mechanisms and 
a higher-order metarepresentation system incorporating stored references to these 
representations across a variety of tasks. 
Lysaker et al., (2005) propose a hierarchal model of metacognition with incremental 
stages of increasing metacognitive sophistication. This commences with acknowledging 
that an individual has mental functions all the way through to a ninth stage wherein 
cognitive and emotional states are integrated into a coherent, social narrative. This rubric 
has then been employed to assess metacognitive capacity through clinical, semi-
structured interviews and to inform psychotherapy (Lysaker et al., 2011). Lysaker et al., 
(2011) relate metacognition to a series of interrelated processes such as the ability to 
form a representation of one’s mental state and the mental states of others, and relate 
these to emotion and behaviour in evolving social contexts. Whilst social cognition 
requires the identification of mental state information of ‘the other’ through discrete 
judgements, this is based on cues such as emotional perception and facial expressions 
or language. The more synthetic self-mental state representation requires declarative 
knowledge of higher-order thoughts based on self-reflection and behavioural integration. 
Thus, social cognition and metacognition are suggested to require different processing 
pathways (Lysaker et al., 2013) although it must be noted that not all authors agree on 
this point (see Carruthers (2009). This inability to produce representations, scrutinise 
them for fallibility and problem solve in daily life (Dimaggio, Lysaker, Carcione, Nicolò, & 
Semerari, 2008) leads to synthetic deficits in thought and results in impoverished 
functioning (Lysaker et al., 2005). This synthetic metacognitive ability has been found to 
be related to but conceptually unique from deficits in neurocognition (Lysaker et al., 2013) 
and accounts for deficits in social function (Lysaker et al., 2011). 
The relationship between cognitive processes and how we regulate them has been 
considered in Nelson and Naren’s (1990) influential model of metacognitive control 
(figure 1 below).  
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Nelson and Narens originally proposed their model to account for memory processing. 
They posit that cognitive processes function on two interrelated levels; object and meta-
level. Object-level processing pertains to basic cognitive processes (perception, memory, 
etc.) that send feedback up to the meta-level structure through monitoring processes. 
The meta-level structure has an abstract plan of object-level function, appraises the 
effectiveness of cognitive or behavioural strategies and exerts control through initiating, 
terminating or allowing object-level processes to continue. This dyadic model has been 
applied to emotional disorder (Wells & Matthews, 1995) and mapped onto hierarchal 
brain structure through posterior and prefrontal cortices (Shimamura, 2008). 
One distinction made in the literature is between metacognitive knowledge and 
regulation or experience. Metacognitive knowledge broadly corresponds to the 
information individual’s possess about their cognition and the factors that impact on it. 
Regulation in comparison refers to the executive control and resource allocation given 
to cognitive tasks and the planning, checking, and error detection in performance (Brown, 
Bransford, Campione & Ferrara, 1983). Metacognitive knowledge can be explicit 
(conscious, accessible and declarable) or implicit (not conscious, often intuitive and 
feeling based) and aligns with Frith’s (2012) model of metacognitive control. 
Metacognitive experiences in comparison are appraisals that the individual makes of 
mental events and their meaning and judgements about the status of cognitions. 
Metacognitive experience is the ‘online’ use of metacognitive knowledge wherein 
cognitive process are appraised and processed at either task or complex judgement level 
(Efklides, 2008) and has been observed in ‘tip of the tongue’ phenomena (Shimamura, 
2008). Metacognitive skill or control is the response the individual makes in regulating 
Meta-level 
Object-level 
Figure 1: Adapted from Nelson and Narens, (1990) 
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slave cognitive systems and directs the individual toward a desired goal based on 
feedback from the cognitive system (Jankowski & Holas, 2014). This latter concept can 
be seen in the control aspect of the Nelson and Narens model (figure 1) whereas the 
variety of metacognitive knowledge resides in the meta-level structure. 
1.15 Neural underpinnings of metacognition 
Metacognitive processing has been implicated in frontal regions through a series of 
studies. Investigations in Korsakoff’s syndrome demonstrate deficits in metamemory 
processing (Shimamura, 2000) and this finding has also been found in patients with 
frontal lobe lesions (Pannu & Kaszniak, 2005). Increased activation has been observed 
in the inferior frontal gyrus for correct FoK judgments (Kikyo, Ohki, & Miyashita, 2002) 
and increased activity in the ventromedial PFC has been seen to correlate with more 
accurate prospective Judgements of Learning (JOL) (Kao, Davis, & Gabrieli, 2005). 
Fleming et al., (2010) in a retrospective confidence-based metacognitive judgement task, 
found a relationship between increased GM volume and metacognitive accuracy in BA10 
and greater white-matter microstructure connecting the PFC to the corpus callosum. This 
indicates that both the local processing and the integration of multiple processing routes 
may be important aspects of accurate metacognitive ability. Buchy, Stowkowy, 
Macmaster, Nyman and Addington (2015) report reduced cortical thickness in the insula, 
frontal and temporal regions in relation to lower metacognitive ability as measured by the 
MAS in a clinically high risk (CHR) cohort. Furthermore, (Vohs et al., 2015) found greater 
GM density in the medial prefrontal cortex and ventral striatum correlated with improved 
metacognition. These regions have been seen to be implicated in cortical atrophy in 
schizophrenia (Watson et al., 2012) and may account for the metacognitive deficits also 
observed in the same sample. 
1.16 Measuring metacognition 
Metacognition has been measured in a variety of ways illustrated in table 1 below. 
Depending on the adopted working definition, measurement is difficult due to 
metacognition not being a directly observable behaviour and individual’s not always 
being aware of the process (Akturk & Sahin, 2011). Fleming and Dolan (2012) distinguish 
between prospective and retrospective judgements; metamemory research has asked 
participants to make prospective judgements of learning assessments of future task 
performance (Do Lam et al., 2012). Feeling of Knowing and tip-of-the-tongue states are 
employed with recognition tasks where an item cannot be recalled; a participant is asked 
to indicate whether they ‘feel’ they know the item although deficits have not been 
reported in schizophrenia literature for this domain (Elisabeth Bacon & Izaute, 2009). 
Learning theorists have also investigated working metacognition through ‘think aloud 
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protocols ‘asking participants to verbally report on current cognition. Such measurement 
strategies however are time consuming, interfere with the cognitive task at hand and only 
access declarable meta-level processes (Akturk & Sahin, 2011).  Questionnaires have 
also been employed such as the metacognitions questionnaire (MCQ), the Metacognitive 
Awareness Inventory (Schraw & Dennison, 1994) and the Metamemory Inventory in 
Adulthood (MIA) (Dixon et al., 1988) tapping general beliefs about cognition and 
perception of memory. These questionnaire-based methods are cost-effective and allow 
for the widespread investigation of metacognition however they are not task specific and 
do not offer insight into the basis for the belief or judgement. A factor analysis of the 
Metacognitive Awareness Inventory also revealed that, despite the original authors 
suggestion of an overall metacognitive system, that the concept is distinctly multivariate 
(Rahman & Masrur, 2011). This suggests that deficits may occur in multiple domains 
although this may be more of an indictment on the validity of the questionnaire than 
reflective of metacognition per se. Self-reflection has also been assessed and 
considered a metacognitive domain through the Beck Cognitive Insight Scale (BCIS) 
(Beck, Baruch, Balter, Steer, & Warman, 2004) and the Self-reflection and Insight Scale 
(SRIS) (Grant et al., 2002) which are questionnaire-based measures requiring the 
individual to reflect back on general mental processes. 
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Table 1 Summary table of metacognition measurement in studies 
Authors Task Method Measurement 
    
Do Lam et al., 
(2012) 
Face recognition Behavioural JoL (prospective estimate 
remember versus forget x 
correct or incorrect recall) 
Bacon & Izaute, 
(2009) 
Word recognition Behavioural FoK (estimate of number of 
letters recalled versus actual 
letters recalled) 
Schraw & 
Dennison, (1994) 
Memory Questionnaire Belief about memory abilities 
(108 items, 1-5 likert scale) 
Beck et al., 
(2004) 
Cognitive Insight 
(BCIS) 
Questionnaire Belief about cognition (15 
items, 0-4 likert scale) 
Moritz et al., 
(2015) 
‘Who wants to be a 
millionaire’ quiz 
Behavioural Correct versus incorrect, 
confidence (1-4) 
Koren et al., 
(2006) 
 
Executive function 
(WCST) 
Behavioural Correct versus incorrect, 
confidence (1-100), include in 
overall score 
Fleming et al., 
(2010) 
Visual perception Behavioural Correct versus incorrect, 
confidence rating (1-6) (meta-
d’) 
Köther et al., 
(2012) 
Mental state 
attribution 
Behavioural Correct versus incorrect, 
confidence (1-4) 
Semerari et al., 
(2003) 
Synthetic 
metacognitive 
awareness (MAS) 
Clinical 
interview 
3 (self-reflection, mind of other, 
mastery) domains, score of 1-9 
Cartwright-
Hatton & Wells, 
(1997) 
Metacognitive beliefs 
(MCQ) 
Questionnaire 65 items relating to beliefs 
about worry (1-4 likert scale) 
Dixon, Hultsch & 
Herzog, (1998) 
Metamemory in 
Adulthood (MIA) 
Questionnaire 7 scales, 108 items (1-5 likert 
scale) 
Persaud, 
McLeod & 
Cowey (2007) 
Visual awareness 
(Iowa gambling task) 
Behavioural Correct versus incorrect, wager 
0, 50p £1) 
 
The more popular measure of metacognitive judgement in experimental psychology is 
the retrospective self-assessment of performance on a cognitive task. Participants are 
typically asked to complete a task and then rate their confidence regarding their 
performance. An objective task performance score is obtained and related to subjective 
confidence in accuracy reports to compute a value of metacognitive judgement. Some 
authors have questioned the motivation for participants to honestly report their 
confidence (Dienes & Scott, 2005) and whether this method reflects on real-world 
decisions based on metacognitive judgements (Koren, Seidman, Goldsmith, & Harvey, 
2006). The post-metacognitive judgement decision wager strategy (i.e. participants are 
asked to place a financial bet on their accuracy) addresses motivation concerns 
(Persaud, McLeod, & Cowey, 2007) however has been criticised for not directly 
measuring conscious awareness as the process itself is not necessarily what the wager 
is based upon (Seth, 2008). Koren et al., (2006) suggest that, in order to measure 
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metacognitive reflections researchers should take a measure of the objective 
performance on a task, the subjective assessment of performance but also an option for 
the participant to decide whether they want to include each trial in their overall score. 
This combination of forced and free-choice decision making is more predictive of real life 
functioning and the use of metacognitive appraisals of cognitive performance (Koren et 
al., 2005). Thus participants are forced to attribute a confidence level to a judgement but 
also have the option of including or excluding the decision in a running total of their score 
which is more reflective of real-life. 
The relationship of objective performance and subjective ratings of performance have 
also been developed using Signal Detection Theory (SDT) modelling paradigms. A 
measure of metacognition is distilled from participants’ ability to discriminate ‘signal’ from 
‘noise’ in that for good metacognitive accuracy, incorrect decisions should be associated 
with low confidence and correct judgements should be associated with high confidence 
(Maniscalco & Lau, 2012). This measure of metacognitive sensitivity or meta-d’ 
addresses individual propensity to rate higher or lower in confidence and have a bias for 
particular stimuli. Concerns have been raised however about task difficulty; as 
metacognitive judgements have been found to differ in the same individual between easy 
and hard tasks. Fleming and Lau, (2014) in their own study artificially maintain task 
performance at a set level across trials to address this concern. This is corroborated as 
important to control for by Moritz et al., (2015) who found that patients demonstrated a 
significantly greater ‘confidence gap’ (overconfidence in errors and underconfidence in 
correct responses) than controls in an easy but not a hard task. 
In clinical literature, Semerari et al., (2003) suggest metacognition should be assessed 
through the participant’s free narrative account of their own mental processes called the 
Metacognitive Assessment Scale (MAS). A semi-structured clinical interview is 
administered and guided by the researcher. The participant’s responses are rated based 
on the participant’s capacity to identify and describe mental states, reflect back on 
cognitions and their relationship to emotions and behaviour, consider thoughts as 
subjective and view their own mental states as different from other’s. The measure 
assesses metacognition as the ability to reflect back on one’s own mental states and 
products (self-reflection or the understanding of one’s own mind), the ability to assess 
the mental state of others (understanding the mind of other or decentration), and the 
ability to use mental state information to solve psychological problems (mastery). 
Lysaker et al., (2005) suggests that traditional explicit task based metacognitive 
judgements do not capture the nuance of real life reflections on cognitive states. The 
MAS therefore provides a more ecologically valid assessment method appropriate for 
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understanding functional deficits in schizophrenia. This measurement of metacognition 
requires the highest order meta-level processing of the measures mentioned thus far. 
The MAS, a measure of synthetic metacognition, is one of the most well used measures 
in clinical research and offers an insight into a host of processes. It captures the 
complexity of integrating constituent skills such as mental state attribution and, linking 
thoughts to emotions and behaviours. This offers rich data for accounting for outcome. 
The BCIS also offers a faster, overall reflection of willingness to consider cognition as 
fallible and subjective and has also been validated in a variety of populations. In terms 
of measuring specific perceptual judgements, the SDT theory of meta-d’ offers a real 
numerical representation of participants ability to differentiate correct from incorrect 
responses avoiding bias seen in other measures such as stimuli bias and individual 
difference in tendency to use extreme scores. It is yet to be employed in studies involving 
those with a schizophrenia diagnosis however and would benefit from such validation. 
The relationships between these different measures of metacognition are not clear. The 
MAS domain of understanding one’s own mind and total score and the BCIS self-
reflectivity subscale have been investigated together and found to positively associate 
(Lysaker et al., 2008). In addition, in a factor analysis investigation, BCIS total and MAS 
total scores were found to inhabit a shared factor separable from social cognition, 
measures of affect recognition and theory of mind (Lysaker et al., 2013). The BCIS has 
also been investigated in relation to confidence-based metacognitive judgements on a 
perceptual decision making task however no significant correlation was found with either 
self-reflectiveness or self-certainty (Fleming, Huijgen, & Dolan, 2012).The self-certainty 
subscale has been found to correlate with over-confidence in erroneous decision in a 
social cognition task however (Köther et al., 2012). This may be indicative of the scales 
measuring different aspects of a multilevel metacognitive system but the relationship 
between measures needs to be elucidated further. 
1.17 Metacognition and neurocognition 
The relationship between cognitive and metacognitive abilities has been assessed in a 
variety of studies and will be considered further in chapter two. Palmer, David and 
Fleming (2014) investigated two measures of metacognition; perceptual and memory 
metacognitive efficiency and found a significant association between the latter but not 
the former on the Wechsler Memory Scale and no significant relationship with either 
measure and IQ or executive function. Other measures of metacognition have been 
found to have significant relationships with executive function. Lysaker, Dimaggio, Buck, 
Carcione and Nicolò, (2007) found significant relationships between the MAS subscales 
of decentration, self-reflectivity, understanding one’s own mind, overall total MAS score 
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and executive function at both baseline and 6 months (Hamm et al., 2012). The BCIS 
self-certainty has also been found to be associated with executive function (Orfei, 
Spoletini, Banfi, Caltagirone, & Spalletta, 2010), and the self-certainty subscale was 
negatively associated with working memory. Visual memory was significantly associated 
with understanding one’s own mind and understanding the mind of others (Lysaker et al., 
2005). Verbal IQ has been associated with the metacognitive domain of mastery (Nicolò 
et al., 2012), understanding one’s own mind (Abu-Akel & Bo, 2013) however a combined 
measure of MAS total and BCIS failed to obtain significance with verbal IQ indicating that 
relationships may be domain specific rather than global. Finally processing speed has 
been associated with mastery (Lysaker, McCormick, et al., 2011), understanding one’s 
own mind and the mind of others (Nicolò et al., 2012). The relationship between 
metacognition and neurocognition has yet to be investigated in FEP which the present 
thesis will also seek to address. 
1.18 Metacognition and functional outcome 
In terms of relationship to function, the BCIS total and self-reflectivity scales have been 
associated with global assessments of functioning (Giusti, Mazza, Pollice, Casacchia, & 
Roncone, 2013) but the self-certainty scale demonstrated a non-significant negative 
association. In relation to the MAS, metacognitive mastery has been associated with 
improved functional capacity in the domain of comprehension and planning but not other 
areas (Lysaker et al., 2011), to correlate with increased social relationships (Lysaker, 
Dimaggio, et al., 2010) and mastery has also been found to mediate the relationship 
between neurcognition and social functioning (Lysaker et al., 2010) (see chapter two for 
further details). 
In FEP, understanding of one’s own mind and the mind of others have been associated 
with premorbid social functioning (Macbeth et al., 2014). O’Connor et al., (2013) found 
that cognitive insight did predict psychopathology but not global measures of function. 
The authors speculate that the role of cognitive insight in functional outcome may be a 
delayed process and become important after immediate symptoms have subsided 
Massé and Lecomte (2015) divided FEP service-users into three metacognitive profiles; 
(i) overall better metacognition across all domains, ii) overall worse metacognition with 
retained mastery, iii) worse metacognition and impoverished mastery. They investigated 
a variety of social functioning domains however the authors found conflicting results. No 
differences were found with understanding one’s own mind and interpersonal functioning 
however some indices of metacognitive function were associated with less social contact. 
Whilst the profiles did not differ overall on all measures of social function, interestingly, 
the retained mastery ability did differentiate between the second and third groups on 
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frequency of social contacts and ability to perform social functioning tasks. No significant 
differences however were found on social functioning measures between high and low 
scorers on understanding one’s own mind and understanding the mind of others. Whilst 
surprising, the authors suggest future studies should define the measurement of social 
relationships as this could be due to question interpretation rather than an accurate 
reflection of performance in FEP. Participants may have rated friendships and social 
contacts inaccurately due to a lack of awareness of the other persons’ perspective. 
Alternatively, those with improved self-knowledge, may also be more aware of social 
stigma and therefore withdraw from social contacts. Further, the measures of function 
were all self-report and may be victim to factors discussed earlier with self-report 
measures of function. 
The aforementioned studies demonstrate that the different measures of metacognition 
are indicative of a multi-layered metacognitive system. Self-reflectivity and 
understanding of one’s own mind appear to be more closely related to each other 
however the different measurement options available may assess different structures or 
metacognitive abilities described in the Nelson and Narens’ model. The nature of these 
relationships, particularly in relation to functioning, need clarification and assessment in 
non-chronic samples to separate from the effects of medication exposure and 
psychological treatments (Lysaker et al., 2008). 
1.19 Cognition, negative symptoms and functional outcome 
Frith, in an early paper, identified the relationship between cognition and 
symptomatology suggesting that the behavioural signs and symptoms of schizophrenia 
were the result of cognitive deficits (Frith, 1993). Kerns and Berenbaum (2002) offer a 
meta-analysis of executive function impairment and found mixed findings for the 
cognitive underpinnings of symptom development; formal thought disorder was found to 
be significantly associated with both impaired executive function and impaired semantic 
processing. Formal thought disorder was especially evident in executive function tasks 
that involved high context memory and inhibition demands to a similar degree and Stirling, 
Hellewell, Blakey and Deakin (2006) propose that the relationship requires further 
elaboration in research. 
Velligan et al., (1997) found that cognition related to both symptom score and function 
with the relationship between function and symptoms attributed to shared variance with 
cognitive ability. Cognitive ability was negatively correlated with negative symptoms and 
both factors significantly predicted social adaptive functioning in a follow-up paper 
(Harvey et al., 1998). Milev, Ho, Arndt and Andreasen (2005) found that both cognitive 
ability and negative symptoms significantly predicted follow-up psychosocial function 
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however the total variance accounted for was relatively low (3.4% and 11% respectively) 
in their model. Couture, Granholm and Fish (2011) investigated the relationship between 
neurocognition, negative symptoms and self-reported function and found that negative 
symptoms were directly predictive of function and mediated the relationship between 
neurocognition and function. In contrast to Green’s (2004) suggestion that between 20-
60% of the relationship is accounted for; both factors only accounted for 7.3% of the 
variance in self-reported function. This could however be attributable to the use of self-
reported data which is victim to a number of problems with validity (see section 1.7). 
Ventura, Hellemann, Thames, Koellner and Nuechterlein (2009) performed a meta-
analytic technique to assess this relationship and also found negative symptoms to 
partially mediate the relationship between cognition and functional outcome and report 
a much larger effect size (r=.42) however caution must be applied when interpreting such 
a finding. The meta-analysis required the inclusion of multiple domains of outcome and 
multiple measures of negative symptoms. The SANS and measures of function may 
overlap as they ask similar questions and the nuanced relationship between different 
domains of function and cognition was not investigated. 
1.20 Metacognition and negative symptoms 
From the literature reviewed thus far, metacognition and negative symptoms appear to 
be the most validated and novel potential mediators to explain the relationship between 
neurocognition and functional outcome. Some work has looked at the relationship 
between the two concepts; earlier work found that understanding one’s own mind 
correlated with emotional withdrawal (Lysaker et al., 2005) and metacognition mediates 
between cognitive ability and social functioning whilst controlling for symptoms in the 
model. This indicates that metacognition accounts for the relationship uniquely to 
negative symptoms (Lysaker et al., 2010). Newer research has looked at the relationship 
between the concepts specifically; Self-reflectivity, understanding the mind of others and 
mastery have all been found to correlate with negative symptom domains (Nicolò et al., 
2012). 
In FEP, McLeod, Gumley, Macbeth, Schwannauer, and Lysaker, (2014) found that 62% 
of the variance in negative symptoms at 12 month follow-up from FEP was accounted 
for by a model comprised of metacognition (MAS) and demographic details. This 
implicates metacognition in symptom trajectory and function. Baseline Negative 
symptoms have also been found to predict functional outcome at 12 months in FEP and, 
when entered into a hierarchal regression model to predict functional outcome, cognitive 
insight was no longer a significant predictor of social functioning (O’Connor et al., 2013). 
Furthermore, baseline cognitive insight was found to predict 12 month psychopathology 
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function as measured by the GAF. This suggests that, whilst cognitive insight does 
predict functional outcome, negative symptoms offered a greater contribution to the 
model. This relationship however has not been fully investigated as, in most studies, 
symptoms have only been controlled for in a mediation model rather than investigated 
alongside metacognition. 
Summary 
There have been multiple theories and definitions for metacognition in academic 
literature and this largely determines how it is measured. As a higher-order metacognitive 
knowledge process, the MAS captures one’s ability to synthesise a wealth of information 
regarding mental states and draws upon declarative knowledge. The BCIS appears to 
be a general sense of reflection on cognition whereas retrospective confidence 
judgements are moment-to-moment reflection on processing accuracy for specific tasks. 
Retrospective confidence judgements would sit in a lower-order section of the Nelson & 
Narens model specified above. Evidence suggests a layered system with differing levels 
of access and awareness to meta-level processing and appraisal of cognitive systems. 
How these different measurements relate to each other is less well known, the most 
investigated in clinical literature appears to be cognitive insight and declarative, synthetic 
metacognitive awareness as captured in the MAS. Relationships have also been found 
between these variables and both neurocognition and functional outcome. The extent 
that differing levels of metacognitive processing mediate this relationship however is not 
known or fully understood. By understanding this relationship better, the preceding 
factors to functional recovery can be better understood and clinical interventions catered 
to what really helps individuals recover autonomy and independence. The relationship 
between metacognition and negative symptoms in relation to functional recovery also 
requires clarification although preliminary evidence suggests both may be important for 
functioning in differing ways. 
1.21 Therapeutic intervention 
As discussed previously, research suggests that an individual’s cognitive skills predict 
their ability to function in the community. This notion as early as the 1960s (Rund & Borg, 
1999) underpinned the idea that, if clinicians can help patients improve their cognitive 
processing abilities, then this should also improve functional outcomes and assist with 
recovery. This intervention approach has been called cognitive remediation therapy and 
the programme is comprised of behavioural interventions focused on the cognitive 
deficits associated with poor psychosocial outcomes (Ostergaard et al., 2014). The 
method adopted vaies with some favouring more ‘drill and practice’ approaches based 
on neuroplasticity and specific, behavioural strategies (Eack et al., 2010) and others 
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targeting compensatory strategies to circumvent neurocognitive impairment (Twamley, 
2010). Some programs are cognitive domain specific, others target multiple domains, 
and some function as part of a stand-alone programme (Medalis & Saperstein, 2013) 
whereas others are integrated into a package also containing behavioural skills or 
vocational rehabilitation (Bell et al., 2008).  
The efficacy of such initiatives has been demonstrated with moderate to large effect sizes 
observed (Krabbendam & Aleman, 2003). Assessment of cognitive remediation 
feasibility studies is problematic however; there is a large variability in method of 
administration, target population and outcome measurement has been identified in other 
reviews (Twamley, 2003). Furthermore, the generalisation of therapeutic improvements 
to the ‘real-world’ is also mixed (Krabbendam & Aleman, 2003). Wykes et al., (2014) do 
report that, when method and nature of programme is controlled for in a meta-analytic 
review, small to moderate effects are still observed and other variables can improve 
programme efficacy such as addressing negative symptoms in addition to cognitive 
process (Greenwood, Landau & Wykes, 2005), employing a strategic approach rather 
than drill and practice, and aligning the intervention to other occupational rehabilitation 
programs (Wykes et al., 2011). 
Another avenue more recently identified to enhance cognitive remediation programmes 
involves the metacognitive monitoring of cognitive processes and information integration 
when learning new skills. Metacognition’s formative development was largely based in 
metamemory and learning styles (Flavell, 1979) and this has been applied to cognitive 
remediation. Metacognitive knowledge pertains to the knowledge individuals’ possess in 
relation to the accuracy of their own cognitive products and metacognitive regulation 
involves the planning ahead of cognitive processes, monitoring of current strategies and 
ability to update and revise the cognitive techniques employed based on self-reflection 
(Flavell, 1979). An early feasibility study (Cella, Reeder & Wykes, 2015) demonstrates 
the utility of such techniques in improving neurocognitive performance, negative 
symptoms and cognitive complaints. Metacognitive learning strategies in the guise of 
raising awareness of procedural rules and plans when delivering cognitive remediation 
has begun to be assessed. By giving learners insight to monitor their own learning style 
and increasing self-assessment of competence, may aid integration of skills into the real-
world. Whether these gains can optimise the integration of such remediation strategies 
into functional improvements has yet to be investigated however and validation is 
required in larger samples (Cella, Reeder & Wykes, 2015). 
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Metacognitive training (MCT) has also been suggested by other authors to facilitate self-
awareness of cognitive deficits; if an individual is aware of dysfunctional processing or 
that they are less able in a particular domain, they can adopt more conservative 
strategies (Frith, 2012) or ask for assistance (Koren, 2006) which may help with 
community functioning. MCT may also address deficits such as jumping to conclusion 
(JTC) bias, self-serving bias, bias against disconfirmatory evidence (Bartholomeusz & 
Allot, 2012) and overconfidence in errors (Bruno, 2012). Whilst early studies 
demonstrated a small association with less JTC and reduced positive symptoms 
(Aghotor et al., 2010) and less conviction in delusions (Ross, Freeman, Dunn & Garety, 
2011), these changes failed to achieve statistical significance. A recent review into the 
efficacy of MCT also reports little support for the reviewed studies with a non-significant 
mean effect size of treatment (Oosterhout et al., 2015). The authors do concede that, 
due to the poor study design and low power of the studies included, definitive conclusions 
are difficult to draw. Also, for the purpose of the current review, MCT has not been 
assessed for impact on function; previous studies have only looked at cognitive bias and 
symptoms as outcome measures. The impact on functional recovery is to this day 
unknown. 
1.22 Summary of introduction 
The aforementioned work describes how neurocognitive deficits are predictive of longer-
term functional recovery in schizophrenia. These cognitive deficits are observed in pre-
morbid, prodromal, FEP and chronic stage schizophrenia and relate to psychosocial 
functioning across a number of domains. In order to maintain social and occupational 
relationships and conduct everyday tasks, certain cognitive skills are drawn upon. These 
already compromised skills may erode further due to illness, and therapy designed to 
enhance these abilities has been shown to improve community outcome. One’s cognitive 
abilities are more important than psychopathology alone in recovery although how they 
interact and impact on negative symptoms is less clear. The definition and measurement 
of recovery and community functioning is also fluid and hinders comparisons between 
existing studies. The service-user focused models of recovery reflect changes in mental 
health care provision however self-report measures, despite being an important factor in 
understanding the individual, are victim to a variety of biases. Instead, objective and 
capacity based measures offer a more scientific assessment of an individual’s ability and 
actual community functioning. A greater understanding of this relationship is critical to 
informing treatment initiatives. Giving the individual the tools to integrate raw skills into 
the complicated real-world setting is paramount to assisting with recovery. 
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The integration of our cognitive abilities into functional contexts appears to be potentially 
explained by our knowledge into our own metacognition. The reflection back on life 
experiences and learning from them may be a key distinction between partial and full 
recovery from psychosis. Conversely, being unaware of inaccurate cognitions may lead 
to less scrutiny of erroneous decisions and propagate continued incorrect strategy 
selections in social and occupational settings. If we are unaware of deficits in cognitive 
skills, we are less likely to seek help or support externally. Deficits in our representations 
of the world may also underpin and exacerbate social withdrawal and inhibit motivation 
to attempt daily tasks or the pleasure derived from completing them. This loss of pleasure 
may germinate the development of negative symptoms discussed previously. A lack of 
comprehension as to why a social situation went wrong may render the world a confusing 
and frustrating place inhibiting the individual from attempting future social interactions. 
The relationship between negative symptoms and metacognition may offer answers to 
these suggestions. How the currently disparately defined mental state measures are 
related also needs further refinement. 
1.23 Conceptual models 
The preceding literature review suggests that metacognition and negative symptoms 
may offer important insights into the relationship between neurocognition and functional 
outcome in FEP. In order to assess the extent to which they offer greater insight in this 
relationship the present thesis proposes to test the theoretical models described below. 
Higher order metacognitive knowledge will be represented through the MAI and cognitive 
insight measures. Implicit lower-order metacognitive processing will be investigated in 
the final empirical chapter through retrospective confidence based metacognitive 
accuracy (meta-d’). 
Both metacognition (conceptual model 1, figure 2) and negative symptoms’ (conceptual 
model 2, figure 3) relationship with neurocognition and functional outcome will be 
investigated for mediation effects through pathway models analysis. 
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Figure 2 Conceptual model of neurocognition, metacognition and functional outcome. 
Note: blue line signifies a proposed mediation pathway 
 
Figure 3 Conceptual model of neurocognition, negative symptoms and functional 
outcome. Note: blue line signifies a proposed mediation pathway 
Having investigated individual model characteristics, both constructs will be assessed in 
a larger model to investigate the relationship between neurocognition, metacognition, 
negative symptoms and functional outcome in psychosis (figure 4). 
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Figure 4 Conceptual model of neurocognition, metacognition, negative symptoms and 
functional outcome. Note: blue line signifies proposed mediation  
Finally, the individual cognitive domains’ identified in the meta-analyses in chapter two 
(memory, IQ and executive function) relationship with metacognition and functional 
outcome will also be investigated in a series of pathway models. This will evaluate 
whether specific cognitive skills are more important in accounting for functional outcome 
in a more nuanced method. 
1.24 Overview of empirical chapters 
The empirical work in the present thesis is designed to elucidate a greater understanding 
of the components of neurocognition (memory, executive function and IQ), 
metacognition (cognitive insight, synthetic metacognition and perceptual metacognitive 
accuracy) and functional outcome (both real-world performance and personal capacity 
to complete everyday tasks). An overarching goal is to evaluate hypotheses about how 
the subcomponents of these constructs relate to each other. A primary research question 
concerns how the overall construct of metacognition, accounts or mediates the 
relationship between neurocognition and different components of functional outcome. 
Secondly, having established the role of metacognition in accounting for the relationship 
between neurocognition and functional outcome, the role of negative symptoms will be 
investigated through i) being controlled for in mediation models to assess the unique 
contribution of metacognition and ii) as a mediation pathway in itself. Finally a 
neurobiological account for metacognition will be explored through a grey matter 
structural analysis through voxel-based morphometry. The extent that metacognitive 
dysfunction is accounted for by potential neurological deficits post psychosis will add to 
the behavioural data reported in chapter 3. 
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Measures of neurocognition have been investigated comprehensively in previous 
research.  However, different measurement strategies regarding metacognition have a 
more equivocal evidence base, and the analysis of this construct must therefore be 
considered more exploratory in nature. The variables of synthetic metacognition and 
cognitive insight were selected for chapter 3 as they have a more established evidence 
base in relation to functional outcome in schizophrenia. Conceptually, our ability to reflect 
back on cognition, accept it as potentially subjective and open to interpretation, and 
identify how cognition is synthesised into relationships, behaviour and the social world is 
a more natural bedfellow for functioning in the community. Perceptual metacognitive 
accuracy was selected for chapter 4 due to known relationships to structural deficits in 
the prefrontal cortex. This has the added advantage of allowing a correlational analysis 
of all three measures of metacognition also provided in chapter 4. 
A first-episode psychosis sample will be selected as this allows for the investigation of 
the association described above whilst minimising the impact of differing exposure 
between participants to neuroleptic medication and access to psychological services 
present in chronic cohorts. However the extent to which a classification of FEP confirms 
a homogenous group of service-users is less well known. Whilst every effort was made 
to recruit participants at first point of contact into care teams, estimating duration of 
untreated psychosis (DUP) is problematic and there may be variation between 
participants in terms of when symptoms first arose and the gap between being accepted 
onto full caseload and recruitment into the research studies. It must be noted that to 
assist addressing this, psychopathology was included in analysis in chapter 3.  This only  
The present thesis will attempt to address these issues with the known research in 
psychosis. The current evidence for the relationship between neurocognition and 
metacognition will first be addressed in chapter two through a meta-analytic technique 
to synergise known evidence. Secondly, the relationship between metacognition and 
functional outcome will also be investigated in chapter two as groundwork for a mediation 
analysis through pathway modelling in chapter three. How neurocognition, metacognition 
and functional outcome are defined in this analysis will first be validated through factor 
analysis in chapter three. This will allow a better understanding of the composite 
constructs and offer insights into how the proposed indicators in the literature of 
neurocognition, metacognition and functional outcome relate to each other. Chapter 3 
will assess the validity of the aforementioned mediation models through pathway model 
analysis and mediation effects. 
35 
 
Finally, chapter four will investigate how organic brain structural measures of GM volume 
relate to perceptual metacognitive accuracy through a MRI study comparing healthy 
controls to FEP participants. The fundamental neurological determinants of 
metacognitive accuracy may offer more insight into behavioural measures in the 
community and demonstrate that dysfunction may occur at a neuroanatomical level in 
FEP. The relationship between higher-order metacognitive knowledge (MAI and BCIS) 
and lower order metacognitive experience (metacognitive accuracy) will also be 
investigated.  
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Chapter 2: A systematic review of the 
relationship between neurocognition, 
metacognition and functional outcome 
in schizophrenia. 
 
Cognitive impairment in schizophrenia is a core deficit of the disorder (Heinrichs & 
Zakzanis, 1998) and observed across prodromal (Jahshan, Heaton, Golshan, & 
Cadenhead, 2010), first-episode (Mesholam-Gately, Giuliano, Goff, Faraone, & Seidman, 
2009) and into remission stages (Hoff, Svetina, Shields, Stewart, & DeLisi, 2005). Whilst 
cognitive deterioration has generally not been found to be progressive in FEP (Leeson 
et al., 2011), improvements after illness remain diminutive in certain domains such as IQ, 
working memory and processing speed (Gonzalez-Ortega et al., 2013). Cognitive 
performance has also been implicated in predicting functional status in patients with 
schizophrenia (Tolman & Kurtz, 2010) and found to be a better determinant of outcome 
than psychopathology (Green, 1996). Green et al. (2004) in a review, report cognitive 
impairment to explain between 20-60% of variance in outcome with Couture, Penn, and 
Roberts, (2006) in further review positing that studies exceeding 40% of variance were 
very much the exception. 
The relationship identified between cognitive ability and community function led to the 
development of cognitive remediation programs with the ethos of improving the cognitive 
skills possessed by those with a diagnosis of schizophrenia to improve their community 
functioning. Despite some gains in function from remediation initiatives (Wykes et al., 
2007), not all of the skills necessarily translated into real-world improvements (Wykes et 
al., 2012) and led researchers to look for mediating variables to account for this 
relationship. Studies have suggested social cognition (Addington, Saeedi & Addington, 
2006), social discomfort (Bell, Tsang, Greig, & Bryson, 2009), defeatist beliefs (Grant & 
Beck, 2009), intrinsic motivation (Nakagami, Xie, Hoe, & Brekke, 2008) and negative 
symptoms (Couture et al., 2011) as potential mediating variables between cognition and 
functional outcome. Proposed variables however haven’t yet provided conclusive results 
and much of the relationship between neurocognition and functional outcome still 
remains unaccounted for (Fett et al., 2011). One approach has been to implicate 
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metacognition in this model (Lysaker, Shea, et al., 2010; Addington, Saeedi & addington, 
2006) and research has begun to explore the relationship between cognition and 
metacognition. By improving an individual’s metacognitive abilities, the cognitive skill 
improvements can potentially be integrated into social and occupational situations 
(Lysaker, Shea, et al., 2010). 
Metacognition refers to the cognitive processes involved in thinking about thinking 
(Flavell, 1979) and incorporates how we monitor and control slave cognitive mechanisms 
(Frith, 2012) (see chapter 1.14 for further details). Most models of metacognition propose 
a multi-level hierarchical system, with a higher order theory and knowledge based (Koriat 
& Levy-Sadot 1999) meta-level processing (Nelson & Narens 1994) comprising of explicit, 
effortful processes (Frith 2012) and the synthesis of complex information to compile a 
representation of one’s cognitive world (Lysaker et al., 2008). This higher-order 
metacognitive knowledge interacts with lower-order subjective experience-based (Koriat 
& Levy-Sadot 1999) automatic, implicit (Frith 2012) metacognitive judgements to 
regulate object-level processing units. Metacognition requires the ability to have an 
awareness of and monitor one’s own mental states, consider the fallibility of cognitive 
products and be able to form, revise and so control one’s mental states in rapidly evolving 
contexts (Lysaker et al., 2010a). Thus metacognition potentially draws upon memory, 
working memory and executive monitoring and control processes. 
An inability to integrate ideas about oneself and others may lead to misinterpretation of 
social situations and avoidance of participating in them (Lysaker et al., 2012). The 
inability to consider the bigger picture and one’s role in it may lead to the poor 
identification and solving of social and psychological problems (Lysaker et al., 2011). 
Thus a deficit in the ability to access metacognitive knowledge may leave individuals with 
basic evolutionary responses such as fight-or-flight to respond to challenges and 
frequent employment of anxious arousal and hyper-vigilance (Gilbert, 2001). The 
improved ability to reflect on cognitive products as fallible may also assist with 
challenging positive symptoms and delusional thoughts (Brüne et al., 2011). The ability 
to produce an accurate representation of one’s cognition and to reflect back on it will 
lead to improved control over cognition and better application of cognition to the real 
world (Lysaker et al., 2011). Thus improved metacognitive knowledge will lead to 
improved functional outcome in the community. 
Whilst neurocognitive deficits have proven links to impoverished psychosocial function 
(Green, 1999), metacognition may offer an explanation independent to neurocognition. 
Despite being considered relatively trait-like in schizophrenia (Lysaker & Dimaggio, 
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2014), metacognitive capacity is impacted by situational, cognitive and emotional 
demands (Dimaggio et al., 2007) and may therefore impact differently on capacity to 
complete daily tasks and actual real-world functioning. The ability to reflect back on 
cognitive products may be essential to the regulation of internal states and behaviours, 
which are crucial to global function (Beck et al., 2004). 
Metacognition can impact on function independently from cognition (Koriat & Goldsmith, 
1999). Koren, Seidman, Goldsmith, and Harvey, (2006) argue that functioning can 
persist in spite of poor cognitive processes through imparting the correct confidence on 
cognitive products (metacognitive monitoring) (i.e. being aware they may be erroneous) 
and metacognitive control (requesting for help). Improved awareness can precipitate the 
identification of inappropriate strategies (Lysaker et al., 2011b), allow better 
psychological problem solving, insight into symptoms, prevent overconfidence in 
erroneous cognitive products and therefore improve function (Nicolò et al., 2012). Thus, 
intact metacognition may bestow benefits on function independently from cognition. 
Previous studies have included varying measures of both metacognition and functional 
outcome each with differing design problems. Functional capacity is the ability to 
successfully complete everyday tasks under observation from a researcher (see section 
1.10 for further details). Capacity measures only assess the ability to conduct a task but 
not whether these are employed in real-life (Mckibben et al., 2004) and self-report 
measures of outcome are victim to bias and level of insight (Atkinson et al., 1997). 
Likewise, studies have often employed individual measures of metacognition (see table 
1) and investigating whether these relationships to functional outcome are observed 
across indices would therefore be valuable to understand. 
Previous research indicates that there is a relationship between measures of general 
cognition, aspects of metacognition, and functional outcome however the specific 
processing streams need further investigation (Nicolo et al., 2012; Lysaker et al., 2010b). 
In relation to bridging the relationship between neurocognition and function, deficits in 
monitoring one’s own mind and the mind of others may underpin functional deficits in 
those with schizophrenia (Frith 2012) and provide a unique barrier to functional recovery. 
A better understanding of the mechanisms driving functional recovery is essential to 
guiding clinical care and providing those with pertinent skills to return to community 
functioning after a period of illness. The present study will function as a ground clearing 
exercise to synthesis the nascent available evidence in a comprehensive fashion to 
provide support to further, refined investigation. To this end, the primary study aim will 
be to compare across studies the impact of neurocognition on metacognition, and 
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metacognition on function in schizophrenia and FEP. The magnitude and consistency of 
current evidence will be assessed towards this end. 
2.1.1 Study aims 
The primary goals of this review will therefore be to a) identify the patterns across studies 
for the relationship between cognition and metacognition, and b) to assess the overall 
relationship between metacognition and functional outcome across studies through a 
meta-analytic technique. 
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Studies investigating the relationship between cognition and metacognition were 
identified through a computerised search of the electronic databases Medline (PubMed), 
PsychINFO and Embase incorporating publications from the years 1983-2013. The 
syntax (schiz$ OR psychosis) AND (cogn$ or neurocogn$) AND (metacogn$) was 
included in the search strategy. Studies investigating the relationship between 
metacognition and functional outcome were also identified through a second 
computerised search with the syntax (schiz$ OR psychosis) AND (metacogn$) AND 
(function$). A secondary search of the grey literature to find unpublished data and PhD 
dissertations was completed with no additional papers found. Duplicate articles were 
removed, articles not written in English, editorials, study protocols, non-human 
populations, articles published solely in abstract form and conference proceedings and 
dissertation articles were also removed. Review articles and meta-analyses were 
excluded however the reference lists were systematically explored to ensure that any 
further articles missed in the original search strategy were included in the review. The 
retrieved studies’ abstract and reference sections were hand-screened for additional 
citations.  
For the purpose of this review social cognition was included as a cognitive variable as 
advised by factor analysis studies (Lysaker et al., 2013; Mehta et al., 2013) and 
correlational evidence strongly linking it to cognition (e.g. Bell et al., 2009). Articles 
looking at metacognition, confidence-based measures of performance and Beck’s 
cognitive insight (BCIS) (Beck et al., 2004), were grouped together as measures of 
metacognition. Self-reported measures of function have been shown to be victim to 
confounding factors such as insight, depression (Mckibben et al., 2004) and 
psychopathology (Atkinson et al., 1997) therefore only clinician-rated and objective 
measures of function were included in the overall analysis 
 2.2.1 Statistical analysis 
The observed correlations from each study were subjected to Fisher’s r-to-z 
transformations as advised by Hedges and Olkin (1985). The z-transformed correlations 
were then weighted by their inverse standard error. The sum of weights and sum of 
weighted effect sizes were calculated to produce the weighted mean effect size and 
heterogeneity was investigated using the Q and I2 statistic. Q statistics were then 
compared to critical values to ensure no violations of homogeneity (Hedges & Olkin, 
1985). Confidence intervals were calculated for all studies in addition to mean effect 
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sizes. A random effects model was employed (Hedge and Olkin, 1985) and results (Zr ) 
were transformed back to the r-metric prior to reporting. 
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2.3.1 Neurocognition’s relationship with metacognition
43 
 
Table 2 Systematic review results table: Neurocognition and functional outcome      
Year Author Sample N Cognition       Metacognition  
    Memory Attention Executive 
Function 
Social 
Cogni
tion 
Processing 
Speed 
Visual-
Spatial 
IQ General 
Cogniti
on 
MAS BCIS Confidence
-rating 
Questionnair
e 
2013 Abu-
Akel & 
Bo 
ICD-10 
diagnosis 
schizophrenia 
42               
2013 Lysaker 
et al., 
(2013) 
SCID 
diagnosis for 
schizophrenia 
or 
schizoaffectiv
e disorder 
95                 
2013 Giusti et 
al., 
Schizophrenia 20                  
2013 Mehta & 
Thirthalli 
Remitted 
schizophrenia 
60              
2012 Kother 
et al., 
MINI criteria 
for 
schizophrenia 
or 
schizoaffectiv
e disorder 
76               
2012 Bruno et 
al., 
DSM-IV 
criteria for 
schizophrenia 
28                 
2012 Hamm 
et al., 
SCID 
diagnosis for 
schizophrenia 
or 
schizoaffectiv
e disorder 
49                
2012 Nicolo 
et al., 
DSM-IV 
criteria for 
schizophrenia 
45                  
2012 Luedtke 
et al., 
SCID 
diagnosis for 
schizophrenia 
or 
schizoaffectiv
e disorder 
41               
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Table 2 Systematic review results table: Neurocognition and functional outcome      
Year Author Sample N Cognition       Metacognition  
    Memory Attention Executive 
Function 
Social 
Cogni
tion 
Processing 
Speed 
Visual-
Spatial 
IQ General 
Cogniti
on 
MAS BCIS Confidence
-rating 
Questionnair
e 
2011
a 
Lysaker, 
et al.,  
SCID 
diagnosis for 
schizophrenia 
or 
schizoaffectiv
e disorder 
98                  
2011
b 
Lysaker 
et al., 
SCID 
diagnosis for 
schizophrenia 
or 
schizoaffectiv
e disorder 
10
1                  
2011 Stratta 
et al., 
DSM-IV 
criteria for 
schizophrenia 
42               
2011 Bacon 
et al., 
DSM-IV 
criteria for 
schizophrenia 
34                
2011
b 
Lysaker 
et al, 
SCID 
diagnosis for 
schizophrenia 
or 
schizoaffectiv
e disorder 
35              
2010
b 
Lysaker 
et al., 
SCID 
diagnosis for 
schizophrenia 
or 
schizoaffectiv
e disorder 
10
2               
2010
a 
Lysaker 
et al., 
SCID 
diagnosis for 
schizophrenia 
or 
schizoaffectiv
e disorder 
37                
2010 Orfei et 
al., 
DSM-IV 
criteria for 
schizophrenia 
84                 
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Table 2 Systematic review results table: Neurocognition and functional outcome      
Year Author Sample N Cognition       Metacognition  
    Memory Attention Executive 
Function 
Social 
Cogni
tion 
Processing 
Speed 
Visual-
Spatial 
IQ General 
Cogniti
on 
MAS BCIS Confidence
-rating 
Questionnair
e 
2009 Bacon & 
Izaute, 
DSM-IV 
criteria for 
schizophrenia 
21               
2008 Lepage 
et al., 
(200 
FEP 51              
2008 Lysaker 
et al., 
SCID 
diagnosis for 
schizophrenia 
or 
schizoaffectiv
e disorder 
49 
             
2007 Lysaker 
et al., 
SCID 
diagnosis for 
schizophrenia 
or 
schizoaffectiv
e disorder 
69 
                  
2006 Soucha
y et al., 
DSM-IV 
criteria for 
schizophrenia 
16 
              
2005 Lysaker 
et al., 
SCID 
diagnosis for 
schizophrenia 
or 
schizoaffectiv
e disorder 
61 
                
2001 Bacon 
et al. 
DSM-IIIR 
diagnosis of 
schizophrenia 
19 
               
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The literature search identified 24 final papers that reported a relationship between 
cognition and metacognition. Based on findings from Lysaker et al., (2013) who found 
that the MAS and BCIS measures loaded on the same component in a Principle 
Component Analysis (PCA), these variables were combined when considering the 
relationship between metacognition and both cognition and functional outcome. 
Executive function comprised measures of WCST perseverations (1) and categories (6) 
and the Delis Kaplan Executive Function System categories subscale (1). Verbal IQ 
included the WAIS vocabulary subset (5 studies) and the National Adult Reading Test 
(1). For the memory analysis, the Hopkins Verbal Learning Test (1), Weschler Memory 
Scale visual reproduction or logical memory test (4), the N-back verbal memory task (1) 
and the Rey-15 word test (1) were combined. Social Cognition measures of the Bell-
Lysaker Emotional Recognition Task (4), the Four Factor Test of Social Intelligence (1), 
The False-Belief Task (1) and the Reading the mind in the Eyes Task (1) were combined 
to account for social cognition. 
The papers all included adult schizophrenia or FEP samples with the majority using a 
DSM-IV diagnostic criteria. The mean age of participants included in the review was 
39.54 (range 23.2-50.4). 
47 
 
 
 
Figure 5 Neurocognition and metacognition search result consort diagram 
2.3.2 Metacognition measurement 
Metacognition was measured through a variety of methods in the papers included. The 
MAS uses the Indiana Psychiatric Illness Interview (IPII), a semi-structured interview 
designed to explore narratives of both the self and illness in those with schizophrenia. 
The interview is designed to be conversational and participants are required to generate 
a personal narrative and self-reflect which can be analysed in terms of metacognitive 
capacity. The scale is comprised of 4 subscales; understanding one’s own mind or self-
reflectivity, understanding others’ mind, mastery and decentration. A higher score 
translates to improved metacognitive ability (see Lysaker et al., 2007 for validity and 
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reliability information). The MAS appears to assess synthetic forms of metacognitive 
processing which are effortful, deliberate and naturally occurring within personal 
narrative. 
The Beck Cognitive Insight Scale (BCIS) is a 15-item questionnaire assessing how 
participants assess their own judgements. The measure contains two subscales; self-
reflectivity and self-certainty relating to the ability to reflect back on cognition and 
confidence in cognitive products. An overall score of cognitive insight or composite index 
score is obtained by subtracting the self-certainty score from the self-reflectivity score 
(see Beck et al., 2004 for scale validation). The BCIS is a general reflection upon one’s 
thinking and is not context specific.  
The other main measure of metacognition was a confidence versus accuracy 
performance on a cognitive task measured through a correlation between the two 
measures. Bruno et al., (2012) adopt Koren’s meta-WCST paradigm which also includes 
the choice to include a response in the final total arguing that this is a more ecologically 
valid form of processing which addresses both the control and monitoring components 
of Nelson and Narens’ (2003) model. 
2.3.3 Overall cognition and metacognition 
An initial analysis was run to investigate the relationship between cognition and 
metacognition. Only one effect size from each paper was included to prevent the sample 
population being included twice. In the situation where two cognitive tasks were available 
from the same cognitive domain for a paper, the most commonly reported measure’s 
effect size was selected to match other papers in the analysis. 
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Figure 6 Cognition and metacognition forest plot 
Effect sizes were extracted from 13 papers to assess the relationship ranging from .13-
.58 and a total of 732 participants were pooled. The Q statistic was non-significant 
(Q=10.86, df=12, p>.05) and I2= 0 suggesting homogeneity of variance. The Z statistic 
suggests a significant relationship between cognition and metacognition (Z= 9.14, 
p<.001) and a mean effect size (𝐸𝑆̅̅̅̅ ) of .33 (95%+/- CI: .27, .40) suggests a moderate 
positive relationship exists between the variables. The study effect sizes and confidence 
intervals are available in figure 6 above. 
In regards to publication bias, the fail-safe N suggests that 374 studies with 0 effect sizes 
would need to exist to dissolve this significant effect and Kendall’s Tau also suggests 
little evidence for publication bias (𝜏(N=13)=.04 p=.855). The funnel plot is available in 
figure 7 below. 
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Figure 7 Funnel plot for cognition's relationship to metacognition 
Next, the relationship between individual cognitive domains and metacognition was 
investigated in separate analyses. 
2.3.4 Executive Function 
Figure 8 Executive function and metacognition forest plot (effect size and confidence intervals)  
Of the studies included for meta-analysis for the relationship between executive function 
and metacognition, the effect size range was from 0.03-0.47 and the total sample size 
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was 393 participants. The Q statistic was not significant across studies (Q= 11.25, df=7, 
p>.05) and the I2 statistic reports low heterogeneity across studies (I2= 12.5) suggesting 
homogeneity of cognitive measurement. The mean effect sizes across studies was 0.20 
(95%+/- CI: 0.10-0.31) and a significant Z score was also observed (z= 3.05, p=.002). 
The individual study effect sizes and confidence intervals are available in figure 8. This 
infers a small-moderate positive effect size (Cohen, 1992) between executive function 
and metacognitive processing therefore better executive function is associated with 
better metacognitive ability. 
An inspection of the fail-safe N value indicates that there would need to be 35 
unpublished studies with 0 effect sizes to ameliorate the significant effect found and an 
inspection of Kendall’s Tau suggests little publication bias (𝜏(N=8)=.07, p=.805). Despite 
a small number of studies present, the funnel plot provides corollary evidence for no 
significant publication bias being present (see figure 9 below). 
 
Figure 9 Executive function and metacognition funnel plot 
 
Higher executive function (as measured with the WCST) was found to be positively 
correlated with decentration and self-reflectivity, understanding one’s own mind (Lysaker 
et al., 2007), total MAS at baseline and 6 months (Hamm et al., 2012), and negatively 
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correlated with self-certainty (Orfei et al., 2010). This relationship to self-certainty 
persisted across measure of executive function (Guisti et al., 2013) however it must be 
noted that Lysaker et al., (2007) did not find this relationship for decentration alone and 
Bruno et al., (2012) found no significant association between executive function and any 
of the BCIS scores. This indicates that having trouble maintaining abstract concepts 
online and fluidly shifting from one abstract concept to another associates with being 
unable to identify one’s thoughts and feelings. Thus retained executive function is 
required for superior metacognitive ability. 
In summary, executive function appears conceptually to be critical to metacognitive 
processing as the ability to self-reflect requires shifting between different mental states 
and the integration of feedback to correct erroneous judgements. Poor executive function 
can lead to over-certainty in false beliefs. In addition, inhibition is also required to inhibit 
one’s own perspective in order to correctly interpret the mental states of others. Effect 
sizes however in the meta-analysis were small to moderate indicating that executive 
function on its own does not account for metacognition and other cognitive processes 
may be just as important. 
2.3.5 Memory 
 
 
Figure 10 Memory and metacognition forest plot (effect size and confidence intervals) 
Memory, alongside executive function, was one of the most consistently investigated 
cognitive variables throughout the papers. In regards to heterogeneity, the Q statistic 
was not found to be significant across studies for memory (Q=4.79, df=5, p>.05) and the 
I2 statistics confirms this (I2= 0). The range of effect sizes included in the meta-analysis 
was 0.09-0.58 and the individual study effect sizes and confidence intervals are available 
in figure 10. The 7 papers included 367 participants in total. The mean effect size for 
53 
 
memory’s relationship to metacognition was 0.28 (95%+/- CI 0.15:0.41) indicating a 
medium effect size. The Z statistic indicates a significant effect of memory on 
metacognition (Z= 4.07, p<.001). This infers that better memory performance is 
associated with better metacognitive processing.  
An inspection of the fail-safe N value indicates that there would need to be 66 
unpublished studies with 0 effect sizes to ameliorate the significant effect found and an 
inspection of Kendall’s Tau suggests little publication bias (𝜏(N=7)=.52, p=.099). Despite 
a small number of studies present, the funnel plot provides supprting evidence for no 
significant publication bias being present (see figure 11 below). 
 
Figure 11 Memory and metacognition funnel plot 
Positive correlations have been found between visual memory and understanding one’s 
own mind (Lysaker et al., 2005; 2007) and understanding the mind of others (Lysaker et 
al., 2005) and a negative relationship was found with self-certainty (Orfei et al., 2010). A 
similar relationship was found with verbal working memory and understanding the mind 
of others (Lysaker et al., 2005), understanding one’s own mind (Lysaker et al., 2005; 
2011), total MAS (Lysaker et al., 2011) and an inverse relationship with self-certainty 
(Orfei et al., 2010). Mastery was positively associated with verbal memory in Lysaker’s 
2005 study but this was not replicated in the 2010 or 2011b papers. Giusti et al., (2013) 
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found no relationship between immediate and delayed memory and indices of cognitive 
insight and Bruno et al., (2011) found no significant relationship with general memory 
and metamemory ability. Bruno et al., (2011) however did find more correct answers on 
a memory test to correlate with a low feeling of knowing compared to healthy controls. 
Lepage (2008) in an early paper, found a significant correlation with overall cognitive 
insight but this relationship was not found with self-reflectivity (the measure included for 
this review) and this effect was similarly found by Orfei et al., (2010). This could suggest 
that the relationship with self-certainty rather than reflectivity underpinned memory 
performance. Being less certain may lead to correcting erroneous performances and 
more conservative strategy adoption when completing tasks leading to improved 
performance. Finally, Kother et al, (2012) report that poor immediate recall was 
correlated with number of high confidence incorrect responses. 
In summary, metacognition measured over multiple indices has been found to relate to 
different aspects of memory. The most pronounced effect appears to be in the 
relationship between immediate memory and the metacognitive domain of 
understanding one’s own mind. In order to reflect back on one’s cognition, it must be 
held online for appraisal and often multiple pieces of information (e.g. the cognition, 
behaviour and outcome) must be simultaneously recalled which requires functional 
working memory. Furthermore, longer term memory may also be implicated as one 
needs to remember past events and mental states to begin with to inform future 
behaviours and behavioural strategy choices. The results of the meta-analysis suggest 
that working memory appears critical to metacognitive processing however Lysaker 
warns that for the true relationship to be revealed, a broader set of assessment methods 
must be incorporated into future study designs. There also seems to be a less linear 
relationship between cognitive insight and memory; this however could be an artefact of 
metacognitive measurement. The MAS requires in the moment assessment of previous 
mental states and therefore the information to be recalled and assessed. The BCIS with 
whom less consistent findings were available, only requires the individual to reflect 
generally with no specific information held online at the time of reflection. 
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2.3.6 IQ 
 
 
Figure 12 IQ and metacognition forest plot (effect sizes and confidence intervals) 
Individual study and mean effect sizes are available in figure 12. In regards to 
heterogeneity, the Q statistic was not found to be significant across studies for verbal IQ 
(Q= 6.02, df=5, p>.05) and the I2 statistic was also low (I2= 16) meaning a consistent 
relationship across studies and a total of 329 participants were included in the overall 
sample. The Z statistic reports a significant effect across studies (Z= 4.83, p <.001). The 
range of effect sizes for studies included in the meta-analysis was 0.10-0.48 and the 
mean effect size calculated across studies was 0.30 (95%+/-CI: 0.18:0.41). This infers a 
moderate effect size for verbal IQ’s relationship with metacognitive processing and 
demonstrates that as verbal IQ increases, metacognitive processing also improves. 
The fail-safe N statistic suggest that 58 unpublished studies would need to be available 
to negate the significant result obtained and Kendall’s Tau suggests little publication bias 
(𝜏(N=6)=.20, p=.573). Despite a small number of studies present, the funnel plot provides 
corollary evidence for no significant publication bias being present (see figure 13 below) 
although this must be interpreted with the fact that only 6 papers were included in 
analysis. 
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Figure 13 IQ and metacognition funnel plot 
Correlations are reported between verbal IQ and mastery (Nicolo et al., 2012; Lysaker 
et al., 2011a), understanding one’s own mind (Lysaker et al., 2007; Abu-Akel & Bo, 2013; 
Nicolo et al., 2012), total MAS score and understanding the mind of others (Abu-Akel & 
Bo, 2013; Nicolo et al., 2012). This pattern of relationship to understanding one’s own 
mind but not to decentration further persists across other IQ domains including arithmetic 
and block design (Lysaker et al., 2007). This suggests that a) metacognition associates 
with IQ across measures and b) that a stronger relationship exists with understanding 
one’s own mind than understanding that others have a different perspective to our own. 
 
Bruno et al., (2012) found borderline significant negative correlations between verbal 
performance and total IQ performance and the self-certainty subscale of the BCIS 
however little to no association was demonstrated on the other measures of cognitive 
insight (Orfei et al., 2010). In addition Bacon et al., (2009; 2001) and Souchay et al., 
(2006) all found no significant relationship between IQ and metamemory performance 
as measured by confidence ratings and Feeling of Knowing (FoK) judgements. In 
Lysaker et al’s., (2013) paper, verbal IQ failed to reach significance to an overall 
metacognitive factor which combined the MAS and BCIS total scores. This could infer 
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differing relationships between IQ and cognitive insight and metacognitive reflection 
which studies only including one measurement component suggest. 
 
Taken together, these findings suggest that deficits observed in metacognition cannot 
be straightforwardly attributed to overall intellectual impairment because certain 
cognitive domains may influence aspects of synthetic metacognition and self-reflection 
uniquely. 
2.3.7 Social Cognition 
Social cognition has one of the most clearly defined relationships with metacognition and 
the literature search found 9 papers investigating the relationship with metacognition. 
This relationship was so developed that some authors have progressed to assessing it’s 
distinctness from indices of metacognition (Efklides, 2008; Lincoln et al., 2011). A meta-
analytic technique was run with effect sizes extracted from 7 of the papers with effect 
sizes ranging from .07-.73 and a total of 358 participants. 
 
The Q (Q=6.89, df= 6, p>.05) and I2 (I2=.13) statistics suggest homogeneity in study 
findings and a significant Z statistic (Z= 3.64, p<.001) suggest a significant relationship 
between social cognition and metacognition. A means effect size of .35 (+/-95% 
CI:.17, .51) once again suggest a moderate positive relationship between social 
cognition and metacognition (individual study effect sizes and confidence intervals are 
available in figure 14 below). 
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Figure 14 Social cognition and metacognition forest plot 
The fail-safe N value suggests that 104 unpublished studies would need to be available 
to negate the significant finding and Kendall’s Tau was also non-significant (𝜏(N=7)=.05, 
p=.881) providing little evidence of publication bias. The funnel plot is available in figure 
15 below. 
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Figure 15 Funnel plot of effect sizes for social cognition and metacognition 
 
Lysaker et al., back in 2007 determined that identification of negative emotions was 
significantly correlated with understanding one’s own mind, and with decentration at both 
baseline and 6 month follow-up (Hamm et al., 2012). However these results surprisingly 
were not replicated when identifying positive emotions. Identification of negative 
emotions in the other was also found in higher scoring individuals on the self-reflectivity 
subscale of the MAS. The lack of difference between the decentered and non-
decentered groups on the emotional recognition measure (BLERT) indicates that making 
sense of other’ intentions is a more sophisticated skill than identifying emotions alone. 
The relationship of metacognition with poor negative emotion identification in others 
therefore may exacerbate or precipitate social avoidance and symptoms such as 
paranoia. By inaccurately concluding that others are experiencing negative emotions 
towards you, may allow paranoia to develop. Identifying the perspective of another is 
contingent upon being able to correctly interpret emotional states so a relationship 
between these variables makes sense to interpret. 
 
Lysaker et al., (2011b) look to further tease this relationship apart investigating the 
relationship between different facets of social cognition and cognitive insight. They found 
that social cognitive tasks correlated with each other but the aggregated social cognitive 
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variables did not correlate with BCIS self-reflection and self-certainty measures. This is 
evidence for a semi-independent function in social cognition and cognitive insight; thus 
the ability to clearly judge one’s own thoughts (self-reflection) requires a 
metarepresentation of internal processes and is distinct conceptually from the ability to 
deduce emotions and thoughts in another. The theory of an overarching, unitary 
‘mentalizing system’ is hard to justify with this evidence; indeed Lysaker et al., (2013) 
undertook a factor analysis of emotional recognition, ToM, MAS and BCIS scores and 
found two distinct components relating to social cognition (BLERT, Eyes Test and hinting 
task) and metacognitive awareness (MAS and BCIS). This distinction has also been 
found by Mehta and Thirthalli (2013).  
Lysaker et al., (2013) advocate that the study demonstrates separate processing for an 
ability to interpret discrete ideas about the thoughts and feelings of others (social 
cognition) and the ability to formulate synthetic, complex representations of both oneself 
and oneself in relation to another (metacognition). However these separate processing 
routes are indelibly linked.  
 
2.3.8 Attention 
Attention has received considerably less investigation than the aforementioned cognitive 
domains with only two papers in the present review investigating this relationship 
specifically. Lysaker et al., (2011) employed the Conner Continuous Performance Test 
(CPT) and compared groups based upon MAS self-reflectivity and social cognition 
profiles. Despite other cognitive domains demonstrating significant differences across 
groups, selective attention failed to obtain this with the self-aware/other aware actually 
demonstrating a slight decrease in attention. Lepage et al., (2008) also failed to find a 
significant association between attention and self-reflectivity although the self-certainty 
and composite index scores found trend level significant relationships. 
 
2.3.9 Processing Speed 
Five papers included processing speed and it has been demonstrated to associate with 
understanding one’s own mind (Lysaker et al., 2005; 2011) and mastery (Lysaker et al., 
2011) however not with understanding the mind of others (Lysaker et al., 2005). 
Furthermore, processing speed was found to predict 10% of the variance in 
understanding one’s own mind. The authors conclude that the metacognitive ability to 
understand one’s own mind is influenced by markers of general cognitive function. This 
finding is replicated in later papers in the domains of self-reflectivity and mastery 
(Lysaker et al., 2011) with participants high in both metacognitive domains 
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demonstrating significantly faster processing speed scores. Nicolo et al., (2012) in 
comparison found significant correlations between processing speed and understanding 
one’s own mind, understanding the mind of others and mastery, extending previous 
findings in a more emphatic manner. Overall, studies indicate that processing speed is 
important to metacognitive function however the current evidence available needs 
refinement and the exact mechanisms need to be determined in relation to other 
cognitive variables. Presumably higher order metacognitive tasks require mental 
flexibility and the ability to switch between mental states in order to assess them 
successfully which relies on processing speed. 
2.3.10 Visual-Spatial Intelligence 
Three studies included assessments of visual-spatial abilities, often considered a 
measurement of non-verbal intelligence; Lysaker et al., (2007), Orfei et al., (2010) and 
Giusti et al., (2013). Lysaker et al., report a significant association between the block 
design task and understanding one’s own mind and found a significant difference 
between those high in self-reflectivity and decentration and those low and without 
decentration. Giusti et al., (2013) report a significant positive correlation between the 
self-reflectivity subscale of the BCIS and visual-spatial intelligence. The composite index 
and self-certainty subscales failed to achieve significance. Orfei et al., (2010) failed to 
find any significant correlations between visual-spatial function, and the BCIS. These 
equivocal findings indicate that visual-spatial intelligence may relate to metacognitive 
function as a reflection of general cognitive impairment rather than having a specific 
relationship itself.  
2.3.11 General Cognition 
Finally, 2 papers completed PCA analysis on a variety of cognitive tasks to produce a 
composite cognition factor. Guisti et al., (2013) found no significant relationship between 
overall cognition and any of the BCIS scales however Lysaker et al., (2010) found a 
significant relationship between cognition and the MAS subscale of Mastery. Lysaker et 
al., (2010) assess this finding and report that in order to respond to psychological and 
interpersonal difficulties, a degree of neurocognition is required to process and react 
appropriately. It should be noted however that whilst both papers employed a version of 
the WCST task of executive function, the other composite tasks were different and may 
explain the difference in findings. Which variable(s) are driving the relationship remains 
hidden and future research in the area must focus on unearthing the mechanics of the 
relationship between general cognition and metacognitive processing. 
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2.4.1 Metacognition’s relationship with functional outcome 
Table three contains the individual study information for those included in the meta-
analysis of the relationship between metacognition and functional outcome. 
Metacognition was measured through a variety of methods in the papers included. Three 
of the studies included the Metacognition Assessment Scale (MAS) as their 
measurement of metacognitive processing, one the WCST-meta paradigm and one the 
Beck Cognitive Insight Scale. The WCST-meta measure of metcognition involves a 
confidence versus accuracy performance on a cognitive task measured as a correlation. 
Stratta et al., (2009) adopt Koren’s WCST-meta paradigm which also includes the choice 
to include a response in the final total arguing that this is a more ecologically valid form 
of processing which addresses both the control and monitoring components of Nelson 
and Narens’ (2003) metacognitive model. 
The outcome measures were more disparate in their scope. Luedtke et al., (2012) 
estimate outcome by comparing the partcipant self-rating of work performance to the 
rating attributed by a researcher. Tas et al., (2012) likewise employ the difference 
between predicted performance and actual performance on a task and Lysaker et al., 
(2011) measure functional capacity through the performance-based skills assessment 
battery (UPSA). The aforementioned outcome measures are considered to measure 
functional capacity and are the first 3 studies included in the forest plot above. The latter 
2 studies employed the GAF which is a measure of objective functional outcome. 
Table 3 Systematic review results table: Metacognition and functional outcome 
Study Diagnosis Population Metacognition 
measure 
Outcome 
measure 
Effect 
size 
Luedtke et 
al., (2012) 
SCID DSM-IV criteria 
schizophrenia/schizoaffective 
disorder 
41 Metacognition 
Assessment 
Scale 
Accuracy of 
Work 
Performance 
Appraisal 
.55 
Tas et al., 
(2012) 
SCID DSM-IV criteria 
schizophrenia/schizoaffective 
disorder 
52 Metacognition 
Assessment 
Scale 
Learning 
Potential 
.32 
Lysaker et 
al., (2011) 
DSM-IV criteria for schizophrenia 45 Metacognition 
Assessment 
Scale 
Functional 
Capacity  
.2 
Stratta et 
al., 2009) 
DSM-IV criteria for schizophrenia 20 Wisconsin 
Card Sorting 
Task-meta 
Global 
Assessment 
of Functioning 
.57 
O’Connor 
et al., 
(2013) 
DSM-IV criteria schizophrenia or 
related disorder, or affective 
disorder with psychotic features 
127 Beck Cognitive 
Insight Scale 
Global 
Assessment 
of Functioning 
.14 
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The five studies included for the meta-analysis had an effect size range of 0.14 to 0.57 
and the total sample size was 285. The Q (Q= 3.96, df=4, p>.05) and I2 (I2= 0) statistic 
suggest homogeneity was present across study domains indicating that there was not a 
significant difference in effect sizes found across studies. The mean effect size across 
studies was .33, the confidence intervals (CI.95) were .15 (lower) to .49 (upper) and a 
highly significant associated Z score between studies was also observed (z= 3.42, 
p=.001). The forest plot with individual study and mean effect size and confidence 
intervals is available in figure 16 below. This infers a moderate positive (Cohen, 1992) 
relationship between metacognitive ability and function therefore as metacognitive ability 
improves so does function.  
 
Figure 16 Metacognition and functional outcome forest plot (effect sizes and confidence intervals) 
An inspection of the fail-safe N value indicates that there would need to be 46 
unpublished studies with 0 effect sizes to ameliorate the significant effect found and an 
inspection of Kendall’s Tau suggests little publication bias (𝜏(N=5)=.6, p=.142). Despite 
a small number of studies present, the funnel plot provides corollary evidence for no 
significant publication bias being present (see figure 17 below). 
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Figure 17 Metacognition and functional outcome funnel plot 
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The results indicate that dysfunctional metacognitive processing is associated with 
impoverished cognitive processing as demonstrated in cross-sectional studies gathered 
from the last 15 years. The individual meta-analyses results indicate a small to moderate 
effect size for different aspects of cognition on metacognitive processing. The most 
striking effect size was observed in the cognitive domain of social cognition in the present 
study. The second analysis confirms that there is a moderate relationship between 
metacognition and functional outcome across studies. 
 2.5.1 The relationship between cognition and metacognition 
Firstly, an overall significant relationship was found between combined measures of 
cognition and metacognition and a moderate mean effect size was reported. In relation 
to individual cognitive domains and metacognition, executive function was the most 
frequently investigated cognitive domain however the present meta-analysis only 
indicated a small-moderate effect size. The relationship between executive function and 
confidence-based measures of metacognition rather than the MAS and BCIS is made 
slightly more complicated by the fact that a measure of executive function was often 
incorporated into the metacognitive judgement in design (such as in the case of the meta-
WCST). This makes the relationship slightly harder to tease apart. In terms of 
metacognitive knowledge, conceptually the relationship makes sense. In order to 
produce and form mental states, a series of cognitive abilities (recall, emotional 
recognition) are required, however in order to do this successfully, one must be able to 
switch between tasks effectively and inhibit irrelevant information to judge and reflect. 
Likewise, in relation to the BCIS, executive function in addition to memory may be 
required in order to hold contextual information online to assess judgements and notice 
distortions or erroneous outputs/conclusions. 
Working Memory has certainly been associated with the MAS as, in order to consider 
mental states, these mental states need to be recalled in the first instance. Episodic 
memory is required to remember previous events, contextual and self-relevant aspects 
to the event, and why one chose particular strategies during the situation. Similarly, 
memory deficits were reported in the majority of studies incorporating the BCIS as a 
measure of metacognition; in order to assess the validity of one’s previous judgements 
and success, memory is required to reflect back accurately. The confidence-based 
measures in comparison, are immediate inferences and are seemingly less dependent 
upon memory (although still draw upon this to an extent) as decisions are made straight 
after attending to a task. One concern in terms of assessing memory in the above 
reviews appears to be a lack of consensus on measurement tasks and types of memory 
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assessed; a variety of memory aspects have been investigated through different designs. 
Working memory and delayed verbal memory may related differently to metacognition. 
Social cognition demonstrated the strongest relationship to metacognition with a 
moderate effect size. This relationship validates the speculations among authors to 
ensure that they are indeed distinct from one another however Lysaker et al., (2013) did 
find this. The task with the strongest effect sizes appears to be the BLERT which requires 
participants to assess emotional states within others; this may overlap with 
understanding the mind of others contained in the MAS although once again, authors do 
suggest that these are processing units from discrete versus synthetic higher-order 
processing. They are related but distinct processing avenues drawing on related but 
separate processing pathways (Lysaker et al., 2013). 
Processing speed deficits have been well documented in schizophrenia research and 
the papers reviewed here offer some evidence for a relationship with metacognition too. 
However it is noteworthy that none of the papers incorporating confidence-based 
measures or the BCIS included processing speed so comments offered on this aspect 
of metacognition are limited to conjecture. Dickinson, Ramsey and Gold (2007) argue 
that processing speed underpins higher cognitive faculties such as executive function 
therefore impaired processing speed may underlie the relation between executive 
function and metacognitive performance. Whether a poverty in processing speed inhibits 
moment-by-moment assessment of cognitive performance would be worth further 
investigation. Intuitively, this appeals more to confidence-based measures or implicit 
metacognitive processing rather than the reflective nature of the BCIS however further 
evidence is warranted before assertions can be made. Confidence-based judgements 
are typically made immediately after a task therefore may be contingent on processing 
both the task and making a decision on how accurate the performance was whereas 
reflexive metacognitive knowledge may be more dependent on memory and executive 
function. 
Attention appeared to have the weakest relationship with either measure of 
metacognition. This could infer that completing metacognitive tasks requires little more 
attention than required for the task itself. One interpretation is that reflection and mental 
state assessment do not require much attention and any trend level effects could just be 
echoes from a general cognitive blunting however this is speculative as the present 
review could not investigate this relationship. 
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 2.5.2 Limitations 
As with all meta-analysis, there were some systemic problems in the data included in 
analysis. Firstly, due to different study designs, the analysis had to find a balance 
between conceptual integrity when combining variables, and running analysis on a 
meaningful amount of data. The verbal IQ analysis was conducted on six studies and 
the executive function and memory on eight. Whilst there is preliminary evidence to 
suggest that the MAS and BCIS are homogenous in measurement (Lysaker et al., 2013), 
more work needs to be completed in the area to improve confidence in this conceptual 
alignment. Previous meta-analyses have reported that cognitive function deficits in 
schizophrenia that measure IQ by the WAIS produce larger effect sizes than those 
investigated by non-WAIS assessment (Heinrichs & Zakanis, 1998; Mesholam-gately et 
al., 2009). They attribute this to differential degrees of sensitivity within intellectual ability 
testing. The effect sizes included in the meta-analysis for verbal IQ were larger in the 
studies that included the WAIS (0.34-0.38) than those that used non-WAIS measures 
(0.1-0.165) thus the mean effect size observed may be attributable to the WAIS 
sensitivity. This potentially could underpin the effects found in other cognitive domains 
and systematic reviews comparing different methods of cognitive function measurement 
may wish to investigate this. 
Similarly, the meta-analysis employed multiple measures of memory when calculating 
mean effect sizes. In order to complete a meta-analysis, studies had to be grouped 
together across measures for numbers however there is some evidence alluding to 
memory deficits being more pronounced in some modalities rather than others (Aas et 
al., 2014). The most severe deficits appear to be observed in verbal working memory. 
Future studies may want to assess the differing functional domains and compare the 
impact of different types of memory on metacognition although it must be noted that a 
heterogeneity analysis did not raise any significant concerns. 
The lack of consistently employed, standardised measures makes cross-study 
comparisons difficult (Green et al., 2008). There has been a consensus in schizophrenia 
research to address this problem and great steps have been made in introducing the 
MATRICS neurocognitive battery (Nuechterlein et al., 2012) however the studies 
reported in this review have yet to benefit from this initiative. Likewise, even studies 
employing the MAS tended to report different subscales, and infrequently total scores, 
which prevents assessing the influence of differing cognitive domains on different 
aspects of metacognitive function. 
Metacognition is defined differently by authors and the search term may also have been 
problematic; some papers looking at related areas may have been missed due to using 
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a different description such as mentalizing (Abu-Akel & Bo, 2013) or high-order thought 
(Rosenthal, 2000) which are metacognitive in nature.  
Due to the nascent research area, fewer studies were available and, publication bias can 
be a factor in meta-analyses as significant results tend to be reported in papers and non-
significant results omitted. Whilst in the present review authors took every step to avoid 
this, not all authors were able to be contacted to obtain any related data therefore some 
data may be missing. A final problem was found in the sample descriptions; whilst some 
studies reported that the sample recruited was from a higher-functioning cohort, some 
of the studies employed different diagnostic entry criteria and some gave little description 
other than ‘persons with schizophrenia’. Thus certainty that similar clinical profiles are 
being compared is difficult to claim. Likewise, only one of the studies was completed in 
FEP; whilst work on both neurocognition (Meshalom-Gately et al., 2013) and 
metacognition (Macbeth et al., 2014) have been investigated in FEP, the relationship 
between neurocognition, metacognition and functional outcome specifically has not. 
Lepage et al., (2008) found no significant relationship between the BCIS and memory 
however whether this is symptomatic of the relationship having not manifest in early-
onset samples or whether this was due to measures selection is hard to elucidate due 
to the dearth of studies. 
2.5.3.Future directions 
One of the main suggestions made in the studies included in the present review relates 
to future studies needing to replicate findings in different cohorts. Many of the 
confidence–based designs employed small sample sizes and higher-functioning 
samples which place restrictions on inferences that can be made on results. A plethora 
of studies list sample selection as a potential problem, with schizophrenia samples 
largely comprised of middle-aged, chronic presentation males. The relationships found 
may be due to treatment exposures, neuroleptic medication administration or 
rehabilitation efforts therefore replication must be made in more diverse samples such 
as FEP, those refusing treatment and female participants. For example, neuroleptic 
medication has been demonstrated to impair processing speed in schizophrenia 
(Veselinovic et al., 2013) and processing speed has been linked to both working memory 
and executive function. Whether the deficits observed in these domains is due to 
cognitive impairment or impairment due to medication exposure would be valuable to 
investigate. The metacognitive profiles may be different in earlier phases of illness and 
neurocognitive function can be assessed prior to extended treatment effects. Towards 
this end, future studies need to be completed in FEP to i) address the aforementioned 
potential confounding variables ii) to assess at which stage of illness the deficits may 
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occur and iii) to understanding the causes of schizophrenia. Similarly, the majority of 
investigations were cross-sectional and only employed restricted measures of both 
neurocognition and metacognition. Future researchers need to employ multiple 
measures of both neurocognition and metacognition across longitudinal designs to really 
excavate the relationship between these concepts.  
Social cognition also requires further clarification as to how different aspects relate to 
each other. Studies have employed multiple measures of emotional recognition, theory 
of mind and social inference and headway has been made in looking at the relationship 
between neurocognition and function (e.g. Horan et al., 2011). Studies in the present 
review appear to have mainly included the Reading the Mind in the Eyes test and the 
BLERT which provide conflicting results. As to how much they measure the same skill 
and are therefore combinable for a review needs clarification. The relationship between 
discrete social processing and synthetic metacognitive processing also needs more 
refinement as conceptually they appear to overlap to a degree. Hamm et al., (2012) did 
look into the two concepts and found a distinct but significant relationship. Preliminary 
research infers that social cognition is multifaceted (Bell et al., 2009) and may have two 
tiers of function; emotional perception and emotional regulation (Lin et al., 2012) and 
higher order inferential tasks such as egocentricity (Bell et al., 2009). These higher-order 
social cognitive tasks have been omitted from studies to date. To what extent these 
inferential tasks overlap with metacognition, symptoms and ultimately function needs 
further investigation as higher-order social cognition such as the ability to detach oneself 
from the other may be closer to metacognitive processing than social cognition. 
2.5.4 The relationship between metacognition and functional outcome 
The results of the second meta-analysis indicate that metacognitive processing has a 
moderate sized effect on functional outcome in schizophrenia. Furthermore, These 
individual effects observed in the preliminary studies are consistently found across 
designs. Put simply, better metacognitive abilities relate to better functional outcome in 
those with a diagnosis of schizophrenia as demonstrated across a larger participant pool 
in the present study. Despite the few studies included in this exploratory meta-analysis, 
there is little indication of publication bias and a large amount of unpublished studies 
would need to be present in order to ameliorate the observed relationship found in 
analysis. 
Functional outcome 
Cognitive insight as a measure of metacognition correlated with functional outcome in 
the O’Connor study and metacognitive accuracy was significantly related to the same 
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outcome measure (Stratta et al., 2009). The authors suggest that the monitoring and 
control of cognitive strategies assessed using the WCST-meta paradigm are also 
required for the initiation and maintenance of interpersonal relationship. These 
metacognitive abilities may be more pertinent skills to successful community integration 
than cognitive ability alone. Interestingly, O’Connor et al., (2009) found that once 
negative symptoms, ethnicity and gender were controlled for in analysis, this relationship 
between cognitive insight and outcome was not significant. This may be reflective of 
cognitive insight having a more pronounced impact on function longer term as 
measurements were only taken 12 months from baseline. A stronger correlation was 
found between cognitive insight and the symptom severity construct of the GAF (.32) 
and a significant relationship was also found between cognitive insight and 
psychopathology as measured by the PANSS. This may also indicate that cognitive 
insight is more closely related to general psychopathology then psychosocial function. 
The authors speculate that the translation of these impairments to functional impairment 
rather than psychopathology may occur later into the illness course therefore studies 
looking at this dynamic overtime may prove valuable. Another potential explanation is 
that this relationship may be reciprocal rather than unidimensional; a lack of cognitive 
insight may foster symptom development unchecked and the persistence of symptoms 
may hinder self-reflection through cognitive disruption and bias assessment of cognition. 
This symbiotic cycle may lead to functional disability and holding down social and 
occupational relationships may be impacted. The relationship between cognitive insight 
and psychopathology has been inconsistently found across studies (Favrod et al., 2008) 
therefore the direction of this relationship may be important to further investigate. 
Functional capacity 
The metacognitive domain of mastery (Lysaker et al., 2011; Tas et al., 2011) and self-
reflectivity (Luedtke et al., 2011) were significantly related to overall functional capacity 
across studies and specific outcome measures. Mastery, being a measure of the ability 
to use metacognitive knowledge to respond to challenges and solve psychological 
problems, and self-reflectivity, may underpin the ability to learn new tasks and solve 
problems. These are critical skills for successful occupational function. The ability to 
identify solutions to interpersonal social problems and reflect back and identify social 
strategy choices as either successful or erroneous is critical to regaining community 
function. Conversely, an inability to use metacognitive strategies to respond to difficult 
situations may lead to a reliance upon basic evolutionary defences (Gilbert, 2001), an 
avoidance of difficult or confusing social situations and the atrophy of functional skills 
(Lysaker et al., 2011). Further analysis of Lysaker’s study reveals that the association 
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between mastery and functional capacity is largely underpinned by the 
comprehension/planning subscale of the UPSA. This is indicative of metacognition being 
required to anticipate future events, situations and interpersonal interactions as a pre-
emptive measure rather than solely relying upon online metacognitive processes to react 
to current circumstances in the moment. Tas et al., (2012) also incorporate intrinsic 
motivation into analysis and suggest that improved metacognitive processing allows the 
personal relevance of a task to become more integrated thus improving learning potential.  
2.5.5 Limitations and recommendations 
The present analysis must be considered exploratory rather than definitive and 
inferences must be made with certain limitations in mind. Firstly, only 5 studies were 
included in the sample which restricts the power of the analysis and the scope of the 
investigation. An inclusion criteria had to be decided upon which lead to the exclusion of 
many papers. This is reflective of the disparate measurement of both variables in 
research. Despite preceding studies offering support to metacognitive variables relating 
to one another, a refined understanding of how they interact and whether they measure 
explicitly the same metacognitive domain is yet to be produced. Most modern models of 
metacognition report there to be different ‘levels’ of processing at play, the WCST-meta 
task reflects more intuitive, subconscious, implicit knowledge of cognitive processes 
whereas the MAS is an explicit, conscious, narrative of mental states integration in social 
contexts. Whilst they are in most conceptualisations part of a meta-level system, a lack 
of standardisation in measurement of metacognition makes cross-study comparisons 
problematic. Different metacognitive abilities may relate independently to function and if 
more studies were available, a separate analysis would shed light on specific pathways 
between levels of metacognitive process and constituent parts of function. Likewise, the 
studies included were of a correlational nature restricting the inference of causal links 
between variables. Study designs incorporating multiple measures of both metacognition 
and different indices of outcome would be a valuable addition to the research landscape. 
Likewise, longitudinal studies tracking the relationship between metacognition and 
function over time would also provide a valuable insight as all the studies included were 
cross-sectional in nature. 
One of the main problems identified in the literature is capturing the nature of functioning 
in schizophrenia. In two of the studies, the index of actual performance by which the self-
reported performance data was compared was a clinician-based assessment. 
Performance-based measures are being suggested as a better measurement of function 
(Depp et al., 2012) however only one study in the present review assessed functional 
outcome this way. The Tas et al., (2012) paper employed learning potential as an 
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outcome measure however, with Wykes and Reeder’s (2005) suggestions that learned 
skills do not necessarily convert to utilisation in the community, this is arguably a 
prerequisite rather than a guarantee of psychosocial function. Finally, Tas et al., (2012) 
included a measure of functional outcome that assessed actual performance against 
expected performance based on WCST performance. How researchers measure an 
expected trajectory of learning potential on basic demographic and cognitive abilities is 
difficult to defend with the multi-faceted determinants of expected outcome. 
Whilst the inspection of publication bias did not highlight any significant ‘file-draw’ 
problems, studies did not always report all of the gathered data across constructs. The 
full reporting of different aspects of outcome and refraining from the use of composite 
aspects of function would make comparisons more impactful. Likewise in the case of the 
MAS, the scale has 4 subscales, and studies varied in which domain was included as a 
measure of metacognition and often only reported one of them. If all 4 domains were 
included in reporting a more comprehensive comparison could be made. 
2.5.6 Conclusions 
In conclusion, the present meta-analysis found small to moderate effects across the 
domains of executive function, memory and verbal IQ on metacognitive processing and 
a moderate effect of metacognition on function. A better understanding of the mechanics 
driving individual recovery in function with schizophrenia is essential and may be used 
to further the known relationship between neurocognition and function. Aspects of 
metacognition have the scope to contribute to the ability for an individual to return to 
work, maintain social relationships, live independently and manage symptoms in the 
community. Questions remain about the manner in which negative symptoms (also 
implicated in functional outcome) interact with metacognition and functional outcome. 
Also, how these relationships change over time may of importance to understanding 
recovery. Potentially symptoms may be more predictive of cross-sectional functioning 
however longer-term, metacognition may be of importance once symptoms have been 
addressed. By understanding the relationship further, cognitive remediation and 
metacognitive behavioural therapy can be focused and refined to give those with a 
schizophrenia diagnosis the raw skills to regain both functional abilities and symptom 
management. 
2.6 Chapter summary 
The aforementioned reviews demonstrate that existing research i) empirically confirms 
a relationship between cognitive and metacognitive function ii) improved metacognition 
is associated with better functional capacity and outcome. If this is considered with the 
findings in chapter one that neurocognition is related to function but does not account for 
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the entire relationship, metacognition may bridge the gap in the relationship. This could 
offer insight into the determinants of recovery from schizophrenia. 
2.7 Chapter limitations 
The aforementioned conclusions must be made with limitations in mind however. Due to 
multiple measures being used in different studies, the exact nature of relationships and 
comparisons between studies is problematic. Different measurements of metacognition 
may draw on different cognitive domains so synthesising studies is conceptually difficult 
to consolidate despite known correlations between the MAS and BCIS. Less is known 
about the relationship between confidence-based judgements, BCIS and the MAS and 
these were combined in the first analysis. Likewise, functional capacity and outcome are 
known to be related but distinct concepts and were combined in the second analysis. 
Therefore this review must function as a ground-clearing rather than definitive 
assessment of the literature. The main drawback of the evidence included in this review 
is the research being grounded in chronic schizophrenia samples. This makes it difficult 
to unpick whether relationships observed are due to longer-term exposure to medication 
or differing access to therapies. Work conducted in early stage psychosis will avoid some 
of these concerns. These limitations will be addressed in the next two empirical chapters 
through a mediation analysis looking directly at neurocognition, metacognition and both 
objective and functional capacity and an MRI structural investigation. 
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Chapter 3: Metacognition as a 
mediator between neurocognition and 
functional outcome in FEP. 
3.1.1Neurocognition 
Neurocognitive deficits in schizophrenia have long been observed (Kraeplin, 1919), 
considered a core feature of the disorder (Reichenberg & Harvey, 2007) and even been 
considered a vulnerability marker for later schizophrenia development (Nuechterlein et 
al., 2012). Deficits are observed in working memory (Lee & Park, 2005) executive 
function (Sullivan, Shear, Zipursky, Sagar, & Pfefferbaum, 1994), language (Kuperberg, 
2010), attention and general IQ (Heinrichs & Zakzanis, 1998b) amongst a host of other 
indices. Researchers differ over whether the cognitive deficits can be considered a 
consequence of generalised impairment (Dickinson, Iannone, Wilk, & Gold, 2004) or 
whether there are distinct cognitive deficit profiles (Reichenberg et al., 2009). In addition, 
different neurocognitive processing domains have been found to relate to differing 
symptom profiles (Nieuwenstein, Aleman, & de Haan, 2001; Greenwood et al. 2008) (see 
section 1.2). 
3.1.2 Relationship with functional outcome 
Whilst cognitive deficits have been known to exist for a long time, it was Michael Green’s 
work in the 1990s that highlighted the importance of cognitive ability in predicting 
functional recovery in the community and placed neurocognition as a focal point in the 
eye of then contemporary research (Green, 1996; Green et al., 2000). Cognitive 
performance has been associated with improved self-reported quality of life (Addington 
& Addington, 2000), social (Stirling et al., 2003) and occupational outcomes (Jaeger et 
al., 2003) and these relationships persist in longitudinal designs (see Green, Kern, & 
Heaton, 2004 for a review). However later reviews found inconsistent measurement of 
cognition across studies (Green, Nuechterlein, et al., 2004) and the magnitude of the 
relationship appears limited (Schmidt et al., 2011). Cognitive remediation programmes 
were introduced to exploit this relationship; by improving an individual’s cognitive skills, 
community outcomes would also improve (Wykes et al., 2011). However these 
interventions did not necessarily lead to real-world improvements in functional status 
(Wykes & Reeder, 2008) (see section 1.11). This led to the search for mediating 
variables between the two constructs to account for the relationship.  
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One such candidate variable to explain the unaccounted for variance in the relationship 
between neurocognition and functional outcome is metacognition (see chapter 1, section 
1.13 for further details) which has been observed to have a relationship between both 
neurocognition (Nicolò et al., 2012) and functional status (e.g. Lysaker et al., 2011) (see 
chapter 2 for a full review of these relationships). 
3.1.3 Metacognition 
Metacognition is broadly defined as ‘thinking about thinking’ (Frith, 2012) and relates to 
our ability to inspect cognitive products and mental states (Lysaker et al., 2005) and 
objectively scrutinise them (Brüne et al., 2011). This higher-order ability draws upon 
cognitive skills to process self-referential information and may be essential to the 
integration of raw cognitive processing into a complex and constantly evolving social 
world (Lysaker et al., 2010). Thus it is what we know that we know that is important 
(Koriat, 2008), Being unaware of erroneous decisions may lead to inaccurate social 
interpretations and poor behavioural response choices fostering social disability.  
 
Metacognition can be both conceptualised and measured in a number of ways (see 
section 1.14 for further details). One particular approach has been through assessing an 
individual’s ability to describe and reflect back on their own cognition, differentiate 
between mental state transitions, their relationship to emotion and behaviour and to 
differentiate between one’s own and the mental states of others (Lysaker et al., 2008; 
Semerari et al., 2003). The Metacognitive Assessment Interview (MAI) encourages the 
interviewee to describe their own mental products in a free narrative account guided by 
the interviewer. This ability has been associated with the insight we have into our own 
cognition called cognitive insight (Beck et al., 2004) which places demands upon the 
individual to demonstrate an awareness of the fallibility of cognition and consider 
alternative interpretations of events. Both assessments of metacognition have been 
found to relate to functioning (Giusti, Mazza, Pollice, Casacchia, & Roncone, 2013; 
Lysaker, Shea, et al., 2010) and neurocognition (Lysaker, Dimaggio, Buck, Carcione, & 
Nicolò, 2007) although the findings for cognitive insight appear more mixed (Lepage et 
al., 2008). In addition, few studies have investigated the extent to which the two 
measures overlap although Lysaker et al., (2013) did find them to load onto a 
metacognitive awareness factor separable from neurocognition in a factor analysis. This 
would provide insight into the extent that different measures of metacognitive processing 
inhabit a shared ubiquitous metacognitive system and relate to functioning. 
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3.1.4 Metacognition as a mediator 
A domain of metacognition (mastery or the ability to use mental state information to solve 
psychological challenges) has been found to mediate the relationship between 
neurocognition and social functioning in a chronic schizophrenia sample (Lysaker, Shea, 
et al., 2010). However whether this mediation is pervasive or specific to this aspect of 
metacognition, and whether it is present in early stage samples, needs to be addressed 
(Lysaker et al., 2010). This will assess whether deficits are present before chronic stages 
of illness or as a result of them. Also, the preceding authors employed only one measure 
of outcome (the frequency of social contacts); functional recovery is considered a multi-
faceted concept including a host of occupational (Bell et al., 2009), social involvement 
(Robertson et al., 2013), ability to complete daily tasks (Leifker, Patterson, Heaton, & 
Harvey, 2011) and subjective sense of recovery (Andresen, Oades, & Caputi, 2003) 
aspects to its measurement. Research needs to account for different measures of 
outcome after illness and explore the relationship between cognitive abilities and 
metacognition. Having the ability to reflect back and learn may be critical to integrating 
cognitive skills into real-world situations. Furthermore, incorporating metacognitive 
processing into cognitive remediation programmes has already begun in small trials with 
positive results thus far (Cella, Reeder, & Wykes, 2015). These metacognitive skills may 
aid the learning of new information, improve social and occupational recovery and 
promote self-management in the community.  
Preceding research has also been predominantly completed on chronic cohorts and the 
effects observed are difficult to disentangle from the longer-term impact of neuroleptic 
medication and differing access to psychological therapies (lysaker et al., 2008). New 
research needs to be completed in early stage, non-chronic schizophrenia to evade 
some of these potential pitfalls. Furthermore, reviews suggest that neurcognition only 
accounts for around 40% of the relationship between cognitive ability and functional 
outcome and metacognition may offer further insight into this relationship (see section 
1.13). 
3.1.5 Summary 
In summary, metacognition has been found to relate to both neurocognition and function 
however the extent to which it may relate to different measurements of functional 
outcome has not been addressed. How metacognition impacts on functional capacity 
and objective function requires clarification as few designs have differentiated between 
these variables. Negative but not positive symptoms have also been implicated in the 
relationship between neurocognition and function (Greenwood et al., 2005; Strassnig et 
al., 2015) and as such, will be also be investigated in the present study. Furthermore, by 
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conducting research in FEP, the aforementioned confounds of medication and therapy 
exposure can be reduced. Whether metacognitive deficits are an aspect of longer-term 
illness chronicity or whether present at an early stage of psychosis can also be 
addressed. 
3.1.6 Study aims 
This first study aim will be to determine the construct structure of different measurements 
of neurocognition, metacognition and functional outcome through a series of factor 
analysis procedures. The following hypotheses will then be addressed: 
Study hypotheses 
i) That the relationship between neurocognition and functional capacity will be 
mediated by metacognition. 
ii) That the relationship between neurocognition and objective function will be 
mediated by metacognition. 
iii) The relationship between neurocognition and time spent in structured 
activities will be mediated by functional capacity. 
iv) The relationship between functional capacity and time spent in structured 
activities will be mediated by metacognition. 
v) The relationship between neurocognition and functional capacity is 
mediated by metacognition and negative symptoms. 
vi) The relationship between memory, IQ and executive function, and functional 
outcome (functional capacity and objective function) will be mediated by 
metacognition and negative symptoms. 
 
These hypotheses will be evaluated through a series of path models looking at the 
relationships independently.
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3.2.1 Design 
A cross-sectional design was employed with neurocognitive, metacognitive and 
functional measures being administered as well as symptom and demographic 
information recorded (see list of measures in section 3.2.5).  
3.2.2 Participants 
A convenience sample of participants were recruited from Early Intervention in 
Psychosis (EIP) services in Sussex Partnership NHS Foundation Trust.  
Inclusion criteria 
The study inclusion criteria was that all participants: 
i) Held a diagnosis of first-episode of psychosis 
ii) Were currently on full caseload of an EIP service 
iii) Over the age of 18 
iv) Had capacity to give informed consent  
v) Had sufficient English language skills.  
 
Exclusion criteria 
The exclusion criteria were that participants: 
i) Had a primary diagnosis of substance misuse  
ii) Had a diagnosis of organic neurological impairment 
3.2.3 Procedure 
Ethical approval was obtained from the London-Camden and Islington NHS Research 
and Ethics Committee (Ref: 11/LO/1877, project ID 72141; see appendix A). The study 
recruitment target was calculated by consulting Fritz (2007) for sensitivity to detect 
mediation effects and the effect sizes calculated in chapter 2 were employed in 
analysis. As the meta-analytic technique suggests that moderate effect sizes may exist 
between neurocognition and metacognition, and metacognition and functional 
outcome, a recruitment target of 80 was set as suggested by Fritz (2007). Participants 
were recruited through either current registration on a research database operated by 
Sussex Partnership NHS Foundation Trust giving consent to be contacted by a 
researcher or through their care team. In the latter case, care teams were approached 
by a member of the research team and permission was sought from the service-user 
via their care co-ordinator. This permission allowed a researcher to contact them to 
explain the study and provide a participant information sheet. Demographic and 
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medication information was recorded at the beginning of study participation and 
medication information was converted to Olanzapine atypical equivalent doses with 
conversion tables from Leucht et al., (2014). The neurocognition measures were 
completed first, participants were offered a short break, then the metacognition and 
functional outcome measures were completed. After another short break, an 
assessment of psychopathology was completed. Participants were also encouraged 
to take any additional breaks should they feel the need. Upon completion of the study, 
participants were given £20 as compensation for their time. Participants were recruited 
from November 2013 until February 2015. 
3.2.5 Measurement of variables 
Neurocognition 
Several specific domains of neurocognitive function were selected as previous 
research identifies the need for more comprehensive (Lysaker et al., 2007) and more 
standardised (Green et al., 2004) measurement of neurocognitive impairment. 
Preceding research identifies memory, executive function (Aas et al., 2014), and 
general cognitive performance (IQ) (Tandberg et al., 2012) to be impaired in 
psychosis and implicated in community function (Leeson et al., 2011). The results of 
the previously run meta-analysis (chapter two) were also used to select 
neurocognitive measurement. The results of the meta-analysis suggest that existing 
research demonstrates a relationship between executive function, memory and IQ, 
and metacognition, and therefore offers grounds for these processes to be 
investigated in the present study. By selecting measures more commonly used, 
greater comparisons can be made with existing research. 
Memory 
Memory was assessed using the Logical Memory (LM) and Letter-Number Sequencing 
(LNS) subscales from the Wechsler Memory Scale (WMS-III) (Wechsler, 1987). The 
LM test is a way of capturing verbal memory ability in which participants are instructed 
to listen to and repeat back two stories as a measure of immediate verbal memory 
(LM1). Participant responses are scored for accuracy on a scale of 0-25 per story, and 
0-75 in total, as the second story is repeated and recalled twice. Participants are then 
asked to repeat the stories 25-35 minutes later as a measure of delayed verbal 
memory (LM2) on a scale of 0-50. The WMS is reliable and validate across a number 
of populations (Selnes, 1991) and employed in FEP (Torgalsbøen et al., 2015). For 
comparison with other studies, the raw scores were also converted to age-scaled 
standardised z scores using the population means from normative data provided by 
Wechsler (1987). 
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The LNS is a measure of working memory. The administrator reads a mixed sequence 
of letters and numbers aloud and participants are asked to repeat the list back with the 
numbers in ascending order and the letters in alphabetical order. The length of the 
sequence commences with 2 items, and becomes progressively longer with correct 
responses. The task requires participants to store a list of information online and 
manipulate the sequence to adhere to the task rules. The total score ranges from 0-
21. The raw scores were also transformed into standardised age-scaled z scores using 
the normative data in Wechsler (1987). 
Executive Function 
Executive function was assessed through the Verbal Fluency (VF) task for letters 
(phonological) (e.g. Benton et al., 1994) and semantic categories (Heaton et al., 2004). 
The administrator asks the participant to list as many words beginning with a letter (F, 
A and S) or exemplars of a category (four-legged animals) within 60 seconds. 
Participants are informed that proper nouns are not accepted (excludes names, 
numbers and places) and repetitions of the same root word with different suffixes are 
only counted once. The VF task requires initiation, inhibition and cognitive flexibility 
(Mitrushina et al., 2005). The total number of correct responses for phonological and 
semantic categories were used as a score. Raw scores were also converted into age-
scaled standardised scores using the normative data in Tombaugh, Kozak, and Rees 
(1999). 
Executive function was also measured using the Trailmaking Task (TMT) as a 
measure of attention, visuomotor skills and cognitive flexibility. The task has two 
sections: Part A contains a page with the numbers 1-25 scattered in circles across the 
sheet. Participants are asked to draw a single line connecting the numbers up in 
ascending numerical order as quickly as possible. Part B contains both numbers (1-
13) and letters (A-L) and participants are instructed to draw a line connecting the 
numbers and letters in ascending numerical and alphabetical order alternating 
between number and letter (e.g. 1-A-2-B-3-C etc.). The participant’s score (time taken 
to complete the task) on task A was subtracted from their time on task B to give a 
measure of cognitive flexibility and set-shifting (as described in Tombaugh, 2004). Raw 
scores were converted into age-scaled z scores using the normative data from  
Tombaugh, (2004). 
General IQ 
The Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI) (Wechsler, 2008) was 
developed as a screening tool for IQ assessment and cognitive impairment The 
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vocabulary subscale is a measure of verbal intelligence wherein participants are asked 
to provide a definition for a list of 40 words. The scores range from 0-80 with an 
individual word scoring scale of 0-2. The Matrix Reasoning subscale is a measure of 
nonverbal fluid reasoning within Performance IQ. Participants are shown a coloured 
geometric pattern with 3 shapes and one missing shape. They must select from 5 
options which is the correct missing section to complete the pattern. Scores range from 
0-35 and raw scores were converted to age scaled scores using validation data. Age-
scaled scores were converted into z scores using the normative data from The 
Psychological Corporation, (1999). 
Metacognition 
Metacognition in this study was assessed through two measures; the Metacognitive 
Assessment Interview (MAI) (Semerari et al., 2012) and the Beck Cognitive Insight 
Scale (BCIS) (Beck et al., 2004). These measures were selected for their frequency of 
use as metacognitive measures in psychosis, as confirmed also in the meta-analysis 
(chapter two).  
The MAI is a semi-structured clinical interview designed to assess 4 domains of 
metacognition; monitoring, integration, differentiation and decentralisation. A 
manualised set of interview questions are conducted with the participant response 
guiding the interview sequence to assess the aforementioned domains. In the event 
that a participant fails to describe or identify the relevant metacognitive domain after 
the initial question, extra prompt questions are also asked to capture the ability level. 
A self-generated description with no prompting from the interviewer for the domain 
would be attributed a score of 5, with additional prompt questions the score falls in 
value. If the participant, despite prompt questions, demonstrates no awareness of the 
metacognitive domain, a score of 0 is given. The monitoring subsection is comprised 
of questions that capture the interviewee’s ability to identify and monitor the thoughts 
and emotions that make up their own mental state. The integration subscale assesses 
the individual’s ability to reflect back on the transitions between their own mental states 
and identify causal reasons behind the transitions. The differentiation subscale 
assesses the individual’s ability to consider their point of view as subjective and fallible 
and distinguish between fantasies, beliefs and assumptions about reality in relation to 
factual events. The final decentralisation subscale requires the participant to describe 
and interpret the mental state of another person and how that person’s beliefs, values 
and perspective is separate from their own. The benefit of the MAI is it offers an 
assessment of in vivo metacognitive knowledge in response to a personally relevant, 
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social situation. This offers an insight into a real-life cognitive event and how the 
individual is able to describe and assess their cognitive processing. 
Each subscale consists of 4 exemplar domains (see table 9 below) (16 items in total), 
which are scored on a scale of 0 (no evidence of metacognitive skill) to 5 (clear 
evidence of ability without prompting). The MAI is an adaptation of the Metacognitive 
Assessment Scale (Semerari et al., 2003) but has the advantage that it directly 
assesses domains of metacognition rather than discretely through psychotherapy 
sessions and is thus less time consuming. The measure has been validated in a non-
clinical population (Semerari et al., 2012). The MAS, from which it derives, has been 
validated across numerous clinical populations (see Lysaker et al., 2005) including 
psychosis (Macbeth et al., 2014). The MAI was selected as this encapsulates higher-
order, declarative metacognitive knowledge as described by Wells (2000), considered 
in the Nelson and Narens model (1990) and discussed in chapter 1. The MAS has 
been previously validated in schizophrenia (Lysaker et al., 2013b; Semerari et al., 
2003) and checked for reliability (Buck, Warman, Huddy, & Lysaker, 2012) and 
employed in FEP (McLeod, Gumley, MacBeth, Schwannauer, & Lysaker, 2014) 
although not fully validated in this population. 
The BCIS captures the participant’s self-reported ability to assess their own cognitive 
products, distance themselves from and re-evaluate thoughts and beliefs, and 
subjective interpretations (Beck et al., 2004). It comprises 2 subscales; the self-
reflectiveness scale assesses the individual’s willingness to reflect upon and be 
objective about thoughts and openness to feedback. The self-certainty subscale 
relates to the individual’s certainty about being right and resistance to correction. This 
information is measured through 15 self-report questionnaire items rated from 0 (do 
not agree at all) to 3 (agree completely). The BCIS was included as a higher-order 
aspect of metacognitive knowledge; the measure requires general reflection on 
cognition however is not elaborative or mental state specific but rather a general ability 
to question the fallibility of cognition, and reflect back on one’s thoughts. The BCIS has 
been assessed for validity and reliability (Beck et al., 2004; Riggs, Grant, Perivoliotis, 
& Beck, 2012) and employed in FEP (Tranulis, Lepage, & Malla, 2008). 
 
The MAI and BCIS scales are available in appendix C and D. 
Symptoms 
Symptoms were measured by the Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale (PANSS) 
(Kay et al., 1987). The PANSS is a 30 item observer-rated, semi-structured clinical 
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interview designed to assess the severity of symptoms in schizophrenia. The interview 
produces scores for positive symptoms (7 items), negative symptoms (7 items) and 
general psychopathology (16 items), has been well validated in research (Peralta & 
Zorita, 1994) and employed in FEP (McLeod, Gumley, MacBeth, et al., 2014). 
Functional outcome 
Functional outcome was measured through two methods; functional capacity and 
objective functioning. Functional capacity was measured by the UCSD Performance-
Based Skills Assessment (UPSA) (Patterson et al., 2001) and objective functioning 
was captured by the Time Use Survey (Fowler et al., 2006). The UPSA is an 
instrument to assess capacity to complete everyday tasks across five domains; 
finance, communication, comprehension and planning, transportation and household 
chores. Participants are provided with equipment and asked to complete a list of 
tasks designed to replicate skills required in daily life. Participant performance is then 
scored by the researcher from the manualised guidelines and converted to a score 
out of 20 for each domain (0-100 in total). The UPSA has been assessed for 
reliability and validated in schizophrenia (Velligan et al., 2013) however has not been 
used in FEP before (although the shorter UPSA-B has in Vesterager et al., 2012). 
 
The Time Use Survey is a semi-structured interview in which the participant is asked 
about the amount of time spent undertaking a variety of activities in the preceding 
month. The activities capture a host of functional domains including employment, 
education, voluntary work, leisure and sport, childcare and household maintenance. 
Two summary scores are produced; Constructive Economic Activity (CEA) is 
comprised of time spent undertaking employment, education, voluntary work, childcare 
and household chores whereas Structured Activity (SA) also includes time spent in 
leisure and sport activities. As previous research has focused on the structured activity 
score (Fowler et al., 2009; Hodgekins et al., 2015), the total number of hours per week 
spent engaged in all structured activity was used as an outcome measure. The Time 
Use survey has been used in FEP and CHR groups (Hodgekins et al., 2015) in 
previous research. 
3.2.6 Analysis Plan 
The primary research questions will be assessed through a series of analysis steps. 
i) The raw data will be inspected for normality and outliers. 
ii) The measurement variables’ construct validity will be assessed through 
factor analysis to justify inclusion in latent variable pathway analysis. 
iii) Reliability statistics will also be run to ensure internal reliability 
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iv) A series of pathway models (outlined in chapter 1) will be built using SEM 
and potential mediation effects will be tested in each model. 
3.2.7 Factor analysis data analysis 
Data processing 
Normal distribution and outliers 
Prior to analysis, the raw data was inspected for the presence of non-normal 
distribution and potential outliers. Univariate distribution was investigated with visual 
inspection of Q-Q and box plots and histogram distributions. Distribution was also 
empirically investigated with Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) tests. In the case of non-
normal distribution, the standard errors can be corrected by use of a more robust 
statistical estimator (Finney & DiStefano, 2006). Skewness and kurtosis were also 
investigated through SPSS (version 22) descriptive statistics.  
 
Multivariate distribution 
Multivariate outliers were assessed through the Mahalanobis’ distance statistic which 
looks at the combinations of scores between variables to assess for unexpected 
relationships outside of the estimated multivariate normal distribution (Penny, 1996). 
Mahalanobis’ distance was calculated in SPSS and a critical values table was 
consulted to look for values a significant distance from the expected distribution 
(p<.001). 
 
Suitability for Factor Analysis 
The suitability of the data for factor analysis was screened through the Kaiser-Meyer-
Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling adequacy and Bartlett’s test of sphericity. Finally 
the determinant of the matrix was consulted to detect multicollinearity; a figure below 
.00001 is considered indicative of multicollinearity and reflects all variables loading on 
one structure (Field, 2013). 
 
Where there are concerns about normality, a Maximum Likelihood Robust (MLR) 
model will be run instead of Maximum Likelihood (ML) as suggested by Kline, (2012) 
as this takes into account non-normality in estimation. 
 
Factor Analysis assessment 
Factor Analysis (FA) (Spearman, 1904) is a widely used research technique to 
investigate interdependencies within observed variables. The relationships between 
observed variables can be used to inform about underlying theoretical factors or latent 
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variables both in terms of function and structure (Jung & Lee, 2011). Exploratory Factor 
Analysis (EFA) is employed to determine the number of constructs represented by 
items and to provide a framework to evaluate a multitude of individual measures. 
Where, the underlying factor structure of the observed variables is estimated with no 
a priori framework placed over the item shared variance (Floyd & Widaman, 1995). 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) in comparison is a technique used to determine 
whether a known prescribed factor model fits the observed data (Floyd & Widman, 
1995) with cross-factor loadings constrained to 0.  
 
Exploratory Structural Equation Modeling (ESEM) is a relatively new technique 
allowing for exploration of factor structure. Many CFA models fail to provide support 
for established EFA models (Marsh et al., 2009) due to EFA allowing for freely 
estimated loadings in model structure whereas CFA imposes a predefined structure 
on item level observations using independent cluster modelling. This constrains cross 
loadings of items on multiple factors to zero which, in behavioural science data, is 
arguably too restrictive for real life data which can have multiple relationships (Marsh 
et al., 2014).  
 
The use of ESEM allows the researcher more a priori control over factor structure for 
the testing of theoretically driven structures (or confirmation of model). ESEM also 
offers model fit statistics similar to CFA allowing the researcher to assess factor and 
model contribution of constituent items. CFA however can lead to the use of non-theory 
driven model modifications which render it more exploratory than confirmatory and the 
misspecification of zero loadings can lead to distorted factors (Asparouhov & Muthen, 
2009). Thus item loadings can be assessed on both hypothesised factors and other 
related factors due to the allowed cross-loading framework althought the rotation does 
‘push’ the items towards the pre-specified factor structure (Asparouhov & Muthen, 
2009). By running ESEM in Mplus, standard error values are calculated so which items 
significantly predict the factor can also be assessed. Marsh et al., (2014) advocate that 
both CFA and ESEM should be applied to model assessment. CFA, and ESEM were 
used where appropriate to validate variable structure. In the case of a measure having 
previous validation data through EFA or CFA, the structure was checked on the current 
sample through CFA. Where no previous measure validation data in FEP is available, 
ESEM was run. 
 
Model fit assessment 
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The extent to which the model (or covariance matrix) imposed by the researcher is an 
accurate reflection of the raw data (or sample covariance matrix) is assessed by model 
fit statistics. If the discrepancy is too great (i.e. the data covariance speaks against the 
model applied) the difference is not attributable to chance or sampling error and the 
researcher must justify the model-to-data discrepancy or revise the model (Kline, 
2012). This is typically assessed by a multitude of model fit indices; the chi-square test 
(𝜒2) assesses the magnitude of difference between the sample and model fitted 
covariance matrices and expressed as a conventional significance test (Gierl & 
Mulvenon, 1995). The Bentler Comparative Fit Index (CFI) and the Tucker Lewis Index 
(TLI) are incremental fit indices which measure the improvement of the proposed 
model to the baseline (or independence model) and the author’s suggest a value of 
0.9 indicates an acceptable and 0.95 a good fit. The TLI is however less impacted by 
sample size. The Root-Mean-Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) conversely is a 
measure of model misfit or poor fit per degree of freedom and a value of .08 implies 
acceptable model fit and .05 good model fit (Browne & Cudek, 1990). Such ‘rules-of-
thumb’ cut-off criteria however must be employed with caution as these are victim to 
sample size and distribution bias, especially the chi-square test, thus no one fit should 
be considered absolute (Hu & Bentler, 1999) and models should not be viewed as 
‘correct’ or ‘incorrect’ (see Yuan, 2005 for a review of model fit statistics). Instead, the 
extent to which observed data fits applied factor(s) structure will be assessed with 
multiple fit statistics reported based on the aforementioned criterion. 
 
Internal reliability 
The construct robustness will also be considered through Cronbach’s alpha 
(Cronbach, 1951) statistics.  
 
Inter-rater reliability: 
To ensure standardised assessment and the reliability of the measure of 
metacognition, inter-rater reliability was assessed using Intraclass Correlation 
Coefficient (ICC) analysis. 
3.2.8 Pathway model analysis  
The relationship between latent and observed variables can be investigated through 
path analysis and conducted in a SEM framework. A path analysis is a multivariate 
regression model which can incorporate multiple dependent and independent 
variables whereas traditional regression techniques restrict analysis to a single 
dependent variable (Geiser, 2012). The increasing popularity of the technique can also 
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be attributed to allowing researchers to investigate both direct and indirect 
relationships between variables (MacKinnon, 2008) in theoretical models. An indirect 
effect is one wherein a third variable explains the mechanism through which one 
variable affects another (Baron & Kenny, 1986; Hayes, 2009). 
 
Traditional approaches to mediation analysis frequently employ the causal steps 
strategy (Baron & Kenny, 1986) whereby a series of conditions have to be met in order 
to claim mediation involving: 
1) A significant relationship between the independent and mediating variable; 
2) A significant relationship between independent variable and dependent; 
3) The mediating variable significantly predicts the dependent variable when the 
independent is controlled for; 
4) The relationship between independent and dependent decreases substantially 
when the mediating variable is entered simultaneously with the independent as a 
predictor of the dependent variable. 
 
This approach has been criticized however as a significant relationship between 
predictor and outcome variable is not required for mediation to be claimed (Mackinnon, 
Krull & Lockwood, 2000), the estimation of standard error for the mediation pathway is 
theoretically flawed (McKinnon et al., 2002) and the requirement of normally distributed 
data for deriving the significance value of the indirect effect being unlikely in all but the 
largest samples (Preacher & Hayes, 2008). Instead, one proposed method advocates 
for bootstrapping wherein the data is repeatedly sampled from, and the indirect effect 
is estimated in each subset over thousands of iterations to develop an empirical 
estimation of sampling distribution (Preach & Hayes, 2008). Thus confidence intervals 
can be calculated for the assessment of indirect effects. Current thinking also suggests 
that mediation can be present in the absence of a correlation between independent 
and dependent variable on the condition that a relationship is present between both 
independent and mediating variable, and mediating and dependent variable (Rucker 
et al., 2011). All models will be estimated through Maximum Likelihood algorithms (ML) 
as the bootstrapping method addresses any concerns about normality of data and 
5000 iterations will be run. 
 
Assessment of mediation effects 
Mediation will be investigated on the proviso that the aforementioned conditions are 
met and assessed through a) significant regression pathways in the model and b) CIs 
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not containing 0 (Preacher & Hayes, 2008). The pathway model will be run in one 
estimation model. The mediation model will be investigated through direct regression 
pathways between i) predictor variable and mediating variable (a), ii) mediating 
variable and outcome variable (b) iii) predictor variable and outcome variable (c’) and 
the overall total effect of the model (c) which is calculated as the beta weight of c’+ 
(a*b). The indirect or mediation effect will also be calculated to assess for mediation 
(a*b) (see figure 18 above for the theoretical mediation model). The size of 
associations will also be investigated through R2 statistics and coefficient values. To 
assess the magnitude of effect, Cohen (1988) suggests that an R2 value of .01=a small 
effect, .09= a medium effect and >.25= a large effect with the respective standardised 
coefficient values of .1= small, .3= medium and <.5= large. Finally, as the data is cross-
sectional, the direction of the proposed effect will be assessed through reverse 
causality model testing. By reversing the model structure and assessing whether 
mediation is still present, the possible direction of the relationship can be indicated. If 
the model structure is reversed and the mediation effect is lost, more confidence can 
be placed on the direction of observed effect. The reverse models will be run by 
swapping X and Y variables and by swapping Y and M variables to assess direction of 
causality.  
 
Overall model fit statistics will also be investigated through the criteria identified in 
section 3.2.7. 
  
Figure 18 Mediation pathway model 
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3.3.1 Sample statistics 
Eighty FEP patients were recruited in total, mean age 26.08 (SD. 5.53, range 18-40) 
and the sample was comprised of 49 male and 31 female patients (see table 4 for 
demographic information). One hundred and eighty-six FEP service-users were 
provisionally identified, 27 declined to participate via their care co-ordinator, 37 were 
deemed too unwell by their care co-ordinators and 28 service-users the researcher 
was unable to contact. The remaining 14 participants failed to attend appointments or 
could not participate for other reasons. 
Table 4 Sample characteristic summary table 
Sample characteristics Mean (SD) 
  
Age 26.08 (5.53 
Gender (M/F) 49/31 
Symptoms (positive) 12.01 
Symptoms (negative) 13.6 
Symptoms (general) 28.35 
Prescribed anti-psychotic medication (Y/N) 48/32 
Olanzapine equivalent dose (of those prescribed medication) 
(mg/day) 
12.77 (7.79) 
3.3.2 Factor analysis 
3.3.3 Neurocognition 
The patient sample were overall -.86 standard deviations below the population mean 
with the highest deficit observed in the trailmaking task (-1.53) closely followed by 
logical memory (-1.3/-1.26). The best performance was found for non-verbal IQ with 
the mean performance being just above what would be expected from the general 
population (.17).   
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Table 5 Sample neurocognitive performance descriptive statistics 
Cognitive Task Raw score mean 
(SD) 
Range Z score mean 
(SD) 
    
Logical Memory I (0-75) 27.7 (10.9) (10-55) -1.3 (1.12) 
Logical Memory II (0-50) 16.28 (8.26) (0-35) -1.26 (1.12) 
Letter-number Sequencing (0-21) 8.64 (2.46) (4-15) -1.08 (.94) 
Verbal Fluency (phonemic) 32.28 (10.27) (5-56) -1.01 (.91) 
Verbal Fluency (semantic) 18.49 (4.77) (9-29) -.55 (.94) 
Matrix Reasoning (0-35) 25.82 (4.13) (13-34) .17 (.85) 
Vocabulary (0-80) 52.8 (11.67) (11-73) -.35 (1.17) 
Trailmaking Task (B-A) 37.99 (33.88)  -1.52 (2.54) 
Overall neurocognition mean 27.5  -.86  
Key: Scale total range indicated in brackets after name (x-x) 
 
Data Assumptions 
All neurocognitive variables were explored for normal distribution through histogram, 
Q-Q and box plots, and SPSS Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests of normality, skewness and 
kurtosis statistics. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test indicated that LM1 (p=.005), LNS 
(.011) and TMT (.004) may violate the normality assumption. TMT was the only 
significant violation of the skewness statistic (statistic/standard error= -3.97) and an 
inspection of the histogram plots indicated a negative skew on the data distribution 
(Field, 2012). All other skew and kurtosis were within expected range. The determinant 
reported <.0001 therefore multicollinearity was not present in the data. 
 
Neurocognitive variables were therefore also inspected for outliers prior to analysis. 
Box plots revealed some data outside of the standard error bar for TMT and LNS 
however the departure was not major and individual cases were not unique within the 
sample therefore the data was not transformed. 
 
Multivariate distribution 
Multivariate outliers were also investigated using Mahalanobis’ distance. Mahalanobis’ 
distance was calculated using SPSS and no scores were significant at p<.001. 
 
Correlation analysis 
The neurocognitive measures were initially inspected for correlations. All items were 
significantly correlated with each other (table 6) indicating intercorrelation however 
LM1 and LM2 were highly correlated (R= .897, p<.001). As they are both measures 
taken from the same scale, this may account for the high correlation therefore were 
left in subsequent analysis steps. The Bartlett’s test was significant (p<.001) indicating 
appropriate relationships between variables for factor analysis. The Kaiser-Meyer-
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Olkin measure of sampling adequacy also exceeded .5 (.75) suggesting that the data 
are suitable for factor analysis. 
 
Table 6 Bivariate correlations among cognitive variables 
 LM1 LM2 LNS FAS Animals Vocab MR TMT 
         
LM1 1 .89*** .36** .26* .28* .47*** .41*** .37** 
LM2  1 .36** 24* .25* .44*** .44*** .38*** 
LNS   1 .46*** .26* .53*** .38** .46*** 
FAS    1 .57*** .48*** .33** .49*** 
Animals     1 .33** 38** .35** 
Vocab      1 .56*** .40** 
MR       1 .48*** 
TMT        1 
 
A host of previous studies have assessed and validated neurocognition through a 
composite score (e.g. Bowie et al., 2010; Harvey et al., 1998; Vesterager et al., 2012) 
so to check the suitability of the present cognitive variables representing a 
neurocognitive factor in the present study, CFA was deemed appropriate. A GEOMIN 
rotation was used as an oblique rotation is recommended in social sciences to achieve 
simple structure due to theoretical grounds to assume that the factors will be correlated 
(Costello & Osborne, 2005). A MLR parameter estimation was used as a conservative 
response to potential non-normality of data as advised by Yuan & Bentler, (2000) and 
analysis run in Mplus (version 6.0; Muthén & Muthén, 1998-2010). 
 
Model Fit 
The CFA suggests a one factor solution demonstrating good model fit indices (𝜒2 (29) 
= 29.55, p=.06, CFI= 0.96, TLI=0.95 RMSEA= 0.08).  
 
Internal reliability  
Cronbach’s alpha was .81 for the general cognition factor indicating good factor 
reliability. Factor loadings are available in table 7 below. 
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Table 7 Neurocognition CFA rotated factor loadings 
Measure Factor 
 Neurocognition 
Logical Memory 1 .56 
Logical Memory 2 .55 
Letter-number Sequencing .65 
Verbal Fluency phonemic .66 
Verbal Fluency semantic .54 
WASI vocabulary .75 
Trailmaking Task .65 
WASI matrix reasoning .66 
 
The results of the CFA confirm the suitability of neurocognition being structured as one 
factor. 
 3.3.4 Metacognition 
Metacognitive Assessment Interview 
Inter-rater reliability: 
All interviews were undertaken and rated by the same researcher (GD). Three MAI 
interviews were recorded and marked independently by a second trained researcher 
to check for inter-rater reliability. An Intraclass Correlation Coefficient (ICC) method 
Figure 19 Neurocognition factor loadings 
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was used to assess inter-rater reliability through a two-way mixed absolute agreement 
model for all 16 items in the MAI. The ICC demonstrated excellent agreement (0.9, 
p<.001) (Fleiss, 1981) between interview ratings across the 16 items. 
 
Data assumptions 
The K-S statistics reported significant violations of normal distribution for all items. An 
inspection of the histogram graphs indicate some negative skew for MAI items 
however the Q-Q plots indicated some adherence to the expected distribution. The 
Box plots indicated no outliers present. As the violation to normal distribution was not 
of a severe magnitude this was addressed by running a MLR model. 
 
Descriptive statistics 
Table 8 Metacognitive Assessment Interview subscale mean scores 
Measure Subscale Mean (SD) 
   
Metacognitive Assessment Interview Monitoring 2.93 (1.25) 
 Differentiation 2.77 (1.17) 
 Integration 2.83 (1.22) 
 Decentralism 2.57 (1.43) 
 
The mean and standard deviation values for the MAI are available in table 8 above. 
Participants demonstrated the highest mean performance for monitoring and the 
lowest for decentralism however the large standard deviation relative to the mean 
demonstrates a large variance in individual performance.  
 
Correlation analysis 
The factor structure of the MAI was first inspected for suitability for factor analysis. The 
correlation matrix indicated high correlation between items. Bartlett’s test revealed a 
significant value (p<.001) and the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy 
was also sufficient (.97) indicating that continued investigation was merited. The 
determinant indicated the presence of multicollinearity (<.00001) suggesting the 
presence of one structure.  
 
Model fit 
Due to a previous EFA validation study (Semerari et al., 2012), the structure of the MAI 
was confirmed in the present study through CFA. A CFA was run with the original 
author’s suggested two factor structure (self-reflectivity of one’s own mind, and the 
understanding of the mind of the other) however extremely high factor correlation (.98) 
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was observed and a violation in the determinant statistic (>.00001) therefore the 2 
factor solution was rejected. An ESEM was then run to investigate factor structure. 
 
The ESEM was run with a GEOMIN rotation as the default in Mplus and a MLR 
parameter estimate model was selected due to concerns about normality of items. The 
ESEM suggested a 1 factor solution (𝜒2 (101) = 122.41, p=.07, CFI= 0.99, TFI=.99, 
RMSEA= 0.05) with good model fit suggested on all model fit indices. The scree plot 
also suggests a one factor solution and there was only one eigenvalue above 1. All 
items loaded highly on one factor (see table 9) and cronbach’s alpha suggests good 
internal reliability of the scale loading on one factor (α=.987). The results of the 
second ESEM analysis suggest the MAI is determined by one latent structure; 
synthetic metacognitive ability. The results of the scree plot are presented in figure 20 
below. 
Table 9 MAI single factor item loadings 
Subscale Item Factor 
  Metacognition 
Monitoring Identifies and specifies emotions .87 
Monitoring Describes and relates to thoughts .89 
Monitoring Relates behaviour to aspects of mental 
state 
.91 
Monitoring Connects thoughts to emotional states .93 
Differentiation Aware that world representation is 
subjective 
.87 
Differentiation Offers plausible interpretation of events .93 
Differentiation Can reflect and evaluate events .94 
Differentiation Can differentiate between different 
representations 
.76 
Integration Can demonstrate a coherent 
connection between thoughts, 
emotions, events and behaviours 
.95 
Integration Can identify transitions between mental 
states 
.89 
Integration Awareness of continuity in thoughts 
and emotions 
.95 
Integration Can describe and rebuild narration of 
mental function with order and clarity 
.91 
Decentralism Can describe the psychology of other .92 
Decentralism Describes intentions of others based 
on their beliefs 
.95 
Decentralism Able to understand same event can 
have differing relevance to people 
.95 
Decentralism Able to understand the psychological 
process of others independent from 
self 
.94 
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Figure 20 MAI item scree plot 
The Beck Cognitive Insight Scale: 
Data assumptions 
The mean and standard deviation information for the BCIS is available in table 10 
below. On average participants scored 14.3 for self-reflectivity and 5.88 for self-
certainty which is comparable to the FEP findings reported by Buchy et al., (2010) of 
13.3 for self-reflectivity however slightly lower than the 8.3 mean score on for self-
certainty. The questionnaire items were inspected for normality and the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov indicated non-normality within the individual items. An inspection of the 
correlation matrix table indicated no correlations between items >.8 and Bartlett’s test 
revealed a significant finding (p<.001). The determinant was <.0001 indicating no 
multicollinearity.  
 
Mahalanobis’ distance was also calculated and no variables were significant at p<.001 
indicating no violation of multivariate distribution. 
 
Correlation Analysis 
The correlation matrix demonstrated that the correlation between all items was below 
.8 (see table 13). 
 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
Due to a multitude of prior studies having investigated the factor structure of the BCIS 
and reporting a two factor solution, a CFA was conducted to assess factor structure in 
a FEP sample. The CFA was run with MLR due to non-normality in the data distribution 
and revealed poor model fit for a 2 factor solution (𝜒2 (89)=140.52 , p<.001, CFI= .77, 
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RMSEA= .087). Model fit statistics were inspected and covariance paths were added 
incrementally however the overall model fit could not be improved. As outlined 
previously, ESEM allows for factor models with approximately zero cross-loadings 
which are potentially more suitable for such psychological variables, It was therefore 
decided to re-test the 2-factor structure through ESEM. 
 
ESEM 
ESEM was run allowing all items to load on both factors with a 2 factor solution 
however a TARGET rotation was employed to push cross loadings towards zero. The 
initial model demonstrated poor model fit statistics (𝜒2 (76)=133.15, p<.001, CFI= .74, 
TLI= .64, RMSEA= .1) however model fit statistics suggested the addition of correlated 
error terms between 2 of the self-reflectivity items. With the inclusion of these 
correlated error terms, the model demonstrated good model fit (𝜒2 (74)=87.75, p=.13, 
CFI= .94, TLI= .91, RMSEA= .05). 
 
Internal reliability was also investigated. The self-reflectivity scale demonstrated 
acceptable internal reliability (α=.793). The self-certainty scale was bordering on 
acceptability (α=.642) with no improvement made through item deletion.  
 
As a result of the factor analysis, and in light of the previous research in this area 
supporting a theoretical distinction between these 2 processes, it was decided to keep 
the BCIS as a two factor structure containing self-reflectivity and self-certainty factors. 
 
Table 10 Beck Cognitive Insight subscale mean scores 
Measure Subscale Mean (SD) 
   
Beck Cognitive Insight Scale Self-reflectivity(0-27) 14.3 (5.06) 
 Self-certainty(0-18) 5.88 (2.88) 
Key: Scale total range indicated in brackets after name (x-x) 
 
Overall Metacognitive structure 
To investigate how the metacognitive domains related to each other, ESEM was run 
with the factors determined in the previous steps. An ESEM was run as there is 
preceding evidence (and therefore a priori structure to apply) to suggest a relationship 
between the MAI and BCIS (Lysaker et al., 2013b) although the specific construct has 
not been refined enough to require a CFA. This was run as a second step in 
determining metacognitive factor structure, rather than as a second order analysis, due 
to the small sample size. As discussed previously, ESEM provides standard error 
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statistics thus allowing significance testing of whether indicators significantly predict 
the latent variable. The factor analyses already presented were used to generate factor 
scores to include in analysis for the 3 factors (self-reflectivity, self-certainty (BCIS) and 
synthetic metacognition (MAI)). 
 
Data assumptions 
The results of the K-S test suggested some concern over the distribution of the self-
certainty BCIS factor and the MAI factor however the Q-Q and histogram plots suggest 
that this possible violation was not severe. The box plot also suggested 2 potential 
outliers however as they were not major violations, they were included in analysis. 
 
Mahalanobis’ distance was also calculated and no variables were significant at p<.001 
indicating no violation of multivariate distribution. 
 
Correlation analysis 
The correlation matrix found significant relationships between the self-reflectivity and 
the MAI factor and the self-certainty factor showed a negative relationship to other 
variables. The KMO (.58) and Bartlett’s test (p<.001) suggest that a factor analysis is 
appropriate for the data and the determinant confirmed that multicollinearity was not 
present. 
 
Exploratory Factor Analysis 
A GEOMIN rotation was run with a MLR estimation model due to potentially non-
normally distributed data.  
 
The factor loading information was inspected for individual model contribution with the 
MAI (.77), self-reflectivity (.52) positively loading on the factor. The rotated loadings 
however suggested that the self-certainty structure had a small and negative loading 
on metacognition construct (-.20) and was not a significant predictor (p=.127) so was 
deleted from the model in further analysis. The final factor loadings are reported in 
table 11 below 
 
Table 11 Metacognition rotated factor loadings 
Variable Factor loading 
  
Self-reflectivity (BCIS) .66 
Synthetic metacognition .60 
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The results of the ESEM suggest that the domains of metacognition investigated thus 
far are suitable to be combined into an overall metacognition latent variable. The 
metacognitive factor will be comprised of the self-reflection and synthetic 
metacognition (see diagram in figure 21 below). 
 
The internal reliability analysis suggested only limited construct reliability (α=.603) 
but it was not possible to improve this value by deleting items due to the construct 
only consisting of two items which may account for the low figure. 
3.3.4 Functional Outcome 
Functional capacity 
The distribution histogram was consulted and confirmed some non-normal distribution 
for the UPSA. The violation was not of significant magnitude however to warrant data 
transformation and, to address this concern, a MLR estimation model was run in the 
pathway model. Participants on average scored 66.48 out of a possible 100 which is 
comparable the other study employing the UPSA-B in FEP who found a mean score 
of 70 (Roche et al., 2014). 
 
Table 11 Functional outcome descriptive statistics 
Measure Subscale Mean (SD) Range 
    
UPSA Finance  (0-20) 15.68 (3.06) (7.27-20) 
 Communication (0-20) 12.99 (3.69) (5-18.33) 
 Comprehension & planning (0-20) 12.48 (4.65) (0-20) 
 Transport (0-20) 15.12 (3.03) (8.89-20) 
 Household (0-20) 15.75 (4.42) (0-20) 
 Total (0-100) 66.48 (23.89) (36.62-95.24) 
Time Use Structured activity (total hours per week) 24.97 (23.09) (2.3-96.74) 
Scale total range indicated in brackets after name (x-x) 
Data assumptions 
Figure 21 Metacognition measurement model 
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The functional capacity variables were inspected for normal distribution and the K-S 
tests revealed significant results for all variables (p<.01) indicating non-normally 
distributed data. The UPSA household, communication and planning histograms 
indicate negative skew which is confirmed in the skewness statistics. The box plots 
indicate the presence of outliers on the household subscale of the UPSA. 
 
The KMO test indicated suitable sampling adequacy (.765) and Bartlett’s test was 
significant (p<.001). The correlation matrix indicates that all variables were significantly 
associated with each other (p<.05) however no correlations exceeded .8. The 
determinant value was above .0001 confirming that multicollinearity was not present 
in the data. 
 
Mahalanobis’ distance was also calculated and no variables were significant at p<.001 
indicating no violation of multivariate distribution. 
 
Correlation analysis 
All UPSA domains were significantly correlated with each other (p=/<.001) however no 
correlations exceeded .8 between items. 
 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
The original authors devised the UPSA to measure 5 domains of functional capacity 
based on everyday tasks encountered by patients in the community (finances, 
comprehension and planning, communication, household maintenance and 
transportation) however many designs include functional capacity as a total score to 
capture overall capacity (e.g. Patterson et al., 2001). Previous studies have validated 
the measure so to confirm the factor structure in the present sample, a confirmatory 
factor analysis was run. 
 
Due to the non-normal data distribution and skewness a MLR model estimate was run 
in analysis, with GEOMIN rotation 
 
Model fit 
The CFA indicated borderline-acceptable model fit for a one factor solution of the 
UPSA performance-based skills assessment test (𝜒2 (5)=10.59, p=.06, CFI= .94, TLI= 
.89, RMSEA= .13). The scree plot also endorses the presence of only one factor with 
a drop in magnitude after the first factor (figure 22 below). 
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Figure 22 UPSA scree plot 
Objective Function 
Data assumptions 
The Time Use Survey was initially assessed for normal distribution. The K-S test 
reported a significant result (p<.001) and an inspection of the histogram suggests a 
positive skew which the Q-Q plot and skewness statistic confirmed. The box plot 
indicates no outliers were present. On average, participants spent 24.97 hours per 
week in structured activities and this ranged from 2.3-96.74 hours. 
 
As there was only one measure, no factor analysis was run. 
 
Functional outcome is therefore determined by a one factor solution for functional 
capacity and objective function is measured by the Structured Activity domain of the 
Time Use Survey. 
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3.3.5 Pathway analysis 
The primary analysis concerned the extent that metacognition mediates the 
relationship between neurocognition and function. The results of the factor analysis to 
determine variable structure were carried over to formulate the latent variables of 
neurocognition, metacognition and function (both capacity and objective). 
3.3.6 Measures: 
Neurocognition 
Neurocognition was measured by a factor score derived from participant performance 
on the logical memory, letter-number sequencing, verbal fluency, trailmaking tasks and 
the WASI verbal and performance IQ scales. A higher score denotes better cognitive 
function. 
 
Metacognition 
The results of the factor analysis suggested that metacognitive ability is best captured 
by the MAI and the BCIS self-reflectivity scale. Both factor scores were entered as a 
measurement model into the pathway model to produce the latent variable 
metacognitive ability. A higher score represents better metacognitive ability. 
 
Psychopathology 
Participant scores on positive, negative and total symptoms were included in analysis 
as covariates. Negative symptoms were also investigated as a mediating variable 
between neurocognition and functional outcome (both capacity and objective function) 
as previous studies demonstrate a relationship between negative but not positive 
symptoms and functional outcome (Fulford et al., 2013). A higher score represents 
greater symptom severity. 
 
Functional outcome 
Two domains of function were investigated; functional capacity measured through a 
factor score of the subdomains of the UPSA performance-based measure and 
objective function through total Structured Activity score on the Time Use Survey. A 
higher score on functional capacity represents increased ability to complete everyday 
tasks and a higher score on the Time Use Survey denotes more time spent in 
structured activities each week over the preceding month. 
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3.3.7 Correlation analysis 
Bivariate correlations 
The relationship between pathway variables was first investigated through 
correlational analysis. Cognitive ability was significantly correlated with both functional 
capacity (r=.70, p<.001) and objective function (r=.48, p<.001) and the MAI factor 
score (r=.61, p<.001) but not the BCIS self-reflectivity scale (r=.19, p=.096). The MAI 
was significantly associated with self-reflectivity (r=.43, p<.001), functional capacity 
(r=.81, p<.001) and objective function (r=.84, p<.001). BCIS self-reflectivity was also 
significantly associated with functional capacity (r=.31, p<.011) and objective function 
(r=.33, p<.004). The BCIS self-certainty was not significantly associated with any 
variable (intercorrelation values available in table 13). 
Table 13 Bivariate correlations between neurocognition, metacognitive, function outcome and 
symptoms measures 
 Neurocognition BCIS self-
reflectivity 
BCIS 
self-
certainty 
MAI UPSA Time 
Use 
Neurocognition 1      
Beck Cognitive 
Insight Scale: self-
reflectivity 
.19 1     
Beck Cognitive 
Insight Scale: Self-
certainty 
.02 -.2 1    
Reportable 
metacognition (MAI) 
.61*** .43*** -.13 1   
Functional capacity 
(UPSA) 
.70*** .31** -.01 .81*** 1  
Objective function 
(Time Use) 
.48*** .33** -.07 .84*** .64*** 1 
Positive symptoms -.21 -.01 -.14 -.14 -.23 -.10 
Negative symptoms -.43*** -.33** -.03 -.64*** -.68*** -.49*** 
General symptoms -.22 -.14 -.1 -.39** -.37** -.27* 
***p<.001, ** p<.01, *p<.05 
 
Table 13 reveals that, as suggested by previous research, that neurocognitive ability 
is significantly associated with one’s ability to conduct everyday tasks and the amount 
of time spent in structured activities. Higher neurocognitive ability is associated with 
better individual functioning. The analysis also demonstrates that metacognitive ability, 
both measured by the MAI and the BCIS self-reflectivity scale, is positively associated 
with both functional capacity and objective functioning. This suggests that better 
metacognitive function is associated with greater capacity to complete daily living tasks 
and spending more time in structured activities. Positive symptoms were not 
significantly associated with any other variables whereas negative symptoms were 
negatively associated with cognition, metacognitive variables and functional capacity 
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and objective functioning. General psychopathology was significantly negatively 
associated with both functional capacity and objective function but not metacognitive 
or cognitive ability. No significant association was found between medication dose and 
metacognition (p=.687) or functional capacity (p=.407) or objective function (p=.369). 
In relation to time spent in structured activities, the present sample are comparable to 
other studies in FEP (table 14 below). The EDEN project found that on average young 
people experiencing their first episode of psychosis spent 25.17 hours per week in 
structured activities and the present study reports on average 24.97 hours per week. 
Table 14 Time Use Survey comparison table 
Study N Min-Max Mean (SD) 
Non-clinical (UK 2000 Time Use Survey) 5686 0-140.00 63.49 (25.89) 
At-risk mental state (EDIE-II) 199 1.31-139.19 35.61 (29.68) 
FEP (National EDEN) 878 0-140.00 25.17 (26.22) 
FEP (present study) 80 2.3-96.74 24.97 (23.09) 
 
3.3.8 Model 1: That the relationship between neurocognition and functional 
capacity will be mediated by metacognition 
 
The relationship between neurocognition, metacognition and functional capacity will 
be assessed in the first model through direct and indirect effects. The overall model 
demonstrated good model fit statistics (𝜒 2(1) = .03, p=.86, CFI= 1.00, TLI=1.00 
RMSEA= 0.00) which indicated that the theoretical framework placed on the observed 
data was a good fit.  
 
The results of the mediation analysis confirm that cognition does significantly predict 
metacognitive ability (β= .56, p=.02), metacognition significantly predicts functional 
capacity (β=.51, p=.005) and there is a significant direct relationship between 
neurocognition and functional capacity (β=.42, p<.001). The mediation analysis 
confirms that metacognition significantly mediates the relationship between 
neurocognition and functional capacity as demonstrated by the indirect pathway (β
=.29, p=.009) and this is corroborated by the CIs (β=.28, +/-95%[.50, .07]). 
 
The mediation model accounted for 67% of the variance in functional capacity (R2 
=.673) and 31% (R2 =.313) of the variation in metacognitive function which are large 
effect sizes. Negative symptoms were also included as a covariate and metacognition 
and functional capacity were regressed onto negative symptoms. The mediation model  
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however failed to retain significance suggesting that negative symptoms also account 
for this relationship (a*b= .16, p=.074, 95%CI [-.01, .31]). When negative symptoms 
were solely controlled for on functional capacity (and not metacognition), the model 
was once again significant (a*b= .22, p=.012, 95%CI [.05, .39]). The reverse model 
was also assessed (Y-M-X) and the significant mediation effect was lost suggesting 
that metacognition mediates the relationship of neurocognition on functional capacity 
rather than functional capacity’s impact on neurocognition. 
 
In summary, one’s cognitive ability significantly impacts on the ability to complete 
everyday tasks however this relationship is also mediated by metacognitive function. 
 
3.3.9 Model 2: That the relationship between neurocognition and objective 
function will be mediated by metacognition. 
Next, the relationship between neurocognition, metacognition and objective function 
was investigated through pathway analysis. The overall model fit was once again a 
good fit (𝜒2(1) = .11, p=.74, CFI= 1.00, TLI=1.00 RMSEA= 0.00). 
 
The pathway model confirmed that neurocognition significantly predicts metacognitive 
function (β=.56, p=.004), metacognition significantly predicts objective function (β
=.74, p=.01) however neurocognitive ability did not significantly predict objective 
function (β=.06, p=.61). The mediation analysis confirms that metacognition mediates 
the relationship between neurocognition and objective function as demonstrated by 
the indirect pathway (β=.41, p<.001 and CIs (β=.41, +/-95%[.62, .31]). 
 
The mediation model accounted for 59% (R2 =.594) of the variation in time spent in 
structured activity and 32% of the variation in metacognitive ability (R2 =.317) which 
Figure 23 Mediation of the effect of neurocognition on functional capacity through 
metacognition. ***p<.001, ** p<.01, *p<.05 
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are large effect sizes. The standardized and unstandardized pathway coefficients are 
available in figure 24 below and overall model summaries are available in table 16. In 
summary, improved neurocognitive ability predicts increased metacognitive function 
which predicts more time spend in structured activities. Neurocognitive ability alone 
however did not significantly predict time spent in structured activities. This mediation 
effect persisted with the inclusion of negative symptoms as a covariate in the model 
(a*b= .34, p=.01, 95% CI[.08, .59]). Finally, the reverse model was assessed and the 
significant mediation effect was lost suggesting that metacognition mediates the 
relationship between neurocognition and objective function rather than objective 
function’s impact on neurocognition.  
 
Figure 24 Mediation of the effect of neurocognition on community function through 
metacognition***p<.001, ** p<.01, *p<.05 
 
 
3.3.10 Model 3: The relationship between neurocognition and time spent in 
structured activities will be mediated by functional capacity. 
 
The relationship between neurocognitive ability and objective function was 
investigated with functional capacity included as a mediating variable. 
 
The model confirmed that cognitive ability significantly predicted function capacity (β
= .70, p<.001) and that functional capacity significantly predicts objective functioning (
β= .58, p<.001) however neurocognition did not significantly predict objective function 
(β=.09, p=.44).  
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Figure 25 Mediation effect of functional capacity on the relationship between cognitive ability 
and objective community functioning. Key: ***p<.001, ** p<.01, *p<.05 
The mediation analysis reports that functional capacity significantly mediates the 
relationship between neurocognition and objective function (β=.40, +/-95% [.26, .55]). 
The model explained 50% of the variance in functional capacity and 41% of the 
variance in objective functioning. The model retained significant mediation even with 
the inclusion of negative symptoms in analysis (a*b=.27, p=.001, 95%CI [.11, .43]). 
The reverse model was run to assess the direction of the relationship and functional 
capacity was found to significantly mediate the relationship between objective function 
and neurocognition (a*b=.32, p<.001, 95%CI [.16, .47]). This suggests that the reverse 
relationship is also true and as someone functions more in the community, better 
cognitive abilities are found to through their increased capacity to complete daily living 
tasks  
3.3.11 Model 4: The relationship between functional capacity and time spent in 
structured activities will be mediated by metacognition. 
 
A model was run to investigate whether functional capacity predicts functional 
outcome with metacognition mediating this relationship (figure 26 below). Firstly, the 
overall model fit was investigated and the pathway model achieved good fit statistics 
(𝜒2(1) = .17, p=.68, CFI= 1.00, TLI=1.00 RMSEA= 0.00).  
 
Functional capacity significantly predicted metacognition (β = .77, p=.001) and 
metacognition significantly predicted objective function ( β =.77, p=.006). The 
relationship between functional capacity and objective function however failed to 
obtain significance (p=.81). The indirect effect of metacognition on objective function 
reported a significant mediation effect however (β=.60, p=.001) and the confidence 
intervals corroborate this finding (+/-95%[.24, .95]. The model reports a large effect 
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size with 66% (R2= .66) of the variation in objective function being accounted for. The 
model was run with negative symptoms as a covariate and retained significant 
mediation effects (a*b=.59, p=.006, 95%CI [.17, 1.01]. The reverse model of 
metacognition mediating the relationship between objective function and functional 
capacity was assessed and no significant relationship was found. The reverse model 
of functional capacity mediating the relationship between metacognition and objective 
function was also run and the mediation analysis was non-significant. Finally, the 
model of both metacognition and negative symptoms mediating the relationship of 
functional capacity and objective function was run and negative symptoms were not a 
significant mediator of this relationship. 
 
Figure 26 Suggested mediation model of functional capacity to relationship objective 
community function mediated by metacognition. Key: ***p<.001, ** p<.01, *p<.05 
3.3.12 Model 5: The relationship between neurocognition and functional 
capacity is mediated by metacognition and negative symptoms. 
 
First, the model of neurcognition on functional capacity was re-run with both negative 
symptoms and metacognition as mediating pathways between neurocognition and 
functional capacity. Both metacognition (β= .40, p=.015) and negative symptoms (β 
=-.27, p=.004) signficantly predicted functional capacity and neurocognition 
signficantly predicted metacognition (β=.56, p=.021) and negative symptoms (β=-
.43, p<.001). Next the mediation pathways were inspected and metacognition (a*b= 
.22, p=.012, 95% CI[.05, .39]) and negative symptoms (a*b=.12, p=.015, 95% CI[.02, 
.21]) mediate the relationship between cognitive ability and functional capacity. The R2 
statistic suggests that 71% of the variance in functional capacity is accounted for by 
the overall model. 
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Figure 27 Mediation model: metacognition and negative symptoms as mediators for the 
relationship between neurocognition and functional capacity. Key: ***p<.001, ** p<.01, 
*p<.05 
The model was also run to investigate the relationship of metacognition and negative 
symptoms on objective function however no signifcant pathway was present between 
negative symptoms and objective function (β= .07, p=.376) therefore one of the 
conditions for mediation was not met.  
3.3.13 Model 6: Memory, IQ and executive function, metacognition and 
functional outcome (functional capacity and objective function) 
Finally, the individual cognitive domains included in the meta-analysis discussed in 
chapter two were also investigated. Memory, IQ and executive function were entered 
into the model as predictors of functional capacity and functional outcome with 
metacognition and negative symptoms included as covariates. The analysis results 
are displayed in table 15 below. 
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Table 15 Summary table of individual cognitive predictors, metacognition and functional 
outcome 
Predictor 
 
Mediator 
 
Outcome Covariate a b Direct 
(C’) 
Indirect 
(a*b,[95%CI]) 
Memory MC Fx  .12(.)* .77(.48)** .26(.49) *** .14(.26)*[.05, .29] 
Memory MC Fx Neg .16(.53) ** 53.37(.68) ** .21(.39) *** .08(.15) [-.02, .31] 
Memory MC FO  .23(.31) * 54.8(.79) * .55 (.02) 6.54(.26) *[.04, .45] 
Memory MC FO Neg .08 (.20)* 55.92(.83) * .21 (.05) 4.36(.16) [-.03, .36] 
IQ MC Fx  .01 (.55)* .84 (.52)** .01 (.41)*** .01(.29) * [.06, .52] 
IQ MC Fx Neg .01(.38)* .62(.36)* .01(.34)** .01(.14) [-.06, .35] 
IQ MC FO  .01(.59)** 57.94(.86)* -07(-.50) .74(.51)*** [.26, .76] 
IQ MC FO Neg .09(.40)* 61.02(.94)** -.12(-.8) .52(.38)* [.08, .68] 
EF MC Fx  .18(.40)* 1.07(.65)** .14(.19)* .19(.3)* [.07, .45] 
EF MC Fx Neg .10(.22) .84(.51)** .08(.11) .08(.11) [-.03, .25] 
EF MC FO  .17(.40)* .53.63(.72)** 2.2(.07) 8.85(.29) **[.13, .44] 
EF MC FO Neg .10(.22) 54.79(.80)** .47(.02) 5.27(.18) * [.01, .35] 
Key: ***=p<.001, **=p<.01, *= p<.05. Notes: NC=neurocognition, MC=metacognition, 
Fx=functional capacity, FO=objective function, Neg=negative symptoms, ( )= standardised 
values 
Metacognition was found to significantly mediate the relationship between all 3 
cognitive domains and functional capacity however all three mediation pathways failed 
to obtain significance once negative symptoms were also included as a covariate. This 
suggests that negative symptoms also contribute to the mediation effect observed. In 
relation to objective function, metacognition was found to significantly mediate the 
relationship between all three individual cognitive domains and time spent in structured 
activity. When negative symptoms were included as a covariate, the significant 
mediation effect was lost in the memory and executive function domains. IQ however 
retained significance even controlling for negative symptoms.  
 
This suggests that metacognition uniquely accounts for the relationship between IQ 
and objective function distinct from negative symptoms. This suggests that executive 
function and memory may be more related to negative symptoms than IQ and account 
for the loss of significant pathways once negative symptoms were included in the 
model. 
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Table 16 Mediation model summary table including model fit and pathway estimates 
Predictor 
 
Mediator 
 
Outcome Model fit 
(𝜒2 (df), p) 
CFI/TFI/RMSEA a b Total (c) Direct 
(C’) 
Indirect 
(a*b,[95%CI]) 
R2med R2out 
NC MC FX .03(1), .86 1.00, 1.04, .00 .36(.56)* .82(.51)** .61(.70) *** .44(.42) *** .40(.29)**[.07, .50] .313 .673 
NC MC FO .11(1), .74 1.00, 1.04, .00 .35(.51) ** 53.37(.74) ** 21.28(.48) *** 2.73(.06) 18.55(.41) ***[.31, .64] .317 .594 
NC FX FO .00(0), .00a 1.00, 1.00, .00 .75(.70) *** 25.11(.58) *** 22.97(.50) *** 4.24(.09) 18.74(.40) ***[.26, .55] .495 .413 
FX MC FO .17(1), 68 1.00, 1.00, 0.00 .45(.69) 54.93(.85) 25.11(.48) .97(.02) 24.14(.41) ***[.31, .64] .314 .66 
NC MC, Neg FX .22(3), .00 .89, .63, .00 .50(.77) *** 51.80(.77) ** 27.69(.64) *** 2.01(.05) 25.68(.60) **[.24, .95] .595 .71 
***=p<.001, **=p<.01, *= p<.05. Notes: NC=neurocognition, MC=metacognition, FX=functional capacity, FO=objective function, Neg=negative symptoms, a= just identified model, ( )= 
standardised values 
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In relation to the first study aim, the results of the factor analysis suggested that 
metacognition is best represented by the self-reflectivity subscale of the BCIS and a total 
score of the MAI. This model demonstrated good overall fit statistics. The self-certainty 
subscale was found to have a non-significant relationship with both other metacognitive 
variables and outcome measures. The factor analysis suggests that neurocognition is 
also suitably represented by a one factor solution, as is functional capacity. The present 
study offers similar levels of functioning as Hodgekins et al's., (2015) FEP study (see 
table 14 above) and confirms that those with psychosis are spending under half the time 
in structured activities as a non-clinical comparison study. Social disability is present 
across FEP cohorts and highlights social disability as a key feature of psychosis. 
 
In relation to the second and third hypotheses, neurocognition and metacognition were 
positively associated with both functional capacity and objective function. Negative 
symptoms were found to have a significant negative association with metacognition and 
functional capacity and objective function. The relationship between neurocognition and 
objective function was mediated by functional capacity and the relationship between 
functional capacity and objective function was also mediated by metacognition. Finally, 
functional capacity and objective function were found to have a significant, positive 
association with each other. 
 
Functional capacity 
The mediation analysis found that metacognition partially mediates the relationship 
between neurocognition and functional capacity explaining 67% of the overall variance 
in functional capacity. This suggests that cognitive skills are associated with successfully 
completing everyday tasks however the ability to regulate these skills through 
metacognition is also important to integrating these domains. 
 
Objective function 
Metacognition was found to fully mediate the relationship between neurocognition and 
objective function with 59% of the variance in objective community function accounted 
for in the model. This suggests that once again, the cognitive skills required to perform 
occupational, social, educational and social activities are also associated with the 
metacognitive abilities required to integrate them into the real world.  
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Furthermore, the individual cognitive domain pathways analyses suggest that the 
relationship between memory, executive function and IQ and functional capacity and 
objective function is mediated by metacognition. When negative symptoms were 
controlled for in mediation analysis, only the relationship with IQ persisted. This suggests 
that a particular relationship exists entirely separate from the influence of negative 
symptoms between IQ, metacognition and time spent in structured activities. This is an 
interesting finding in light of Hill et al., (2002) work documenting that those with a 
diagnosis of schizophrenia may fall into distinct cognitive profiles. However, the direct 
pathway between IQ and objective function was not significant suggesting that there is 
something unique to the relationship between metacognition and IQ accounting for the 
relationship to objective function as IQ individually did not significantly predict objective 
function.  
 
Verbal IQ was employed for this particular analysis as most other studies also report this 
relationship (see chapter two). Verbal IQ is suggested as a measure of both premorbid 
IQ and verbal intelligence; whilst having adequate verbal skills is essential to conducting 
social and occupational activities, language in itself may not be enough. Likewise, if it is 
considered a measure of premorbid IQ this suggests that intelligence prior to psychosis 
is a key determinant of functional recovery after illness. However this relationship only 
appears when considered through metacognition; metacognition may be the essential 
ingredient associated with translating these abilities into actual real-life activities. 
 
Functional capacity and objective function 
In terms of the relationship between functional capacity and objective function, 
metacognition was found to fully mediate this relationship. This is an important finding 
as this suggests that, whilst individuals may possess the capacity to complete tasks 
essential to community function, without sufficient metacognitive abilities, these skills 
may not be integrated and adapted successfully to support real-world recovery. This 
confirms that functional capacity is required to take part in structured activities.  
 
Negative symptoms 
The relationship between neurocognition, metacognition and functional capacity and 
objective function was not attributable to negative symptoms as these relationships 
persisted even when negative symptoms were included in analysis. In addition, a second 
mediation pathway was observed between neurocognition and functional capacity going 
through negative symptoms. This confirms that negative symptoms also play a role in 
translating cognitive skills into functional capacity. The overall model with both 
113 
 
metacognition and negative symptoms accounts for 71% of total variance in functional 
capacity. Interestingly, no relationship was found between negative symptoms and 
functional outcome in model 4 which was unexpected. Conceptually, as both measures 
assess amount of involvement in activity (although in different ways) this is surprising 
and may be a power issue. However this does suggest that negative symptoms are more 
predictive of capacity to complete a task rather than whether you are actually engaging 
in community activities. 
 
In relation to the hypotheses, the present study can confirm that metacognition partially 
mediates the relationship between neurocognition and functional capacity and fully 
mediates the relationship with objective function. Metacognition also fully mediates the 
relationship between functional capacity and objective function. Additionally, 
metacognition was found to mediate the relationship between individual cognitive 
domains and both functional capacity and objective function. In relation to objective 
function, no significant direct pathway was observed between the cognitive domains of 
memory, IQ and executive functioning and time spent in structured activities. Direct 
pathways however were found in the functional capacity models. This suggests that 
cognitive ability is directly related to functional capacity as it is likely that these tasks 
directly require raw cognitive skills. Objective function in comparison requires these 
cognitive pathways to be integrated into complex social environments hence 
metacognitive ability is more important to the relationship. This could suggest that 
remediation interventions may have a greater impact on equipping individuals with the 
capacity to complete everyday tasks by also working on a metacognitive level. If 
improvements in metacognition are also promoted, cognitive improvements may be 
passed on to improved community functioning. For example having improved working 
memory skills may be important to completing individual tasks in an occupational setting 
however managing cognitive resources and monitoring when the individual task may go 
wrong may be more critical to holding down employment longer-term. 
 
Interestingly, in relation to model 3, the reverse model was also found to be significant. 
The relationship between time spent in structured activities and neurocognition was 
mediated by functional capacity. This may suggest a form or reinforcement is important 
to community function with spending more time in structured activities relating to better 
capacity and better cognitive function. Taking part in more activities may allow individuals 
to practice their cognitive skills and therefore improve them which facilitates increased 
community engagement in a cyclical relationship. 
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The present study corroborates Lysaker et al.'s (2010) study which also found that 
mastery, a form of metacognition, mediated the relationship between cognition and social 
function. However this builds on the study by demonstrating this effect across different 
measures of function and a richer overall construct of metacognition. Furthermore, as 
the present study employed FEP, the argument that deficits may be due to chronicity of 
illness and associated medication and treatment therapy exposure rather than 
metacognition itself are addressed.  
 
The medication analysis also suggested no significant relationship between medication 
and metacognitive domains or outcome domains. Likewise, Lysaker employed a largely 
older, male cohort restricting the claims that can be made in terms of generalizability. 
Although the sample was still predominantly male, the ratio was much more even (61% 
male versus 39% female). This is the first study to incorporate cognitive insight into this 
analysis and suggests that self-reflectivity may contribute to community function in 
addition to cognitive ability. 
 
In terms of the relationship with neurocognition, the present study corroborates the work 
of Hamm et al., (2012), Nicolò et al., (2012) and Abu-Akel & Bo, (2013) and a host of 
papers by Paul Lysaker (2005; 2007; 2011) in which improved neurocognition is 
associated with better metacognition. The present study also confirms that 
metacognition is an important predictor of community function as suggested by Giusti et 
al., (2013) and Brüne et al., (2007). 
 
The factor analysis offers some insight into the construct of metacognition; the self-
reflectivity subscale of the BCIS loaded onto a single factor with the MAI total score 
suggesting that they are indicators of a shared latent factor. The self-certainty subscale 
did not fit with this model and no significant relationships were found between self-
certainty and other variables. Two findings can be concluded from this; firstly, the self-
reflectivity aspect of cognitive insight may fit in a multi-layered metacognition system 
related to synthetic metacognition as a form of metacognitive knowledge. The self-
certainty subscale measures an unrelated aspect of cognitive insight and this is 
supported by other studies showing mixed findings when including overall scores for 
cognitive insight rather than separate indices. The present study suggests that authors 
should use caution when using a composite index score of cognitive insight as these two 
factors may relate to different processing systems. 
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The study findings are important as they suggests that cognitive abilities are an important 
predictor of our capacity to complete everyday tasks however metacognition is also 
required to navigate the complexities of daily life. When it comes to translating these 
skills into a real-world setting, metacognition is potentially equally important as raw 
cognitive ability. Metacognition was observed to significantly mediate the relationship 
between cognition and objective function whilst controlling for negative symptoms 
however no significant direct pathway was observed between cognition and objective 
function. This indicates that metacognition is more important to real-world functioning 
than either neurocognition or negative symptoms. In summary, one’s ability to reflect 
back on cognition and monitor the transitions between mental states may improve 
learning and correct strategy selection in response to both the capacity to complete daily 
tasks and real-world situations. 
3.4.1 Limitations 
Whilst the present study attempted to address many of the identified issues with known 
research, a number of limitations must be held in mind when considering the findings. 
Firstly, the present study is cross-sectional so the impact of changes in neurocognition 
and metacognition and how these may impact on functional levels in the individual are 
not known. Future studies tracking the changes in all three domains across time would 
offer greater insight into the mechanisms of the relationship between variables. The 
analysis of reverse models offers some confidence in relation to the direction of causality 
however how these variables interact in psychosis needs clarification.  
 
The MAI, as a measure of synthetic and declarable metacognitive ability, relies on self-
report of internal mechanisms. Language disturbances have been identified as a primary 
feature of schizophrenia (Kuperberg & Caplan, 2003) or as a result of current symptoms 
(Stirling, Hellewell, Blakey, & Deakin, 2006). As a self-report interview measure reliant 
upon verbalisation of internal experiences, deficits may be due to linguistic deficits or 
descriptive impairment rather than metacognition per se. However as one of the 
measures of neurocognition is verbal IQ and logical memory and verbal fluency also 
draws on theses abilities, both neurocognition and metacognition measurement would 
have been impacted on equally by language deficits in the study. This should minimise 
the effect language would have on the results however this should still be considered 
when interpreting the findings. 
 
Secondly, the present study was potentially underpowered despite recruitment targets 
being calculated in advance as suggested by Fritz, (2007). Whilst exact numbers 
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required for factor analysis vary from author-to-author (Jung & Lee, 2011), some 
commentators suggest a minimum of 150 (Hutcheson & Sofroniou 1999) even when 
there is high correlation amongst variables as in the present study. Likewise, the models 
assessed were restricted due to concerns over power; ideally the pathway models would 
have been measurement models with all indicators included however the present study 
had to approach this in a piecemeal manner and run through multiple models to maintain 
a respectable case to parameter ratio (Bentler & Chou, 1987). Finally, due to self-
certainty’s poor factor loading, the latent variable of metacognition was only measures 
by two indicators. Whilst Kenny suggest this as a minimum number, three is a safer 
option (Kenny, 2012) and under estimation may lead to bias parameter estimates 
(Iacobucci, 2010). The significant correlation however between the two indicators acts a 
protective factor and helps justify the use of only two indicators (Kenny, 2012). 
3.4.2 Implications 
Despite these restrictions, the present study implicates metacognition in both functional 
capacity and real-world functioning. This builds on the work discussed in chapter 1 and 
2 and confirms the relationship between neurocognition and function being mediated by 
metacognition. This also demonstrates that this relationship is present at early stage of 
illness. There are important implications of these findings; metacognition may be a critical 
ingredient in integrating a host of skills into occupational and social situations and this 
may suggest that treatment programs may wish to target this ability in care pathways. 
Cognitive remediation programmes have already started to incorporate metacognitive 
content to traditional cognitive remediation exercises and the present study suggests 
that this is a valuable addition. By improving both cognition and metacognition rather 
than solely the former, recovery from psychosis after symptoms have subsided may be 
maximised. The effect sizes were also larger than previous studies investigating the 
relationship between neurocognition and function ranging from 40%-70% of the overall 
variance in outcome. This offers far more explanation of functioning and highlights the 
importance of both metacognition and negative symptoms in outcome. 
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Chapter 4: A Voxel-Based 
Morphometry (VBM) investigation of 
perceptual metacognitive accuracy in 
FEP. 
The neurodegenerative process in schizophrenia was suggested as early as Kraeplin’s 
(1919) description of dementia praecox and was similarly asserted by Bleuler (1911). 
Authors such as Bender (1947) and Watt (1978) added further evidence that early 
abnormal neurodevelopment may underpin the deficits observed in schizophrenia. With 
the advent of MRI technology, nascent studies began to suggest the presence of 
neurological abnormalities in schizophrenia (Crow, 1982; Smith et al., 1984), such as 
differences in overall brain volume, enlarged ventricles, and localised volume changes. 
Evidence for differences in total brain volume compared to controls has been mixed, with 
some studies reporting larger (e.g. Andreason et al., 1990) and others smaller (e.g. Barta 
et al., 1990) overall total intracranial volume. However Shenton, Dickey, Frumin and 
McCarley, (2001) in a review reported that 78% of studies found no difference. A more 
consistent finding appears to be enlarged lateral ventricles, and localised volume 
changes including reduced basal ganglia, prefrontal, medial temporal (Shenton et al., 
2001) and hippocampal (Radulescu et al., 2014) volume. Furthermore, enlarged 
ventricles have been associated with a reduction of the thalamus, striatum and temporal 
cortex (Gaser, Nenadic, Buchsbaum, Hazlett, & Buchsbaum, 2004). Whilst longitudinal 
studies have not shown a continued degeneration in more advanced stages of chronic 
illness (Pantelis et al., 2005), progressive brain volume changes have been found post 
earliest phase of illness, and further degeneration has been associated with poorer 
clinical recovery (Lieberman, 1999). Zipursky, Reilly and Murray, (2013) warn that 
longitudinal studies demonstrating a longer term degenerative process must be 
considered with the fact that the further degeneration may be due to effects of continued 
exposure to antipsychotic mediation and substance abuse rather than psychosis per se. 
Structural abnormalities have been found to be present at first stage of illness (Zipursky 
et al., 1998) and more recently, a strategy to avoid the aforementioned confounding 
variables has been adopted by investigating non-chronic samples. Furthermore, different 
GM deterioration profiles have been observed in affective versus non-affective psychosis 
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and are associated with worse outcomes (Rosa et al., 2015). Equally, differing GM 
volume and cortical thickness are associated with positive and negative symptom profiles 
separately (Padmanabhan et al., 2015). In FEP, reduced GM volume has been observed 
in limbic structures (Watson et al., 2012), frontal, temporal, occipital and cerebellum 
regions compared to controls and more severe GM reduction has been associated with 
earlier onset of psychosis (Tordesillas-gutierrez et al., 2015). Clinically high risk (CHR) 
groups have been investigated and researchers have found that those that converted 
into psychosis demonstrated a higher decline in overall GM volume than those that did 
not (Borgwardt et al., 2008), although other studies have only found this effect in specific 
brain regions such as the prefrontal cortex (Sun et al., 2009) and temporal regions 
(Pantelis et al., 2003). Scanlon et al., (2014) in comparison found cortical thinning of GM 
in temporal and caudate regions in relation to controls. However no differences were 
found in the local gyrification index and no relationship was found between structural 
abnormalities and symptom or global functioning 3 years later. Tognin et al., (2014) 
report reduced cortical thickness in the parahippocampal gyrus compared to controls 
however they found no GM volume differences between CHR individuals that 
transitioned to psychosis compared to those that did not. This suggests that cortical 
changes may not necessarily predicate transition to psychosis. Comparison among 
studies looking at prodromal and CHR samples are problematic as studies differ in terms 
of group definition, scan interval between baseline and follow-up, contain relatively small 
sample sizes, and employ differing MRI analysis techniques (Chung & Cannon, 2015; 
Tognin et al., 2014). This suggests that, whilst there are structural deficits evidenced in 
schizophrenia and FEP, the exact profile is not established as yet. 
A further complication in considering previous research is the comparison control groups 
employed. Studies often fail to control for education (Smith et al., 2015), find significant 
difference in IQ and compare anyway (Benetti et al., 2013; Watson et al., 2012) or recruit 
a sample of patients with intact IQ who may not be representative of a typical 
schizophrenia population (Radulescu et al., 2014). Some evidence suggests the 
presence of a sub-profile of patients who retain cognitive abilities and may very well have 
a different structural profile and different clinical outcome statistics (Leeson et al., 2011). 
Typical meta-analysis reports suggest that IQ in FEP is -.91 standard deviations below 
the population mean (Mesholam-Gately et al., 2009) therefore selecting patients with 
above mean IQs may not be representative of the group on the whole.  
In summary, structural deficits have been observed in schizophrenia and some work has 
begun to investigate this at early stage of illness such as FEP. How these GM deficits 
interact with metacognition in FEP has not been researched and will be the focus of the 
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next section. Understanding the relationship between neural structure and metacognitive 
processing in FEP may offer insight into determinants of disability in later schizophrenia. 
Metacognition 
Metacognition refers to ‘thinking about thinking’ (Flavell, 1979) and is a fundamental 
component of higher order cognition (Rosenthal, 2000) (see section 1.14). The ability to 
critically evaluate one’s cognitive products requires a number of higher order skills and 
the preoccupation with accurate self-knowledge is not a new notion dating back Plato 
and Socrates. Nelson and Narens (1990) provide a model of metacognition, detailing a 
dual system of object and meta-level processing, wherein cognitive processes send 
information through a feedback loop relating to task performance, and meta-level 
processes regulate the cognitive resources allocated to a task. Meta-level processes are 
responsible for assessments of cognitive accuracy, selection of strategy and the 
updating of goals which allow successful learning and completion of daily tasks (see 
section 1.15 for further details). The monitoring and control of these processes are 
dependent on subjective appraisals and may be explicit (conscious) or implicit (feeling 
driven or ‘gut instinct’) and are pertinent to successful social interactions (Frith, 2012).  
 
Dysfunction in metacognition has been found in a number of neuropsychiatric disorders 
(David, Bedford, Wiffen, & Gilleen, 2012) and specifically in schizophrenia (Vargas, 
Sendra, & Benavides, 2012) and may underpin functional deficits. Those with 
schizophrenia have been found to have deficits in reflecting back on their own mental 
states (Lysaker et al., 2013) overconfidence in erroneous conclusions (Köther et al., 
2012) and these deficits have been associated with a jumping to conclusions bias (Buck 
et al., 2012) due to inaccurate assessments of self-knowledge. Koren, Seidman, 
Goldsmith and Harvey (2006) suggest that successful metacognitive ability depends on 
the ability to perform a task, an appropriate level of confidence in performance (i.e. which 
tracks objective performance) and, thirdly, the decision to act on these confidence 
judgements in real-life. They argue that these processes may be essential to social 
recovery. The preceding research suggests presence of deficits in metacognitive 
processing in schizophrenia and FEP. Being aware that one may be wrong will lead to 
more caution in decision making whereas overconfidence may lead to inappropriate 
social strategies being employed leading to poor social and occupational function. 
Research has investigated these metacognitive judgements in schizophrenia and 
psychosis through prospective learning assessments (JOLs) (Do Lam et al., 2012) and 
feelings of knowing (Bacon & Izaute, 2009). More recently retrospective reports of 
confidence in accuracy have been employed to estimate metacognitive control (Fleming, 
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Weil, Nagy, Dolan, & Rees, 2010) using signal detection theory (SDT) to model the ability 
to discriminate signal from noise (Maniscalco & Lau, 2012) (see section 1.16 for further 
details on measurement). To have good metacognitive efficiency, an individual should 
be confident in correct responses and unconfident in incorrect decisions. Perceptual 
metacognition has been used in previous research (Fleming et al., 2010; Palmer et al., 
2014) and using SDT gives a ‘bias free’ estimate of metacognitive accuracy without the 
confounds of task performance or stimuli bias (Fleming & Lau, 2014). In relation to the 
Nelson and Narens (1990) metacognitive model, metacognitive accuracy is considered 
a lower-order metacognitive experience. 
The study of the neural basis of these judgements has become of increasing interest in 
research (for a review, see Fleming & Dolan, 2012). The frontal cortex has been 
associated with mentalizing about one’s self since the beginning of the 21st century (Frith 
& Frith, 2003). More recently, the processing of self-referential information and engaging 
in introspective behaviours has been associated with increased activity in the 
dorsomedial PFC and Schmitz et al., (2004) found a relationship between the 
dorsolateral PFC and self-evaluative metacognition. Higher activity was demonstrated 
when responding to self versus other evaluations. Retrospective confidence judgements 
have been found to be associated with the lateral PFC (Fleming & Dolan, 2012) and 
lesion studies implicate the rostrolateral PFC in subjective reporting of conscious 
perception (Del Cul, Dehaene, Reyes, Bravo, & Slachevsky, 2009). Beyond studies of 
brain activation, metacognitive judgements have been investigated in relation to 
structural volume. Fleming, Weil, Nagy, Dolan and Rees (2010) found a correlation 
between metacognitive accuracy and GM volume in the anterior PFC, and white-matter 
microstructure connecting the anterior PFC. However the authors failed to control for age 
which has since been implicated in GM volume (Terribilli et al., 2011) and metacognitive 
accuracy (Palmer et al., 2014).  
In schizophrenia, Spalletta, Piras, Piras, Caltagirone and Orfei, (2014) assessed 
metacognitive insight through a questionnaire design and found poor self-reflection 
associated with reduced volume in the ventrolateral and right dorsolateral PFC. Vohs et 
al., (2015) investigated metacognition using the Metacognitive Assessment Scale (MAS), 
a semi-structured interview free narrative account of mental state reflection in the self 
and others. It was found that greater GM density in the medial PFC and ventral striatum 
was associated with increased metacognitive ability across a number of indices. Buchy, 
Stowkowy, Macmaster, Nyman and Addington, (2015) investigated metacognitive ability 
within a CHR group and found associations between cortical thickness and inferior and 
middle frontal gyri, superior temporal and insula regions, and higher scores on the MAS. 
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Finally, metacognition has been associated with functional outcome in psychosis and 
schizophrenia (Lysaker et al., 2010; McLeod, Gumley, Macbeth, Schwannauer, & 
Lysaker, 2014). It is thus essential to understand how metacognitive processing and 
neurological structure interact in FEP. The ability to correctly appraise cognitive products 
for accuracy can assist with social (Frith, 2012) and occupational (Giusti et al., 2013) 
performance and lead to requesting help at an earlier point before community 
deterioration (Koren et al., 2006). This metacognitive ability may also predicate self-
management of symptoms and is also implicated in delayed recovery (Nicolò et al., 2012). 
The ability to form complex representations of one’s self may allow for the revision of 
negative self-beliefs and assist with motivational deficits (Hamm et al., 2012). In relation 
to Nelson and Narens (1990) metacognitive model, (section 1.13), metacognitive 
accuracy is considered an implicit form of lower-order metacognitive processing. How 
this relates to high-order, synthetic metacognitive knowledge discussed in chapter three 
will also be investigated. 
The previous evidence provides a number of suggestions; i) that GM differences can be 
present at early stage of illness, ii) these deficits are more subtle than at chronic stages 
iii) that worse symptom outcomes are associated with greater GM deterioration. However 
the nature of this relationship is as yet unclear and the profile of continued GM 
degeneration is not certain after first episode. There appears to be sub profiles of those 
experiencing their first-episode of psychosis; a proportion make a full recovery however 
others deteriorate into chronic schizophrenia and longer term social disability. 
Understanding variables that predict recovery at first point of illness is critical to 
understanding the causal factors of schizophrenia. 
Metacognition is a higher-order mentalisation process and has been linked to frontal 
regions which have also been proposed to be deteriorated in FEP. How the two may 
interact is yet to be investigated and retrospective judgments of cognitive processes has 
also not been explored in FEP. The forced-choice metacognitive efficiency appraisal may 
be part of a different processing level to the MAI. How this appraisal process relates to 
brain structure in FEP may be of relevance for community outcome; incorrect confidence 
judgements of cognitive processes may lead to the individual assigning incorrect 
credence to self-judgements. If incorrect confidence is attributed to cognitive products, 
this could lead to poor real-world decision making. Deficits in metacognition at early 
stage of illness may underpin the functional deficits observed in the real-world that are a 
core feature of later schizophrenia. Structural deficits in the PFC and impoverished 
metacognitive ability may indeed be a marker for FEP. 
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4.1.1 Hypotheses 
Metacognitive accuracy has already been associated with GM volume (Fleming et al., 
2010) however whether this relationship is evident in FEP is unknown. GM volume 
deficits may account for metacognitive impairment seen in schizophrenia and FEP. To 
address these questions, the present study will (i) investigate whether patients with FEP 
have a deficit in metacognitive accuracy compared to matched healthy controls; (ii) 
investigate structural GM differences between FEP and healthy controls. The present 
study will focus on temporal and frontal gyri and the PFC, as there are clear a priori 
implications for these regions in both metacognitive processing and GM volume deficits; 
(iii) to investigate the relationship between structural GM volume and metacognitive 
processing in FEP and healthy controls; (iv) assess the extent to which this lower-order 
metacognitive accuracy relates to high-order, synthetic metacognition (discussed in 
chapter 3) in patients with FEP. 
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4.2.1 Design 
A cross-sectional design was employed with a convenience sample of FEP service-users 
who were recruited from Early Intervention in Psychosis (EIP) services from the Sussex 
Partnership Trust.  
4.2.2 Participants 
Potential participants were identified through either being registered on an existing 
research database or referred by EIP service care co-ordinators.  
Inclusion criteria 
All FEP participants were diagnosed as having their first-episode of psychosis and 
accepted onto full caseload of an EIP service. Inclusion criteria included a primary 
diagnosis of first-episode psychosis, being over the age of 18 and an exclusion criteria 
of organic neurological impairment and primary diagnosis of substance misuse were 
applied.  
Twenty-one age, sex and education matched control participants were recruited from the 
community through local media outlets and were screened for relevant psychiatric, 
substance misuse or medical history. MRI safety protocol contradictions such as existing 
heart condition, non-removable metallic piercings and pregnancy were also reasons for 
exclusion.  
4.2.3 Procedure 
Ethical approval was obtained from the London-Camden and Islington NHS Research 
and Ethics Committee (Ref: 11/LO/1877, project ID 72141; see appendix A) and a local 
NHS research governance committee (appendix B). Participants were recruited through 
either current registration on a research database operated by Sussex Partnership Trust 
giving consent to be contacted by a researcher or through their care team. In the latter 
case, care teams were approached by a member of the research team and permission 
was sought from the service-user via their care co-ordinator for a researcher to contact 
them to explain the study and provide a participant information sheet. The FEP sample 
were advised to discuss taking part in the study with a family member or member of their 
care team and both groups were compensated for their time by £20.Informed consent 
was obtained by a) checking capacity with a member of the care team and b) by 
discussion with the service-user on the day of the study. A short version of the Positive 
and Negative Syndrome Scale (PANSS) (Kay, Fiszbein, & Opler, 1987) and the Time 
Use survey (Constructive Economic Activity subscale) (Short et al., 2000) were also 
collected in addition to the behavioural task and the MRI scan acquisition on the day of 
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the study. Neuroleptic medication information was taken and converted to Olanzapine 
equivalent doses (Leucht et al., 2014) for correlational analysis with other variables of 
interest. Measures of metacognition (MAI and BCIS) collected as part of the study 
reported in chapter 3 were included for the investigation for how different metacognitive 
variables relate to each other (N=30). See table 18 for clinical characteristics information. 
4.2.4 Behavioural Task; perceptual metacognitive accuracy 
All participants received a standardised instruction sheet describing the task and a 
researcher was available to answer any questions prior to commencement. Participants 
were seated in a darkened room and positioned approximately 60 cms from a PC 
computer screen. The task was programmed and administered on MATLAB 8 
(Mathworks Inc., Natick, MA, USA) using the COGENT 2000 toolbox. 
Perceptual metacognitive accuracy was investigated through a computerised visual 
perception task adapted from a previous study (Fleming et al., 2010). Participants 
undertook a forced choice visual perception task wherein they were presented with 2 
screens one after the other. Each screen contained 6 Gabor patch stimuli (circular 
patches containing alternate black and white vertical bars presented at 1.5 visual angle, 
2.2 cycles per degree) arranged around a central fixation point (see figure 28). One of 
the Gabors in each screen was manipulated to ‘pop-out’ by increasing the contrast in the 
patch itself compared to neighbour patches. The contrast of the background Gabors was 
set to 20% luminance, the target Gabor was set to vary from 40% (little difference) to 
100% (large difference) contrasts. All stimuli and instructions were presented on a grey 
background.  
Stimuli array screens were presented for 200ms with an interval of 300ms between 
stimuli displays. The target Gabor’s location was randomly alternated both in terms of 
screen location and which presentation screen (first or second) it would appear. 
Participants were requested to state which screen they believed the target Gabor had 
appeared in (1 or 2) by pressing an assigned key on a standard qwerty keyboard. They 
were given 2500ms to respond or a message stating ‘too slow’ would appear. 
Participants were then asked to report their confidence regarding with their decision on 
a scale of 1 (low confidence) to 6 (high confidence) by pressing a labelled key on the 
computer keyboard. They had 4000ms to make this decision before the next trial would 
automatically commence. Participants were encouraged to use the full range of the scale 
and a red box would surround their selected responses. The response window was 
increased from the original study (Fleming et al., 2010) (stimuli response was 2000ms 
and confidence response was 3500ms) to account for the potentially slower FEP sample 
response speed and ensure a suitable level of accuracy was achieved. 
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Figure 28 Perceptual metacognition 'pop out' task. Adapted from (Fleming et al., 2010) 
To avoid metacognitive accuracy being confounded by general performance, the Gabor 
patch contrast was set using a 1-up-2 down staircase procedure to maintain participant 
accuracy at ~70%. One incorrect response would lead to a 3 % increase in contrast and 
two consecutive correct judgements would lead to a 3% decrease in contrast. All 
participants received a practice block containing 10 trials to familiarise themselves with 
the procedure and ensure task comprehension. The main task consisted of 4 blocks of 
50 trials with a short break between each block. Due to the clinical sample, the number 
of trials was reduced to 200 from the 600 included in the original study to reduce task 
demands. 
Perceptual metacognitive accuracy was calculated using the Maniscalco and Lau (2012) 
type 2 SDT method for meta-d’ and quantified as meta-d’/d’. Meta-d’/d’ is measure of 
how aware the individual is of their accuracy given their processing capacity (d’). A value 
of 1 equates to ‘perfect’ or optimal metacognitive awareness where confidence tracks 
accuracy in response to the task and values less than 1 demonstrates lack of 
metacognitive awareness or suboptimal metacognition. Meta-d’ was calculated using a 
Matlab code available at http://www.columbia.edu/~bsm2105/type2sdt/ (Maniscalco & 
Lau, 2012). 
4.2.5 Image Acquisition 
All participants underwent the same imaging protocol. Structural MRI scans were 
obtained using a Siemens Avanto 1.5 T scanner. A T1-weighted MPRAGE sequence 
was performed with the following parameters: TR/TE = 2730ms/3.57ms, GRAPPA 
acceleration 2, an in-plane matrix of 256x 256 pixels over a FOV of 256mm x 240mm, 
flip angle 7, slice thickness 1mm yielding 192 sagittal plane slices, coronal and axial 
resolution 1mm, acquisition time 5 min 58 seconds. All images were inspected for image 
and motion artefacts prior to analysis. 
4.2.6 Voxel-Based Morphometry 
Structural data was preprocessed and analysed using FSL-VBM (Douaud et al., 2007, 
http://fsl.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fsl/fslwiki/FSLVBM) with an optimised Voxel-Based Morphometry 
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(VBM) protocol (Good et al., 2001) in FMRIB software library (FSL) version 5.0.7 (Smith 
et al., 2004). For the purpose of creating the study template, a sample (21) of the FEP 
were randomly selected to match the number of controls, using an in-house MATLAB 
script. This is necessary because mismatching group numbers may lead to a biased 
template being used in analysis. In the first stage of FSL-VBM, the T1 images were skull-
stripped using the FSL Brain Extraction Tool (BET), using a fractional intensity threshold 
of 0.15 with the options –R for a more robust brain centre estimation and–N to counteract 
the presence of greater neck volume in the images. The resulting images were inspected 
for suitability to be included in the study template. Two participant images did not show 
satisfactory skull stripping and were then separately re-processed with BET using a 
fractional intensity threshold of 0.1 with options –R, -S and –B to address residual eye, 
optic nerve and neck voxels. In the next step of FSL-VBM, the skull-stripped images 
were segmented to extract grey matter only and registered to the MNI 152 standard 
space using non-linear registration (Andersson et al., 2007). The resulting images were 
then averaged and flipped along the x-axis to create a left-right symmetric study-specific 
grey matter template. A modulation process was then run to compensate for the 
enlargement/contraction required for non-linear spatial registration wherein each voxel 
of each grey matter image was divided by the Jacobian of the warp field (Good et al., 
2001). All normalised grey matter images were then smoothed with an isotropic 
Gaussian kernel with a sigma value of 3 (equal to a full width half maximum of 7 mm). 
Finally voxelwise GLM was applied using permutation-based non-parametric inference 
testing correcting for multiple comparisons across voxels. Whole-brain analyses were 
conducted across all GM voxels within the template. In addition, given the clear role for 
prefrontal cortex in metacognition, region of interest analyses were conducted across 
GM voxels within a frontal lobe mask, as defined by the frontal lobe region in the FSL 
Harvard-Oxford Cortical Atlas. 
4.2.7 Design matrix 
A design matrix was compiled with the FSL general linear model tool. The following 
contrasts were run to investigate the main effect of group on GM volume, the main effect 
of metacognitive accuracy on GM volume, and the interaction between group and 
metacognitive accuracy in GM volume. Contrasts were also run to explore age and 
gender. In the main effect and interaction contrasts, age and gender were controlled. All 
covariates were demeaned before entering to the design (see 
http://mumford.fmripower.org/mean_centering/ for details on demeaning variables) 
matrix. Contrast and design matrices are available in table 17. 
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Table 17 VBM analysis contrasts 
 Variable      
Contrast control FEP control*meta-d’ FEP*meta-d’ gender age 
Group (con>FEP) 1 -1 0 0 0 0 
Group (FEP>con) -1 1 0 0 0 0 
Metacognition (positive) 0 0 1 1 0 0 
Metacognition (negative) 0 0 -1 -1 0 0 
Group*Metacognition 
(con>FEP) 
0 0 1 -1 0 0 
Group*Metacognition 
(FEP>con) 
0 0 -1 1 0 0 
Gender (female>male) 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Gender (male>female) 0 0 0 0 -1 0 
Age (positive) 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Age (negative 0 0 0 0 0 -1 
 
Statistical analysis was conducted using the FSL tool randomise, which allows for 
inference testing on statistical maps through a permutation method. Permutation 
methods allow inferential testing against the null hypothesis when little is known about 
the normality of the data and when there are multiple comparison concerns to control 
against false-positives (Bullmore et al., 1999), by drawing a null distribution on the basis 
of the data. Using randomise, the data were analysed using 5000 permutations with 
Threshold-Free Cluster Enhancement (TFCE) (Smith & Nichols, 2009). More information 
on the permutation method in neuroimaging is available elsewhere (Winkler et al., 2014; 
Nichols & Holmes, 2001).  
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4.3.1 Sample 
Forty-one psychosis participants were recruited in total, 32 male, 9 female with an age 
range of 19-39 (mean age 25.95) (see table 18 for demographic information). Thirteen 
patients were medication free for one month or more and 28 were receiving antipsychotic 
medication (see Table 18 for mean Olanzapine equivalent daily dose calculated for those 
prescribed medication). Seven patients did not complete the metacognition task due to 
fatigue and one was removed as a statistical outlier. One patient was excluded from 
further analysis due to poor quality T1 MPRAGE and one due to atypical neurology. 
Table 18 FEP and control participant demographic information 
 FEP (N=41) HC (N=21)  
    
Age (SD) 25.95 (5.66) 24.43 (5.62) P>.05 
Gender (female/male 9/32 6/15 P>.05 
Education (years) (SD) 13.27 (1.64) 13.71 (1.76) P>.05 
Time Use Survey (CEA) (hours/week) 19.97  N/A  
Medication (olanzapine equivalent mg/day) (SD) 12.91 (7.19) N/A  
PANSS (3 item) positive symptoms (mean) (SD) 5.35 (2.38) N/A  
PANSS (2 item) cognitive disorganisation (mean) 
(SD) 
3.33 (1.43) N/A  
PANSS (3 item) negative symptoms (mean) (SD) 5.67 (2.8) N/A  
4.3.2 Perceptual metacognitive accuracy 
Group comparisons 
Variables were inspected for normal distribution prior to analysis, despite a slight positive 
skew, no significant violations were observed. An analysis of covariance was run to 
investigate metacognitive accuracy between the control (N= 19) and FEP (N=32) 
samples with age controlled for as previous evidence suggests this is implicated in 
metacognitive accuracy (Palmer et al., 2014). A significant difference was found between 
groups (F(1, 48)= 4.54, p=.038) with the control sample demonstrating increased 
metacognitive accuracy (M=.42, SD=.34) compared to the FEP sample (M=.22, SD=.36), 
despite equivalent performance accuracy as ensured by the staircase procedure built 
into the task. The magnitude of the effect size indicates a medium sized effect of group 
on metacognitive accuracy (Cohen’s d = .57). 
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Figure 29 Perceptual metacognitive accuracy between FEP and control participants. Error bars 
represent standard error of the mean. 
4.3.3 Relationship of different metacognitive measures. 
FEP performance on the perceptual metacognition task was also investigated in relation 
to the other measures of metacognition outlined in chapter three with a subset of FEP 
participants who had completed all three measures (N=30). No significant correlations 
were observed between meta-d’, and the MAI or the BCIS subscales (p>.05). No 
significant associations were observed between meta-d’ and symptoms, medication 
dose (r=.18, p=.33) or time spent in structured activities (r=.15, p=.41). Time spent in 
structured activities did however demonstrate a significant association with negative 
symptoms (r= -.49, p=.002) and cognitive disorganisation (r= -.44, p=.005) but not 
positive symptoms (r= -.05, p=.763). 
4.3.4 VBM analysis: whole-brain 
A threshold—free cluster enhancement (TFCE) correction was applied to correct for 
multiple comparisons across all GM voxels within the template, with Family-Wise Error 
rate (FWE) p<0.05. 
Whole-brain group difference 
In a whole-brain analysis testing for a group difference with control GM volume greater 
than FEP, no voxel clusters were significant at p=.05 when controlling for multiple 
comparisons. Two clusters were found at a trend significance level of p=.07, in the right 
middle occipital gyrus (figure 30 below), with FEP having reduced GM volume compared 
to control participants (clusters localised using the MNI structural atlas within FSL). A 
significant association (p<.05) was found between i) age and decreased GM volume, 
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with lateral caudate nucleus, putamen and frontal gyri regions showing decreased GM 
volume with increased age and ii) gender, with the cerebella regions showing greater 
GM volume in male participants (see table 19 below). 
 
Figure 30 Full brain analysis: significant 18 cluster, peak coordinate 44, -74, 6 shown at p<0.07 
FWE 
Table 19 Whole brain analysis for GM volume and relationship to variables. Regions localised 
according to the Harvard-Oxford atlas in FSL 
Contrast Peak voxel 
coordinate 
(x y z) 
Cluster 
size  
(voxels) 
Region P 
value 
HC>FEP 44 -74 6 18 Right middle occipital gyrus .07 
HC>FEP 54 -74 0 3 Right middle occipital gyrus .07 
Age 
(negative) 
-12 12 6 196 L caudate nucleus .05 
Age 
(negative) 
-34 32 -18 112 L inferior frontal gyrus .05 
Age 
(negative) 
-30 -14 4 105 L Putamen .05 
Age 
(negative) 
-42 48 -16 102 L inferior frontal gyrus .05 
Gender 
(M>F) 
-12 -54 -64 6608 Cerebellum .05 
4.3.5 VBM analysis: Frontal lobe mask 
An investigation was run with regions of interest specified encompassing the frontal lobe. 
A GM mask was created using the Harvard-Oxford Cortical Atlas. This includes the 
frontal pole region highlighted in previous research as specifically relevant for 
metacognition (Fleming et al., 2010; Buchy et al., 2015). This a priori region of interest 
approach allows researchers to investigate specific motivated brain regions while 
reducing the number of corrections required to exceed FWE p<0.05 threshold (Haller et 
al., 2011). 
Frontal mask group difference 
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A significant group difference was found within the frontal lobe, with the FEP sample 
having significantly lower GM volume in the right superior medial gyrus (p<.05) 
controlling for multiple comparisons (figure 31). 
 
Figure 31: significant 47 voxel cluster from frontal mask region of interest analysis, peak 
coordinate 16 58 8, shown at p<0.05 FWE. 
Main effect of perceptual metacognitive accuracy 
Metacognitive accuracy was also investigated however contrary to the hypothesis, there 
was a trend level negative relationship with GM volume (p=.07) in the frontal gyri  region. 
Better metacognitive accuracy was associated with lower GM volume in both FEP and 
controls. 
 
Figure 32: Metacognitive accuracy 34 voxel cluster from frontal mask region of interest analysis, 
peak coordinate 27, 83, 47, shown at p<0.07 FWE. 
Metacognitive accuracy and relationship to group  
No significant (p<0.05 FWE) interaction effects were found between metacognitive 
accuracy and group on GM volume, suggesting that the relationship between 
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metacognitive accuracy and GM volume did not significantly differ between FEP and 
controls 
Age 
There was a significant negative association (p<.05) between age and GM volume in the 
left and right inferior frontal gyrus and the right superior medial gyrus. As age increases, 
GM volume was lower across participants in both FEP and controls.  
Table 20 Contrast results got GM volume and relationship to variables. All clusters reported 
were tested with a frontal lobe region of interest mask and FWE corrections. Regions localised 
according to the Harvard-Oxford atlas in FSL 
Contrast Peak voxel 
coordinate 
(x y z) 
Cluster 
size  
(voxels) 
Region P 
value 
HC>FEP 16 58 8 47 superior medial-frontal gyrus .05 
Metacognitive accuracy 
(negative) 
44 40 30 34 R middle frontal gyrus .07 
Metacognitive accuracy 
(negative) 
52 34 26 1 R inferior frontal gyrus .07 
Age -34 32 -18 634 L inferior frontal gyrus .05 
Age 10 50 44 257 R superior medial gyrus .05 
Age 48 40 0 239 R inferior frontal gyrus .05 
Age -54 36 -12 7 None .05 
Age 22 44 -20 3 R middle orbital gyrus .05 
Age 20 54 -22 1 None .05 
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The results of the study confirm that the FEP participants demonstrated significantly 
worse metacognitive accuracy compared to healthy controls matched on age, gender 
and education level. This is indicative of a specific processing deficit in the metacognitive 
domain and not attributable to objective task ability. The second hypothesis relating to 
structural deficits within the population is less clear. In a whole-brain analysis, trend level 
volume differences were observed in the occipital gyri and when applying a frontal lobe 
region of interest mask, significant medial-frontal gyrus differences were found in GM 
volume compared to controls. No interaction was found however between group and 
metacognitive accuracy and no significant relationship was found between metacognitive 
accuracy and GM volume. In relation to the structure of the metacognitive system, no 
relationship was found between perceptual metacognitive accuracy and synthetic 
metacognitive knowledge (MAI and BCIS). No relationship was found between 
medication and measures of metacognition. 
The first finding is novel and confirms the deficits observed in metacognition in other 
studies. Köther et al., (2012) found a similar effect in overconfidence in relation to 
incorrect decisions on a social cognition task compared to controls and Warman, Lysaker, 
& Martin, (2007) found less self-reflectivity and increased certainty in patients versus 
control participants. Cartwright-Hatton and Wells (1997) found differences in patients 
compared to controls for a metacognition questionnaire relating to worry and, in another 
questionnaire design, Bacon, Huet, and Danion, (2011) found patients to have less 
awareness of their mental state than controls. Importantly, whilst the above measures 
relate to social cognitive insight, this study experimentally demonstrates metacognitive 
deficits in FEP in perceptual decision-making.  
In relation to the neural underpinnings of metacognition, Fleming et al., (2010) found an 
association between metacognitive accuracy and the BA10 and precuneus regions. The 
present study failed to replicate Fleming et al.,'s (2010) findings. The present study 
included both control and FEP patients whereas the original authors only investigated 
members of the general population which may account for the failure to replicate the 
original authors’ findings. Furthermore the present study also controlled for age in 
analysis due to subsequent research implicating this as a factor in metacognitive 
accuracy which the original did not. This may account for the disparity in results. Other 
papers have failed to find a relationship between cortical thickness and task performance 
instead suggesting that task performance and cognitive function is more related to white-
matter function (Ziegler et al., 2010). The relationship between function and structure 
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may be more complicated than merely differences in straightforward GM volume and 
may be more related to white-matter integrity which Fleming et al., (2010) also found. 
The GM volume group differences appear in line with other VBM studies (Watson et al., 
2012; Buchy et al., 2015) however in an attenuated form. The present findings generally 
relate to the right hemisphere rather than bilaterally which may indicate a specific deficit 
in cortical symmetry as found in Kawasaki et al., (2008). The lower GM volume in the 
superior medial gyrus in the present study is an interesting finding; Lesion studies have 
found a deficit in this region compared to controls and a relationship with inhibitory control 
(Aron, Robbins, & Poldrack, 2004). This may account for the suggestion that people with 
FEP struggle to inhibit competing cognitive responses and the process of excessive or 
hypermentalization observed in schizophrenia (Schimansky, David, Rössler, & Haker, 
2010) which impacts on sense of agency. Other studies have implicated middle occipital 
regions in attention shifting (Kim et al., 1999) which may be involved in attentional deficits 
observed in schizophrenia (Shakeel & Docherty, 2012). However further investigation 
revealed that the deficits were more severe on the left, not right hemisphere.  
There could, however, be a number of reasons behind the less pronounced cortical 
differences found compared to other existing studies: the healthy controls to whom the 
FEP sample was compared were a better match in terms of education level and 
demographic information and half the FEP sample were not exposed to antipsychotic 
medication. Previous studies, such as Smith et al., (2015), have failed to match on 
education level or studied long-term populations (Douaud et al., 2007). The more severe 
deficits reported elsewhere could be attributed to these factors rather than FEP status 
alone. Other studies appear to have recruited those with mean level IQs which are not 
typical for the cohort and may also be a factor. The causal factor in GM atrophy post 
illness may have a multifaceted aetiology which includes illness trajectory, symptoms, 
changes in IQ and access to treatments. Mental health care provision varies country-to-
country and, even within Early Intervention in Psychosis services in the UK, there is some 
heterogeneity in acceptance criteria for caseload. The surrounding location of the 
present study was a city with two large university campuses so the patient sample may 
contain a higher than typical concentration of those with higher IQs and different 
sociodemographic details. The mean level of education in the present sample was higher 
than other studies (Rosa et al., 2015) which may also explain the attenuated structural 
deterioration despite every precaution being made to find matched controls. Future 
studies may wish to control for both years of education and take a measure of IQ.  
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4.4.1 Limitations 
Finally, whilst the present study recruited those from FEP and medication information 
was taken, inclusion in analysis would have been difficult to do due to the group 
comparison. Medication dose was investigated in relation to metacognitive accuracy and 
no significant relationship was noted suggesting that metacognitive dysfunction in FEP 
is not attributable to medication alone. None of the controls were on medication so an 
analysis would have been reflective of group membership rather than impact of 
medication. The present study employed a 1.5T scanner, if the scan had occurred in a 
more powerful 3T MRI scanner, it may have picked up more subtle group differences 
and more accurate GM volume readings. Finally power may have been lower than ideal. 
Fusar-Poli et al., (2014) suggest that detecting group differences increases with sample 
size in VBM investigations; recruitment of more participants may have revealed more 
pronounced group differences.  
Participants in the study completed the behavioural task after they had been through a 
long MRI scan. As the study also recruited FEP participants, in order to minimise the 
potential distress caused the number of trials completed in the perceptual task was 
reduced from Fleming’s original study to 200. This is considered the lower end of the 
number required to obtain an accurate reading however the present study’s mean 
performance is lower than in other studies employing a similar design. Whilst this could 
be due to a clinical population, the matched controls were also lower which could be an 
artefact of the reduced number of trials. This may have impacted on the GM investigation. 
However as both comparison groups completed the same task, this should not have 
affected the group comparison analysis in which a significant difference was observed. 
The nature of research may also be inhibitory in capturing the true manifestation of 
psychosis. Recruitment into studies is dependent on social circumstance, living 
conditions and current level of recovery. Most patients recruited into studies may be at 
the higher end of the functioning and social spectrum which may impact on getting a true 
reflection of psychosis. The present study additionally was a cross-sectional design; 
ideally the pattern of deterioration assessed longitudinally, rather than a one-off cross-
sectional scan may be of greater value. Comparing how metacognitive accuracy 
changes with deterioration in structural volume may offer better insights into the 
relationship between the two. Whilst the task would need to be validated for practice 
effects, tracking metacognitive accuracy with structural changes may offer a richer 
insight into the neural basis of metacognition so future studies may wish to consider a 
longitudinal design. Incorporating functional outcome measures would also allow for 
inspection of the relationship between metacognition, GM volume and functioning in the 
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community. The impact that neural deterioration has on actual real-world outcome, as 
well as on a cognitive task, would offer valuable information as to the impact of 
metacognitive and structural profiles in schizophrenia. Metacognition may function for 
example as a protective factor in maintaining independence in the community and 
compensating for cognitive deficits and cortical atrophy. 
4.4.2 Implications  
The metacognitive system may be a cluster of related but distinct individual processing 
routes; the finding that metacognitive accuracy does not significantly associate with other 
forms of metacognition can be explained through the Nelson and Narens (1990) model. 
Metacognition may function on both higher-order and lower-order levels and perceptual 
metacognitive accuracy is performed at a lower-order section of an overall metacognitive 
system. Metacognitive dysfunction in FEP may be impacted by deficits in different 
processing routes and these routes may offer unique contributions accounting for 
functional disability in both FEP and chronic schizophrenia. The fact that these lower-
order metacognitive deficits are present at first episode suggests they may play a causal 
role in the development of schizophrenia. 
4.4.3 Conclusions 
In conclusion, the present study offers new insights into the structural differences at early 
stages of illness and into metacognitive deficits in schizophrenia. The profile of GM 
volume deficits in FEP appears less linear and more subtle than in other studies and the 
nature of GM atrophy in psychosis is likely not a definitive trajectory. The metacognitive 
deficits, which the present study demonstrates are present, were not explained through 
structural difference as previous work suggests. How these differences interact with 
community function would be a useful next step as the real-life social cost of psychosis 
should be of the upmost importance to researchers adopting an anatomical approach.  
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Chapter 5: General discussion 
 
5.1 Summary of chapters 
Reduced social function is a core feature of psychotic disorder and part of the diagnostic 
criteria for schizophrenia. Social impairment has been observed in prodromal (Cornblatt 
et al., 2007) and FEP samples (Hodgekins et al., 2015) compared to control participants. 
The development and trajectory of dysfunction post-treatment can be impacted by a 
range of factors; investigation in FEP is critical to understanding the underlying factors 
which lead to longer-term disability (Bratlien et al., 2013) and the causes of schizophrenia 
(Lin et al., 2013). Previous evidence implicates neurocognitive impairment (Green et al., 
2000), negative symptoms (Ventura et al., 2009) and metacognition (Lysaker, Mccormick, 
et al., 2011) in accounting for this disability. The extent to which metacognition mediates 
the relationship between neurocognition and functioning, and whether this relationship 
is present at early stages of illness remains unexplained. In addition, the extent that 
different measurements of metacognition relate to each other also has not been explored 
in research. How different aspects of functional capacity and the extent to which the 
individual actually engages in community activities interact with each other, and with 
neurocognitive and metacognitive dysfunction has also not been addressed sufficiently. 
Understanding the predictors of capacity and real-world function is important to recovery 
in psychosis and ensuring that treatment pathways are targeting ‘the right stuff’. 
5.1 Integrated overview of chapter findings 
Chapter one identified that a relationship between neurocognition and functional 
outcome has been well documented in experimental research however the extent to 
which variance in outcome has been accounted for is limited. Metacognition has been 
suggested as a mediating variable and some work has begun to assess this possibility 
(e.g. Lysaker et al., 2010). Metacognition as a concept has developed from a host of 
disciplines with different measurement strategies suggested as capturing the ability and 
Nelson and Narens (1990) provides a model for how meta and object-related processing 
avenues interact with each other. The chapter ends with a conceptual model being 
suggested as to how metacognition may mediate the relationship between 
neurocognition and different aspects of functional outcome. The different measurements 
of metacognition may be accounted for in the Nelson and Narens (1990) model and 
relate to higher and lower-order abilities that may be impacted in those with a diagnosis 
of schizophrenia. 
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Chapter two demonstrated through a meta-analytic technique that a relationship exists 
across studies between neurocognition and metacognition, and also between 
metacognition and functional outcome. Small to moderate effect sizes were found across 
different cognitive domains and a moderate effect size was found between cognition and 
metacognition, and metacognition and functional outcome. The papers reviewed 
suggested that more work is needed at an earlier point of illness and across multiple 
measures of both neurocognition and functional outcome. Papers also suggested that 
how different measurements of metacognition relate to each other also required 
clarification. 
Chapter three addresses these aforementioned points. A factor analysis suggests that 
from the measures selected, the construct of metacognition is most stably captured by 
synthetic metacognition and the self-reflectivity component of cognitive insight. Objective 
function was also significantly associated with functional capacity suggesting some 
shared skill in both domains. It is possible that the capacity to complete daily tasks is a 
pre-requisite to actually performing these skills in real-life but not a guarantee that this 
will happen successfully. The mediation analysis confirmed that metacognition does 
mediate the relationship between neurocognition and both functional capacity and 
objective function. This relationship is not attributable to negative symptoms as both of 
these models withstood the inclusion of negative symptoms as a covariate and the 
direction of the relationship is maintained by the non-significant reverse models tested. 
Negative symptoms, in addition to metacognition, were found to also mediate the 
relationship between neurocognition and functional capacity but not objective function 
which is an unexpected but interesting finding. This suggests that metacognition offers 
a unique account separate from negative symptoms for the relationship between 
neurocognition and objective function. Services should therefore focus on assisting with 
metacognitive skills rather than symptoms in order to assist return to function in the real-
world.  
Chapter 3 also found that, when metacognition was included as a mediating variable 
between functional capacity and objective function, there was no longer a significant 
direct pathway between capacity and objective function. This is an important finding as 
this suggests that the relationship between functional capacity and objective function is 
accounted for through metacognition. In order to assist those with FEP translating 
functional capacity skills into the real-world, metacognition should be targeted by 
services. However these suggestions have to be made with the low power of the study 
in mind; a larger sample may have revealed a relationship with negative symptoms too. 
The final model is available in figure 33 below.
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5.2 Final study model 
Figure 33 Final mediation model 
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Chapter three also contains another interesting finding; the mean neurocognitive 
impairment in the present study was -.86. Meta-analytic investigations of cognitive 
impairment (e.g. Mesholam-Gately et al., 2009) found mean neurocognitive deficits of 
-.91 across studies suggesting a similar level of function between the present study and 
other known assessments. Likewise, the present study found similar amounts of time 
spent in structured activity to those found in the large EDEN project (24.97 compared to 
25.17) (Hodgekins et al., 2015). This suggests that deficits in both domains are pervasive 
across studies and are defining features of early stage illness. 
Chapter four addressed the lower-order aspect of metacognitive experience documented 
in the Nelson and Narens (1990) model and how metacognitive accuracy relates to GM 
volume through an MRI investigation. The study demonstrates that FEP performed 
significantly worse than matched healthy controls on the perceptual metacognitive 
accuracy task and that the FEP had GM volume deficits in frontal regions associated 
with higher-order thought. An interaction between metacognitive accuracy and GM 
volume was not found however suggesting that the relationship between cognitive 
performance and neural decline is more complicated than GM architecture alone or that 
similar effects are found in both FEP and controls. Surprisingly, a negative trend level 
relationship was found between better metacognitive accuracy and lower GM volume. 
This is difficult to interpret however and may suggest that the relationship between 
cognitive performance and GM volume is not a straightforward one thus other factors 
may account for this relationship. Finally, participant scores on a metacognitive accuracy 
task did not associate with either cognitive insight or synthetic metacognition suggesting 
that a separate, lower-order processing pathway may exist as part of the same system 
described in chapter one. These claims have to be made with power in mind again; only 
30 of the FEP sample managed to complete all measures, a larger sample may offer a 
different conclusion. How generalizable metacognitive accuracy is across tasks would 
also benefit from further investigation; Palmer et al. (2014) found no significant 
relationship between metacognitive efficiency on a memory and perceptual task. This 
suggests that how models of lower-order metacognitive accuracy, and upon what 
information these decisions are made, needs further clarification in research. 
5.3 Clinical implications 
Functional outcome is a multifaceted concept not easily captured in research. The 
present study suggests that the ability that an individual has to complete tasks required 
to function successfully in the community does not have a direct relationship with actually 
having an active, structured life across domains of occupation and social indices. There 
exists a related but conceptually distinct pathway to objective function that involves 
141 
 
recovering the cognitive skills that underpin function but also the higher-order knowledge 
of one’s own cognition that allows these skills to be integrated into real-life. 
Neurocognition was directly predictive of functional capacity but not objective functioning 
in the pathway models suggesting that having the raw cognitive skills is not enough in 
itself to maintain real-world function. Rather, metacognitive skills are associated with 
integrating these cognitive abilities into both the ability to complete daily tasks (model 1) 
and importantly to transfer these capacity skills into the real-world (model 3). 
The present study investigated metacognition in relation to functional outcome in FEP. 
Whilst the direction of the relationship was considered through reverse model testing, it 
is possible that functioning may also have a reciprocal impact on metacognition. Frith 
(2012) discusses the role of metacognition in human social interactions and suggests 
that the knowledge we possess into our own actions and perceptions is improved through 
social interactions and discussion with others. Social interactions and functional activity 
can impart knowledge into our own cognitive processes and therefore build more 
accurate accounts of the world and ourselves (Frith, 2012). Thus, whilst metacognitive 
dysfunction may inhibit social and occupational interaction, the lack of interaction may 
also then feedback into poorer insight into our own cognitive worlds. Greenwood et al., 
(2005) also report this relationship and suggest that our cognitive and functional skills 
may be improved by increased functional activity. Thus the more we use these cognitive 
and functional skills through use in daily life, the better they become. The number of 
hours spent in structured activity was very low on average for the FEP participants (<25 
hours per week) compared to a non-clinical matched sample (63 hours). The lack of 
exposure to social and occupational interactions may function to exacerbate existing 
metacognitive deficits in a cyclical fashion. 
The role of metacognition in remediation is also highlighted by the present study. 
Metacognitive awareness and learning encoding skills may assist both recovery and the 
success of cognitive remediation initiatives. Whilst the efficacy of MCT has received 
mixed reviews, this may be due to the treatment outcome measures used. The presented 
work assessed MCT success on symptoms remission scores however the same analysis 
with measures of function may provide different results. Integrating metacognitive ability 
into traditional CBT and remediation programs may assist adoption of these skills in the 
real-world. Other authors have begun to suggest the value of such approaches (e.g. 
Cella, Reeder, & Wykes, 2015) and the present study offers support to these notions. 
The current research extends the literature by extending this relationship to FEP. By 
targeting these skills in FEP skills that promote better functioning can be developed prior 
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to longer-term disability. The idea of a critical period in which to ameliorate the course of 
illness in psychosis is not new (Birchwood, Todd & Jackson, 1998). By offering 
interventions targeting the skills associated with improved psychosocial function, this 
would address the costs to both the individual and society relating to chronic illness. 
Improving the skills required to complete everyday tasks (or capacity) may not be enough 
to ensure actual real-world (objective function) improvements however  without 
addressing metacognition. 
Clinically speaking, the present study confirms the lack of a clear relationship between 
total and positive symptoms, and outcome. Negative symptoms were seen to be 
important in the relationship between neurocognition and functional capacity but not 
objective function. More importantly, the overall models were still significant when 
controlling for symptoms in analysis as predictors of both metacognition and function. 
This confirms that metacognition offers a unique contribution to functional recovery that 
cannot be attributed to psychopathology. 
5.4 Implications on metacognition 
Metacognitive Assessment Interview 
The current research offers new information on how different measurements of 
metacognition relate to each other.  Firstly, the original authors of the MAI suggest two 
separate domains of metacognition (knowledge of one’s own mind and the other) and 
the MAS suggests there to be three (knowledge of own mind, mind of the other and 
mastery). The present factor analysis however suggests a high correlation between 
knowledge of one’s own mind and the mind of other’s. This could be due to a relatively 
small sample for factor analysis (see section 3.5 for further comment on sample size) or 
the fragmentation of processes may have not manifest at early stages of illness such as 
FEP. The early deterioration rather could be a global one in metacognitive capacity 
however further investigation would be required before this claim could be substantiated. 
The domain specific deficits reported elsewhere may develop with chronicity.  
Relationship between the MAI, cognitive insight and perceptual 
metacognitive accuracy 
The aspects of metacognition captured in the MAI and BCIS have a clear relationship 
that can be considered through Nelson and Narens (1990) model as high-order, 
declarable metacognitive knowledge. The moment-to-moment retrospective 
metacognitive accuracy judgements (meta-d’) may relate to metacognitive feelings or 
intuition and fall under implicit or lower-order judgements of a specific object-level task. 
Exactly what these trial-by-trial judgements are based on is hard to stipulate. Both forms 
of metacognition are accounted for in the model however and may rely on separable 
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processing routes which would explain the lack of relationship found. Whilst both may be 
important in functioning, they may relate differently to individual domains; metacognitive 
accuracy may account for error monitoring of object-level processes whereas higher-
order knowledge-based awareness may govern overall strategy choice and the complex 
synthesis of contextual and personal information. The present research suggests that 
synthetic metacognition and cognitive insight are considered metacognitive knowledge 
based processes whereas perceptual metacognitive judgements may fit better as 
metacognitive experiences. Deficits in implicit metacognition may account for other 
reported deficits in clinical research such as JTC bias. An overconfidence in cognitive 
products based on inaccurate intuition may have a knock-on effect leading to erroneous 
conclusions, and causal relationships being assumed with little evidence. This may 
underpin symptoms such as delusions and paranoia. 
Metacognitive knowledge based decisions require deliberate consideration of higher-
order thought; presumably, in order to conduct inspection of synthetic metacognition 
(MAI), one must first possess and be willing to use general self-reflection skills (BCIS). 
Perceptual metacognitive judgements only require a degree of accurate self-certainty to 
be aware when one may have been inaccurate rather than the reflective skills to consider 
specific cognitive products. The self-certainty subscale was not found to adequately load 
on the metacognitive factor produced in chapter three.  This suggests that self-certainty 
may reflect an entirely different processing route and future studies may wish to 
investigate this in relation to function in itself. 
Whilst perceptual metacognitive judgements were assessed in chapter four, how 
metacognitive judgements across different cognitive (or object level) tasks relate to each 
other was not addressed in the present thesis. Palmer, David, and Fleming (2014) found 
significantly different performance levels between perceptual and memory metacognitive 
judgements in a general population sample suggesting that metacognitive substrates 
may exist. A profile similar to cognitive abilities within psychosis may exist where 
individual’s may demonstrate better and worse ability across different domains and this 
would relate to functioning in different ways. 
Finally, the original authors suggest that the MAI detects ability in two domains of 
metacognitive knowledge; awareness of our own mind and the mind of others (Semerari 
et a., 2003; Semerari et al., 2012). The present study however failed to find evidence of 
a separate underlying structure but rather that both substructures were reflective of an 
overall metacognitive system. If there is a separable mind of other processing system 
how this relates to social cognition and ToM would also be valuable to establish. Social 
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cognition and metacognition have been found to load onto separate factors in previous 
research (Lysaker et al., 2013) however their relationship to each other in FEP needs 
clarification. The extent to which impairment can be present in one but not the other 
system would reveal insight into how knowledge of our own minds and others interact. 
Also, the relationship between how we conceptualise the perspective of other people 
and awareness of our own mental states may be determinant of our social and 
occupational functioning. If research could delineate the relationship between each 
metacognitive ability and remediation programmes focus on specific deficits, this may 
optimise returning to functioning after illness. 
5.5 Research implications 
Understanding the different components of metacognition and how they relate is 
important for real-world functioning. MCT teaches metacognitive awareness of cognitive 
biases (Aghotor, Pfueller, Moritz, Weisbrod, & Roesch-Ely, 2010) and assists the 
identification of errant cognition through higher-order awareness. Whilst a recent review 
found mixed findings for the success of MCT (van Oosterhout et al., 2015), the main 
index of efficacy was positive and general symptoms reduction rather than functional 
recovery. The present study suggests that metacognition is a larger determinant of 
community function than symptoms and may assist with this domain rather than 
symptom reduction alone. By improving metacognitive knowledge, a knock on effect may 
occur with lower-order metacognitive accuracy and assist outcome in multiple ways. 
More caution may be applied to intuitive judgements and more conservative strategies 
employed to confidence-based judgements leading to error reduction in decision making. 
Whilst previous reviews find mixed evidence for MCT efficacy, a re-evaluation looking at 
impact on functional skills rather than psychopathology may offer different and important 
conclusions. 
Chapter four failed to find a relationship between GM volume and metacognitive 
accuracy or an interaction effect between GM volume and metacognitive accuracy 
between groups. This is particularly surprising in light of Fleming et al., (2010) suggesting 
that reduced volume in the BA10 was associated with worse metacognitive accuracy. 
Subsequent studies have demonstrated an effect of age on metacognitive accuracy 
(Palmer, Dawes, & Heaton, 2009) which was controlled for in the present study but not 
Fleming’s. This may account for the disparity in results. GM deterioration has been 
associated with chronicity of illness and worse psychopathology (Rosa et al., 2015) 
however the present study suggests that the relationship is less clear cut than previously 
thought. The interaction between IQ, GM volume and function may be of more 
importance than just GM volume alone. The results have to be considered with the 
145 
 
imbalance of FEP (N=32) versus control (N=19) participants and a more balanced design 
would have had greater power and sensitivity to detect effects. Also, as subjects were 
matched on years of education rather than raw IQ, this may have addressed 
sociodemographic disparities between patient and control participants.  Those at 
university are found to have come from higher sociodemographic backgrounds (James, 
2007) so by matching control and FEP participants on years of education this may have 
addressed sociodemographic status as well. This may underpin the more widespread 
differences found in previous structural investigations due to the groups being more 
discrepant on IQ and education. 
Future studies may also wish to investigate the relationship between neural structure 
and functional outcome. Guo et al., (2015) report that less progressive brain volume loss 
in chronic schizophrenia is associated with preserved social and occupational 
functioning however a causal relationship is difficult to establish due to medication 
exposure and time spent in hospital. Likewise, Allen et al., (2015) investigated the 
neurobiological underpinning of functional outcome in a UHR population and found that 
‘good’ or ‘poor’ functioning at 18 month follow-up was predicted by cortical and 
subcortical function and lower prefrontal-striatal activation. By investigating the 
neurobiological underpinnings of functioning at first point of illness a greater 
understanding could be gained into the onset of cortical deterioration in schizophrenia 
and its relationship to social disability. Whether functional disability is a result of cortical 
decline or whether a symbiotic relationship exists is not known and would be of value to 
know. 
5.6 Limitations of empirical chapters 
Sample size 
One drawback of the analysis in chapter three was the number of participants entered 
into the factor analysis and pathway models. The factor analysis had to be broken into 
separate analyses between metacognition and neurocognition; demonstrating the 
distinction of individual scales to cognitive and metacognitive components by entering 
them simultaneously into a factor analytic technique would reveal more about how they 
relate to each other. An analysis with a higher number of participants may offer more 
information on the clarity with which component items comprise metacognition and 
neurocognition. The pathway models also had to be broken down into smaller 
components to allow the detection of meaningful effects whilst maintaining a sufficient 
case-to parameter ratio (Bentler & Chou, 1987). Increased power would have allowed 
the model to have run as a measurement model allowing more sophisticated effect 
detection (Fritz & MacKinnon, 2007). A larger sample would also have allowed items 
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rather than subscales to have been entered into both cognitive and functional capacity 
factor analyses offering more subtlety of investigation. 
Omitted variables 
Due to the relatively small sample size, sociodemographic information could not also be 
entered into the models in addition to metacognition and psychopathology. Some authors 
suggest that sociodemographic factors are predictive of social opportunity, recovery 
post-illness (O’Connor et al., 2013) and defeatist beliefs (Grant & Beck, 2009) however 
decisions had to be made to focus on negative symptoms and metacognition as the most 
important predictors of functioning based on available evidence. 
Measuring functional outcome 
The current research, based on known evidence identified in chapter one, decided to 
measure both functional capacity and objective functioning due to their validity and 
reliability statistics (Cardenas et al., 2012; Hodgekins et al., 2015) and ability to be 
compared with other both clinical and non-clinical samples. However the subjective 
sense of recovery and functioning was not assessed due to reliability studies (McKibbin, 
Brekke, Sires, Jeste, & Patterson, 2004) suggesting concerns over the comparability of 
self-report and subjective sense of recovery indices. The recovery models of psychosis 
suggest this as a primary target of mental health services and the relationship between 
metacognition and a subjective sense of inclusion in society and recovery would have 
been interesting to ascertain. Whether better metacognition allows for more accurate 
self-assessments of recovery may be important to know. Future studies may want to 
investigate this measure of functioning in relation to other measures of functional 
outcome as well in FEP. 
The Time Use Survey relies on self-report data which, as discussed in chapter one 
(section 1.7), can be problematic (Bowie et al., 2007). Whilst the questions asked remain 
concrete (i.e. how many hours spent in employment/education/social situations) they 
assume a level of accuracy in recall. Sabbag et al., (2012) suggest that accurate self-
reporting of function is associated with improved neurocognitive ability thus there is a 
possibility that the increased objective function is due to more accurate reporting. 
However the evidence suggests that poor neurocognitive function is associated with 
overestimation rather than underestimation of functioning so this possibility is unlikely to 
be responsible for the effects demonstrated. Also, functional capacity is not influenced 
by self-report bias (Sabbag et al., 2012) so the mediation effect of metacognition 
between neurocognition and functional capacity would not be victim to such confounding 
variables. 
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Design  
The present research was cross-sectional in nature which restricts the conclusions which 
can be drawn in terms of causal direction. Whilst reverse model testing allows a greater 
degree of inference about the direction of effects, how neurocognitive impairment 
predicts function through metacognition over time would be more valuable to know. By 
looking at changes across time points latent growth curve modelling could be applied to 
look at the interaction of variables across recovery. Capturing outcomes of psychosis 
would be best served by up to 10 year follow-ups which has been investigated through 
cognitive trajectories (Hoff et al., 2005). The true impact of metacognition after initial 
symptoms have subsided would allow interventions to target the most important deficits 
that relate to disability. However, higher-order metacognitive knowledge seems likely to 
constitute one such target. 
Some evidence suggests that DUP has an impact on social disability (Bratlien et al., 
2013). Whilst the current study attempted to recruit participants at first point of contact 
with clinical services, DUP information was not included in analysis. Studies suggest a 
present but weak effect of DUP on neurocognitive and functional outcome (Faber et al., 
2011) and some participants would have had greater access to therapy due to differing 
gaps between entry into care teams and recruitment to the study which may underpin 
findings. Ideally all participants would be recruited at first point and DUP information 
would be taken for inclusion in analysis however this is victim to capacity to take part in 
research. Many of those first into services are too unwell to participate in research 
studies so this particular issue is difficult to address. 
5.7 Conclusions 
The main implications of this thesis are that metacognitive processes may be part of an 
overall system but are distinct from each other. They can be accounted for through 
Nelson and Narens (1990) higher–order metacognitive knowledge and lower-order 
metacognitive experience pathways and the present study suggests they may relate to 
functioning independently from each other. This thesis also extends the previous 
understanding of the role of metacognition in bridging the gap between neurocognition 
and functional outcome and demonstrates this at early stages of illness. In addition, 
negative symptoms may impact on functional capacity uniquely. 
The relationship between metacognition and functional outcome is an important one as 
Early Intervention in Psychosis services place community recovery as a primary 
objective of their care pathway. By understanding more of the mechanisms that underpin 
social disability, teams can offer treatment initiatives that target important determinants 
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of longer-term functioning. Metacognitive skills can be integrated into traditional cognitive 
remediation and vocational rehab programs in a ‘two-pronged’ approach to equipping 
those experiencing their first episode of psychosis with the skills required to function in 
the real-world. Social disability and neurocognitive impairment are unfortunately core 
features of psychosis and schizophrenia as demonstrated in chapter three however by 
understanding the relationship between them, clinicians on the frontline can target the 
right skills. More refinement of this relationship is required across longitudinal designs 
before this can be brought to the policy makers of contemporary mental health services.   
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Appendix C: Beck Cognitive Insight Scale  
 
Do not 
agree at all 
Agree 
slightly 
Agree a lot Agree 
completely 
At times, I have misunderstood other people’s 
attitudes towards me. 
    
My interpretations of my experiences are 
definitely right. 
    
Other people can understand the cause of my 
unusual experiences better than I can 
    
I have jumped to conclusions too fast 
    
Some of my experiences that have seemed very 
real may have been due to my imagination 
    
Some of the ideas I was certain were true turned 
out to be false 
    
If something feels right, it means that it is right 
    
Even though I feel strongly that I am right, I 
could be wrong 
    
I know better than anyone else what my 
problems are. 
    
When people disagree with me, they are 
generally wrong 
    
I cannot trust other people’s opinion about my 
experiences 
    
If somebody points out that my beliefs are 
wrong, I am willing to consider it 
    
I can trust my own judgement at all times 
    
There is often more than one explanation for 
why people act the way they do 
    
My unusual experiences may be due to my being 
upset or stressed 
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Appendix D: Metacognition Assessment Interview 
INSTRUCTIONS: 
"Dear Mr. / Madam, I am Geoff ...., I thank you for agreeing to do this interview created with 
the aim of a better understanding of the way people think. 
The purpose of this interview is not to give any diagnosis, nor to perform a therapeutic 
intervention, but to look at your “way of being” in the relationships with others. We think 
that this psychological element is very important to better understand the relevant clinical 
questions.  
You will be asked a series of questions about a recent episode in your relational life that was 
important to you. We apologize if, in some occasions, the questions may seem repetitive or 
obvious. These repetitions are useful for evaluating your way of relating to others. We 
consider important that you keep in mind that in this test there are no right or wrong 
answers, and there are not any better or worse performances from your part. 
QUESTION: 
"Can you tell me, what -  from a psychological point of view -was the worst event or 
interpersonal situation, that you had to face in the last 6 months?" Possibly a relationship 
episode, that means an episode that involved another person and it was meaningful to you on 
a psychological level. 
1) Regarding the episode just described, how were you feeling? 
2) What emotions did you experience? 
3) What was the origin of these emotions? 
4) What were your thoughts? 
5) What was the cause of these thoughts? 
6) What did you do? What behavioural choice did you make? 
7) What motivated you to behave in a certain way? 
8) So, trying to sum up the episode that just told me, you felt this ... thought this... and 
reacted by... What was your aim at that time? 
9) What did you want most? What made you feel afraid in that situation? 
10) So, you told me you were feeling (refers back to described emotions). 
When did your state of mood change?  
11) How did it change? 
12) What, in your opinion, caused it to change? 
13) You told me you were thinking .. (the interviewer refers to the episode recounted). 
How deeply did you believe, in that moment, that .. (reported thinking)? 
14) On a scale of one to ten how much did you believe this to be true? 
15)  Do you think it was possible to have a different interpretation of the facts?  
16a) If yes: which kind of interpretation? 
17a) If yes: What has changed? 
18a) If yes: What encouraged this change? 
19) Looking back now, is there something that has changed your point of view compared 
to 6 months ago? 
16b) If no: Do you think that, in future, that your point of view on what has happened may 
change? 
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17b) If not: What could help you to revise your point of view on what has happened? 
20) During the episode described, did you feel like you were in a state of confusion as if in 
a dream or had a sense of not being in reality like the event was only imagined?  
21) Have you ever had an experience that felt a sense of confusion, like being in a dream 
or fog like state? 
21a) If yes: Did it happen to enable you to immerse yourself in a fantasy such as to lose all 
sense of time and the relationship with the real world? 
21b) If yes: Have you ever experienced very vivid memories or images that felt as if they 
were really happening at that time? Can you give me some examples? 
21c) If yes: are you feeling the same confusion now? 
22) So, did you ever have such reactions (points out the described behaviour), to 
experience this kind of emotions…….or……? Do you often feel/think/experience/behave in 
these ways? 
23a) If yes:How do you explain your typical reaction? 
24a) Have you ever experienced a different reaction, (different emotions and thoughts) 
facing similar events? Can you remember and try to describe some episodes? 
25a) So, sometimes you react  ____ (first example interviewer  here summarizes the 
typical state of the subject, using terminology more close as possible to that of the 
interviewee), while other times  your reaction is____ (episode two_ the interviewer 
summarizes here the new story obtained through questioning). What according to you 
dictates which reaction occurs? 
26a) Why, in your opinion, did you react in the first way? 
Why, in your opinion, did you react in the second way? 
23b) If not, can you remember your typical reaction facing difficult situations? 
24b) If yes, How did you react in that moment? Which were your emotions in that 
circumstances? What about your thoughts? 
23c) If not, repeat questions  
27) You told me that ….(name the protagonist of the story) had a significant role in this 
story. I would like you to take his/her point of view. In your opinion, how did the other 
person emotionally perceive the situation?  
28) What emotions did he/she feel? 
29) Why did he/she feel this kind of emotion? What did you conclude from this? 
30) What could he/she have thought? 
31) Why did he/she think this way? What reasons did he/she have? 
32) In your experience, is it typical of____ (character name) to think and feel this way? 
32a) If yes, why is this their typical way to react? 
33a) Can you make another brief example of when you tried/felt, heard and acted the 
same way? 
32b) If not, why was it different? 
